

**Naval Historical Center
Oral Interview Summary Form**

Interviewers:

CAPT(s) Michael McDaniel

Interviewer's Organization:

Navy Combat Documentation Det. 206

Interviewee:

CDR(s) Charles Capets

Current Address:

N78
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Date of Interview:

2 Nov 2001

Place of Interview:

Navy Annex

Number of Cassettes:

One

Security Classification:

Unclassified

Name of Project: Pentagon Terrorist Attack Incident

Subject Terms/Key Words: Pentagon; Terrorist Attack; 11 September 2001; triage; evacuation; lessons learned; Defense Protective Service; FBI; carnage; Navy Command Center; renovation

Abstract of Interview:

Interviewee Information:

Born in Pennsylvania, father was an insurance salesman. Went to Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Majored in social studies and criminology. Was going to go into the law profession but talked to a Navy recruiter. Went into the Navy as an Intelligence officer. Started his first tour with flying remotely piloted vehicles off of battleships, had tours with an F-14 fighter squadron at intel officer, served at the Office of Naval Intelligence, graduated post graduate school at Monterey, Calif. Currently with N78, providing current and future intelligence assessments for Director Naval Air Warfare.

Topics Discussed:

1. Had an interesting work arrangement. Main office is in 5D453 of the Pentagon where most of the people in N78 worked. Due to his job and security requirements he utilized the Navy Command Center where he has access to the highly classified LAN and access to the CNO Intelligence Plot (IP). He heard about the WTC strike, the second aircraft had just hit the second tower. As an intel officer he realized he better go find out what was going on for his boss. He went downstairs to the NCC, passed the watch floor and back to the CNOIP. His intent was to go and gather information and not to bother the watch team. He went into Intel Plot (IP) in the corner, this ended up as being an important decision since everyone who was on the watch floor was killed.

2. He saw that the President was on TV from Florida. He overheard a conversation that the Petty Officer of the Watch had received a call from the terrorism desk of the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) within the National Military Command Center. The call was informing them there was possibly of a third hijacked airplane and it was heading to the Washington DC area. All of this had really gotten his attention but he really didn't think the Pentagon was a target. As he was picking up a phone to call his office the plane hit. A tremendous explosion and simultaneously the room lost all shape and form; the room went dark, the ceiling fell down, the walls fell down, the modular furniture collapsed. It was so sudden - the shock, he fell on the floor and he did not know what hit them. The fire immediately ensued and smoke filled the room. He had one thought on his mind – get out of that space!
3. He got to the door of the office he was in but the door was blocked, at this point he thought he was going to die. He dropped to the floor, immediately started crawling to find an escape. The only illumination was from the fire. He started crawling towards the graphics dept where the main entrance was to the CNOIP. He was crawling over rubble, chains, computers, walls etc. He saw some light and saw the smoke billowing out of the hole. He went through the hole and out of space.
4. The feeling and the experience of hearing the phone conversation about the plane heading to DC the impact of the explosion was incredible. He sat down to get his wits about himself and then he began to think of helping get other people out. He was amazed that 6 of 13 people who got out of CNOIP were not hurt. Life and death was only a few feet away, one bulkhead. If that hole was not blown out of the wall in the graphics shop everyone would have been killed.
5. He helped other people who got out of the NCC. A fence in the alleyway between the new wedge and old wedge construction was locked. The locked fence was too high to climb and they could not get injured people out and people could not get in to help them. He then went towards the 5th corridor near what he thought was the CNOIP VTC area. The area was an inferno. He assessed that anyone in there were dead.
6. Some Army people who were on the second floor of the Pentagon were trapped so he helped organize others to help them. They were going to have the Army people jump and they would try to break their fall. A couple of people hung off a ledge of the second floor and dropped down to them. They then tried to find a ladder to get people down.
7. He then went back to NCC area and people there had him go to find some fire equipment to help. He went to about ten fireboxes and did not find any equipment. It had probably already been removed. Finally he found some extinguishers. He never did find any hoses or axes.
8. He was told to leave the area because another plane was incoming but they did not leave. They were ordered to leave again but they went into 5th corridor to see if they could find a back way into the NCC. They thought some people might still be in there. They called out and went it - but they got no response.
9. Finally evacuated through the 4th corridor to the center court of the Pentagon. He then left the Pentagon into south parking. He finally ended up on the road that is the Route 27 underpass that leads up to the Navy Annex.

10. He then volunteered for the working parties that were being organized. He was assigned to the "Red" triage team, what ever that was. They continued to relocate the teams several times due to alerts of inbound aircraft. Finally they ended up in the middle of the route 27.

11. During the following hours, other people who had been in the area began to come over to the side of the Pentagon he was on. Some officers who knew him asked him where he had been. He told them he had been the CNOIP area when the plane hit.

12. He went up to the Navy Annex, N2 had started a watch in the Marine Corps intel spaces. He gave them a debrief of names and what had happened. He hung around at the Navy Annex for awhile but on his way out he ran into his boss an Admiral and his aids. His boss and the others did not know what he had gone through. His boss invited him to tag along, his boss had a video teleconference with the CNO. CNO directed a 100% muster by 7:00 p.m. of all OPNAV. He helped with conducting the muster. During that evening he told some other officers and aids about being in the CNOIP spaces when the plane hit. Some of the aids then told the admirals that he had been where the plane hit. He then had to keep repeating his story to the FBI, DPS etc. Had to retell his story about 5 times.

13 After he got home after 11:00 p.m. he told his wife what happened to him. His wife was very shocked and upset. His admiral told him to take the next day off. So he took Wednesday off and he felt guilty about that. Felt weird sitting at home. Surely there was something he could do. He had no office to go to. Contractors in his Pentagon space gave them some office space in Crystal City, at Crystal Gateway. They are now in the NC spaces in Crystal City.

14. Lessons learned:

- Only one entrance into and out of the SCIF (Sensitive Compartmentive Information Facility). Egress out of any SCIF should be looked at. Have primary and secondary evacuation routes.

- Basic rescue equipment such as battle lanterns and axes should be in the workspaces, not just the out in the hallway. They needed the equipment inside the spaces due to the total destruction in the NCC spaces.

- They lost a significant amount of data on the computers. Server and data storage needs to be reviewed.

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Transcript of Interview:

Interviewee Information:

Born in Pennsylvania, father was an insurance salesman. Went to Indiana University of Pennsylvania. Majored in social studies and criminology. Was going to go into the law profession but talked to a Navy recruiter. Went into the Navy as an Intelligence officer. Started his first tour with flying remotely piloted vehicles off of battleships, had tours with an F-14 fighter squadron at intel officer, served at the Office of Naval Intelligence, graduated post graduate school at Monterey, Calif. Currently with N78, providing current and future intelligence assessments for Director Naval Air Warfare.

Topics Discussed:

Q (08:47) Chuck, walk us through—first of all tell us what office you, tell us where your office was located.

A. OK. I have a kind of interesting work arrangement in the Pentagon. My main office, or the office where I spent most of the time was up on the fifth floor, room 5D453, which is where most of the people in N78 work, or worked. However, in order for me to do my job and primarily

to get connected to the, the clas—the highly classified LAN, where I had access to most of the, most of the more sensitive because of supporting, I would have to go down to the Navy Command Center. In particular into the CNO IP, the CNO Intelligence Plot, because that's where we had CON (phonetic) activity down there. Up on my desk, my desk top up in the main space, I only had a NPRNET and SPRNET connection, which was the unclassified LAN and the secret LAN. In order to get to that high level classified LAN I'd have to go down to CNO IP.

Q. (10:03) Is there a name for that? Or is it just a -?

A. JWICS , JWICS is the LAN.

Q. OK.

A. Yes, and it's the backbone for the SCI Sensitive Compartmented Information that we needed to, that we use to make our assessments. So, the morning of September 11th upon learning of the attacks on the World Trade Center –

Q. (10:34) How'd you hear about that?

A. I was actually sitting at my desk.

Q. Up at 5D –

A. Up at 5D453.

Q. (10:41) Give us a quick rundown of 5D453.

A. 550, kind of the whole –

Q. Yes.

A. It's a big open bay, cubical type city. Probably somewhere in order of a hundred people would work in the main office. It is actually connected to the C ring as well by a corridor and on the C ring at approximately 5 Charlie 453, or we're all spun off this area.

Anyway, I sat in the sat in the, I guess it was the southwest most, most corner of that space. And I was sitting there work –

Q. (11:22) Which would be where, OK, where the plane came in?

A. Yes, exactly.

Q. (11:25) You were where? Where were you?

A. Probably the closest point that, and this will make a difference when I tell you where I went, but I was, my desk is probably at the closest point of impact to the, the point of impact of the plane will be E ring. OK. That wall. That outer most wall if you will on the D ring. But I wasn't there at the time of the attack, because when I learned of the attacks on the World Trade Center, in fact what happened was, I was sitting at my desk, and some –

Q. (11:56) Let me ask one more before you go there. The IP Plot and the Navy Command Center, kind of describe the physical layout of that.

A. OK. The Intelligence, the SCIF area within—SCIF stands for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility—the SCIF area within NCC was located in the northeastern most corner of the NCC.

Q. (12:22) So you walk in there, go up the little ramp that goes up in -

A. You make a right, You past the watch floor.

Q. OK.

A. You go to, you go down and then you, towards the outer wall of the C ring, and towards the B ring, and you would make a left and you would walk up and you enter into another secure door to get into CNO IP. That was the northernmost main post corner. I guess that's the primary location. Yes, that's right.

Anyway, one of my co-workers came up to me says, "Hey, you're not going to believe this. Come take a look at the TV." And we didn't have cable in the space up in 5D453, but they had, we were high enough where we'd get reception of the major networks on ten. So I, I saw the news coverage of the World Trade Center and the second aircraft has just flown in to it. I don't even know what the time of that was.

Q. Yes.

A. But, but what they were doing was they were loading back that video clip of that second aircraft flying into the second World Trade Center.

Q. (13:30) 9:05.

A. Right. So I, at that time, because when I first—when I saw—before I—and it had already occurred, but I had not yet seen the second aircraft fly into it –

Q. (13:43) At that time, had you heard that it was terrorism or - ?

A. No.

Q. (13:46) You just thought that a plane had –

A. At that time, I thought it was an accident. Or something like that, but when I saw the, the second one come in, I knew immediately that this was bad news. So, as an Intelligence Officer, I said, “I need to find out what’s going on here, because my boss, Admiral McCabe’s going to be asking some questions here, real shortly.

So I figured my best source of the best information available would have been CNO IP, down in the Navy Command Center. So at that time I went back to my desk, and log, finished what I was doing, whatever it was and went downstairs.

So I entered the Navy Command Center. It’s kind of ironic, I just, the folks in CNO IP, because I’m not a permanent part of the NCC, I’m more or less of a frequent visitor, had to get my badge coded, and my PIN assigned for me to gain access to the NCC and the inner door to CNO IP. Up until that day, my PIN never worked and I always had to pound on the door to get in or actually I would call CNOIP from the phone located outside the NCC and say, “Come and get me,” and to be quite honest with you, I knew they were probably busy down there and I may not have gone in if my badge wouldn’t have worked, because I probably wouldn’t have wanted to bother them to come out and let me in, because they had to leave that office. They had to come down and I could understand that they’d be busy and quite frankly they have a more current intelligence focus and mission and I had more of strategic, future mission, and—but my badge worked. (chuckle) My PIN worked for the first time. (chuckle) So I let myself in, and walked by the watch floor.

Took a quick pause to take a look at the action on the large screen displays there. People buzzing about. Didn't really recognize anyone there. I— sometimes I know some people in there and I might have stopped to talk to them, but I didn't. I went, went and proceeded directly back to CNO IP.

My badge didn't work there. PIN didn't work there, but, I didn't have far to walk, so I called up, actually, they have a, I believe they have a camera there. I'm not sure. They might have a camera on the door. They might have even buzzed me in before I even had a chance to pick up the phone. But, went back, opened the door. The Watch Officer popped his head out and said "Hey, who you here to see? We're kind of," you know, "busy right now.

I said, "I'm just come down to check out the, check out the traffic. Check out, and see what I can pick up." My intent was to go down there and pick up and gather information without bothering them, because I knew they were shoring up. As a former Watch officer I knew that, you know, it's not time for someone to, who really, it's not mission essential for me to gather this information. I was just kind of a passive mode.

But I was the only one down there, other than the permanently assigned folks in CNO IP. I was the only Liaison Officer, which was out of where I am, to be in that space. So I walked into the Watch Floor which was the second office in on the right after entering CNO IP. You have the graphic shop. I call it the graphic shop. I don't know what the official name is. You have the watch floor, second office. The third office isn't really an office it's a VTC room, and then you have adjacent to the VTC room is a VTC tech control room and adjacent to that as you walk further back into the space, is a, I call it a brief, or briefing prep area. It's the place where all the briefers hung out and prepared the briefs and then adjacent to the briefers area were the offices for the OINC and the Assistant OINC for CNO IP.

I didn't go back to see those guys. Normally I would have if there wasn't something going on, because they were friends of mine and I always see them when I go in. One of them, is a good friend, and we play soccer together and we always, you know, chew the fat when I go back there. I chose not to bother them this time and went right in to the Watch Floor. That was also an important decision, because anyone interior to the space where I—to the watch Floor, any of those people that were interior to that space that I entered, died. So—shortly after I entered.

Q. (18:39) Take one look at something for me.

A. Sure.

Q. (18:57) OK, here 481, OK, right, so this looks like the ramp like here?

A. OK.

Q. (18:59) So this looks like the ramp right here.

A. OK.

Q (18:57) As you go, I believe that's the ramp?

Q. (Another questioner) This might take –

Q. (19:03) Ok, right, so IP is located back in this corner.

A.OK.

Q. (19:09) OK. Is this the B ring? Here's the B ring. Here's the C ring?

A. Yep.

Q. (19:12) Good, OK, so IP is back in this corner. This corner right here.

A. I would say, yes, that's about right. Maybe occupying this area.

Q. OK.

A. Kind of this area back here.

Q. OK.

A. It may not be that day, I cannot, don't have the time to scan here. So, boy if you think of these, this little thing as a corridor here. If you think of that as a corridor, graphic shop is here, watch floor is here, and PC room is here, and the PC tech control is here, and the briefers prep area and what not was located here.

Q (19:48) OK.

A. The OINC's office was here and the Assistant OINC's office was here.

Q. (19:55) OK. Kind of like that.

A. So I went into Watch Floor. Shortly I walked in I found my—there's always a couple of open desks in there. An open computer on the SCI LAN. I asked if I could, you know, use that computer. Again we're not, we don't work there all the time. We're kind of visitors, so it was, "Where shall I log on? Where can I log on?"

A little after logging on, I chose a cubical that was a computer that was against that wall, that outermost wall between the C and B ring. OK? Logon and the President came on television. He

was at that elementary school; guess it was Florida, and he had given his initial comments on the, when it happened, the World Trade Center. So I listened to that. It was very brief. Couldn't have been more than a couple of minutes.

After listening to that I really wasn't even talking to the Watch Officer, or the Petty Officer of the Watch. I really didn't carry on a conversation with him. I knew they were busy. So I went back to the computer, and started to, you know get on the email, classified email. Can't recall if I'd even checked the classified internet jet. I can't really remember that that much. But while I'm sitting there I recall the Petty Officer of the Watch taking a phone call, and out of my peripheral vision, I knew that he had left the room. As I am sitting facing you, they are sitting over to my left. So I remember him leaving the office. I can't remember, but I thought also the Watch Officer was also out of the office, but I can't recall.

But when both he and the Watch Officer returned to the office, or were in the office, I then heard him tell the Watch Officer, or they had a discussion over the nature of the phone call that the Petty Officer of the Watch received just prior to leaving the office. And what that was, my understanding was that the terrorism desk up on the, in the NMJIC, the National Military Joint Intelligence Center Watch floor, which is also in the Pentagon, located within the Navy—the National Military Command Center had called the Watch Officer in CNO IP to relate to him that a third aircraft, third and I can't remember exactly the terminology, was possible or probably, but a third aircraft was inbound, hijacked aircraft was inbound Washington, DC, and that was about it.

I later learned that the Petty Officer Watch had gone to relay that information to the leadership of CNO IP, the OINC, the Assistant OINC, and the briefers who were back in that briefing prep area conducting what they call a hot wash of the morning brief to the CNO. They do a –

Q. (23:10) The normal routine.

A. The normal routine, OK. And likely preparing information based on what they knew for, to be ready to brief the ongoings of the World Trade Center attacks. But that's speculation, I really don't -

So this kind of had my attention, this very possible hijacked aircraft, inbound Washington. Not necessarily because I thought that it was going to hit the Pentagon, but just in light of what had just occurred at the World Trade Center and knowing that there is a target likely somewhere in DC that that aircraft would hit. So I thought for a moment, what I should do (chuckle) and again I'm not in a position, I don't serve in a position to be—I'm not a Watch Officer. I'm not a—I don't provide indications and warning. I'm not in that type of job, but it's something I thought that my boss would like to know, so I thought I'd make a phone call (chuckle) upstairs to relay this information.

No sooner did I pick up the phone, then did this thing hit. At first I didn't know what it was - destroyed it. It was just a tremendous explosion and simultaneously the room just lost all shape and form. Darkness fell upon the room. The ceiling fell down. The walls appeared to fall down. The modular furniture just collapsed. It was, it was so sudden that, and I think the shock, you know, I'm now on the floor and I just, and I don't know what just hit us. Because it was, it happened in a, what I felt was an instant, a second.

But immediately the sensation of the crash, darkness, the heat, the fire which immediately ensued, and was now in the overhead, I do remember that. The room immediately filled with smoke and now I had one thought in my mind and that was - get out of that space. It was a basic instinct of survival at that point, because I knew where I was and knew that this was a place that

had no windows. No doors, exterior doors. It was what I would consider a bad place to be trapped in whenever there's a fire. (chuckle)

Well our problems were not only the fire, but the rubble and the block. What had happened was I crawled and made my way back to the only entrance to that space that I knew of, that I used. And keep in mind that this was a new space and I hadn't been in there more than probably four or five times, maybe six. But when I got there, and I didn't even recall seeing the other two folks in the office until I got to the door. They had already reached the door and then at that point kind of collectively tried to open it, but it was already, it was obvious that it was blocked and it appeared to be blocked on the inside. You couldn't open it because, you know, the structure, the walls lost structure. The doors were no longer square. There were things in the way and we couldn't get out.

After the doors blocked, I thought, this is it. I'm going to die. I'm going to die right here and this is what it's going to feel like, and I dropped to the ground, because believe it or not, the smoke had become so thick and so, I felt toxic, because I could feel it's just burning, that, you know, I think my, my, my insti—my damage control training onboard the *Peleliu* and the rest of the training I received in the Navy as far as fire fighting, you know, kind of kicked in there, and subconsciously. And I sought the only oxygen I could find was down on the floor. You know, you learned that as a kind, that, you know, get down low, crawl out.

So I dropped to the floor. I immediately started crawling, looking for an escape. Now the others, two folks in the office, I later learned went to the, to the VTC room. And the Watch Floor of the VTC room was separated only by the desks, and the computers, kind of like a half wall if you will, but there was an entrance to the VTC room. Again an entrance off that interior corridor, that

interior corridor that I was trying to escape—that I was trying to get, get to from the door that was blocked to the Watch Floor.

They went forward and attempted to—and they told me this later. I didn't know this at the time. I really didn't really see each other too much. I saw maybe hands and things, but you know, again it was dark and the only illumination source was from the fire in the overhead, and that was mostly obscured by the smoke.

So they went apparently to the VTC room and then they later told me that that door was also blocked and the Petty Officer Watch, Petty Officer Lhuillier mentioned that he actually stuck his arm out into the opening of the space and he said he felt fire, or it was hot on the outside of that, so that wasn't an option either, apparently.

I went the other way. I started crawling back toward the—what—towards the graphics shop, but I was probably thinking I want to get, somehow get out to that door that goes, the main door to CNO IP. Keep in mind –

Q. (29:54) Not the door you went in?

A. Not the door I went in, but keep in mind, there was, there was no structure anymore.

Everything had collapsed and things, and you know, (chuckle) who knows I could have found, you know, I was thinking I want to get out towards that way, which was the door to the main entrance to the IP. As it was I was crawling back towards the graphic shop. And in fact the door, the wall between the graphic shop and CNO, the Watch Floor was collapsed. But, which was a good thing, because as I crawled back towards the graphics shop, I began to see light. And at first, and I looked up and I, you understand I'm crawling and I'm crawling through rubble, and over computers and electronic equipment and chairs and drywall and the aluminum studding that

they now use for the drywall and it was just a mess. But when I looked and saw this light, what I initially described it as was a florescent light like the one over your head. That's what it looked like. It looked like a polygon shape, or a square or something that, you know, as I look at it from the oblique, you know, a, a, a, squared off type shape like. I thought it was a florescent light and that kind of struck me as kind of odd, because everything else was dark.

Q. (31:21) Yes.

A. And there's no electricity. Well, as I crawled closer to this thing, I began to realize and I could see now smoke billowing out of this light.

Q. (31:35) This light, yes.

A. And I thought, this is a hole and I found a way out. So I called back to the others and yelled back to the others, "I found a way out! I found a way out! Follow me! Keep following my voice," you know, something to that, I can't remember my exact words. And then I continued to crawl towards the light.

Short of getting of, out to the light, I looked back, kept calling and eventually they came out, Petty Officer Lhuillier came out first.

Q. (32:03) Willard?

A. Willie—Lhuillier. L-h-u-i-l-l-i-e-r. Lhuillier.

Q. OK.

A. He came out first.

Q. Petty Officer?

A. Petty Officer, IS2 and then eventually, and then LT. Humbert came out.

Q. (32:24) Humbert

A. Humbert H-u-m-b-e-r-t.

Q. OK, Humbert.

A. I helped them get out of the space. Lhuillier, I think was, certainly could have got out on his own power anyway. He seemed to be pretty motivated to get out of there. And Humbert, I helped just pulled out. The hole was actually rather large after you cleared away the debris and I was kind of at the same time trying to push debris outside the hole and trying to get around through it. It all happened pretty quick. I can't tell you how long I was in the space. It didn't seem like more than a minute. But –

Q. (33:06) At some point where you realized that the door was not going to open, until—

A. Yes.

Q. (33:13) And you thought that was it?

A. Yes.

Q. (33:15) As soon as you got down low—

A. We couldn't have been more—we couldn't have been in there more than-

Q. And tried to crawl.

A. A couple of minutes, OK?

Q. (33:25) Yes. Can you tell me what was going through your mind, during that—?

A. Well, exhilaration once I saw the light, but I told you at the first, after with the doors locked, I told you, this was it. I mean I'm going to die right here, and I didn't really think about too much else, but, you know, I—for that split second, and then it was like panic. I got, you know, panic to get out, you know, and so first, initially—

Q. (33:56) Did things go slower -?

A. Yes, panic, transitioning to exhilaration. No, I didn't see my life pass before me. It wasn't that close—I wasn't that close to death.

Did things go in slow motion? No. I felt I was pretty pumped up, charged up on adrenaline, and that eventually got me out of there. You know it's tough, you know, the-the-the- feeling of that experience of hearing that message relayed on the phone, of hearing the nature of the message that was just relayed. The impact, the explosion, and at that, and until this time I didn't know that an aircraft hit the Pentagon. OK.

Q. (34:50) So what did you think it was?

A. I thought it was a bomb, a truck bomb parked out in that alleyway between the B and C ring. One of the things that lead me to believe, is later on as I got out in the alleyway, shortly after I got out in the alleyway and I was dazed, and I was confused, and choking and didn't know what happened. You know, it's like a war zone. I'm looking down around. There's other people dazed,

confused, choking, you know. It just completely something that you never prepare for and that you can't, that has never been replicated in any type of damage control drill, or anything like that. But what I saw, an alleyway, was what I thought I saw, was a windshield, that was still intact, but shattered. You know, a safety windshield. And I thought, well this is a truck bomb, because, you know, here is a part of the truck, or a car bomb or something, and you know, they drive trucks and cars back in between those, those alleys as we call them.

It wasn't later until I got my wits about me, that was just a third airplane that was hijacked and possibly inbound DC that hit us. And that came a few minutes later after I was out in the alleyway.

So, and that windshield I saw was slightly, could possibly have been then a windscreen from the aircraft, because the aircraft penetrated as far in as that alleyway between the C and B corridor.

Q. (36:25) So from phone call, the phone call to report the actual –

A. Impact.

Q. Impact, and then -

A. "Til time we got out, time we got out of the alleyway, just a few minutes worth.

Q. Yes.

A. Maybe two minutes max.

Q. (36:36) So you helped the Lieutenant out.

A. Yes, so we got her out, you know, after getting out and again I kind of stumbled over to the opposite side of the alleyway there, against the B ring and kind of turned around and sat down for a second to try and get my wits about me, to see what had just happened. My next instinct was that there's other people in that space. OK? I didn't know who was in CNO IP, but I knew there were others in there. So I actually conferred with Lhuillier, Petty Office Lhuillier, and I said, "Who's in there?" He went down the list and he had rattled off seven names, which I think I documented in my statement. And, I said, "Oh, OK. Well, maybe they're still alive." (ironic chuckle). So both he and I went back into the space. Into that hole that was created in the graphics shop and crouched down low. Calling out, trying to yell out for others, you know, just in the event that they are crawling out as well, but we didn't hear anything. Just the sound of burning, you know. Lots of smoke and just screams and everything like.

So we came out, I came back out. I kind of was on my own after that. I didn't really bother to give any instruction, further instruction to the other two. I mean, I wasn't in their chain of command. I was more senior to them, but they were on their own and they were safe, and I did learn that the three folks back in the graphics shop made it out as well, because they were literally blown out of that hole that was created in the graphics shop, into the alleyway.

What's amazing in this whole thing was that six of us, six of thirteen of us that were in CNO IP that survived got out with nary a scratch, or just bruises and scratches. You know, a few cuts, but none of us required any signi—any medical attention. So literally the difference between life and death was only a few feet, a couple of bulkheads really. But not just the difference between life and death, but the difference between a fatal injury and no injury, which is amazing and perhaps a testament to the construction. I don't know. It's speculation.

What I do know is if that hole was not blow in, blow out of the wall of the graphics shop into that alleyway, that we would all have died. No question in my mind. I already felt like I was dying. I thought I was going to die at one time, and that's one thing for sure that if that hole was not there, there was no way out, and there would have been six more people dead in that attack. So call it what you will, you know divine intervention.

Q. (40:01) Sounds like it.

A. The very fact that the others said they couldn't see anything and they were pretty much feeling the same way I was about dying, and that the light was our savior there. So, maybe there's something to that. I don't know, but –

Anyway, out in the alleyway now, and there's clearly other people that need help and I believe I helped a couple of people. Injured people came out of a, further back in the NCC, there was a, I guess an emergency exit or something back there that they were, a couple taken people out of. People that got out from further back there were also helping people who might have been trapped in back of the NCC. My immediate concern was those in IP because those were what I considered my immediate co-workers even though I wasn't permanently assigned there, I considered them my colleagues. So, and I wanted to try and take care of them if I could first. Helped a couple of injured people out. There was a gate, there was a fence between—there was a fence that separated the new wedge one construction from the older wedge in that alleyway, that was locked. It was a rather high fence. That was a problem initially, because we, you know, none of us that were inside the fence could get out to include anyone that was injured that needed to get out, but we couldn't really get help either. And there was other people on the other side of the fence who were trying to get in to help, but they couldn't get in. So then that was a problem, that

locked fence, and it was too high to scale. But eventually they got that open. I don't know how, but I, when I came out of the alleyway, I told you I helped a couple of people and I went up towards, I went up further. I walked up to that alleyway towards the 5th corridor and I noticed the, there was a ladder well, which I believed at least space-wise and distance-wise was probably adjacent to the VTC room which was the space forward of the space I was in. And as I looked through that ladder well the adjacent space, which I believe to be the VTC room, was an inferno. On fire, burning, out of control, and as far as I could see the rest of those spaces, interior to that were also an inferno. I think I see that ladder well on your diagram there, looking at it. At that point, I kind of made a quick assessment that anyone that was left inside there was dead, and I shifted my attention away from those folks. I say dead or inaccessible from the location that I was in. One of those two. I didn't know, I still didn't know how the aircraft had come in or anything like that.

Q. (43:27) Right.

A. I really didn't, you know, I knew that—I figured that it was an aircraft at this point that went in, and we and got in the way, but, you know, knew nothing of the orientation. I was also thinking that the damage was a lot more widespread and severe, that I was just in a small portion of the Pentagon that was being, that was attacked. There might have been the same level of effort on going throughout the Pentagon. So I really thought, you know, everything was kind of crumbling down almost here. As it turned out, I was really at the epicenter of this.

So I went back in, back towards that where they were pulling people out of the NCC, and there people above and on the second floor some Army people hanging out the window, out a window. Four or five people, you know, windows were broken, busted out, you know. Black smoke

billowing around, you know. The only air space they had was if they stuck their head out the window and they were yelling for help.

Again, we really didn't think too much and it may not have been the smartest thing to do, but I said—I gathered, I tried to organize a couple of other people to get underneath the window and I called out to folks to jump and we would help break their fall.

Now the second floor of the Pentagon is not your ordinary second floor story like in your house. It's actually elevated, the ceilings up in the first floor are even higher than the ceilings on the second and third floor. So, but, interestingly, and luckily, there was like a ledge outside of the window, where they could step outside of the window onto the ledge and kind of hold on to that, hold it, if they were able to hold on to anything, that they could kind of slowly work themselves down. Not climb down, but they could hang there and fall less of a distance than would if they were to just take a flying leap outside the window. So we kind of instructed them to do that and caught a couple of guys and a lady. In fact, one lady fell. She was probably mid-50s or 60s. She jumped or fell before we were ready for her. She landed on top of me and kind of glanced off me and straight down. We believe she broke her leg. I know Petty Officer Lhuillier and a couple of other guys hauled her off.

By that time somebody found a ladder, so three people, or four people jump in, I can't really tell. Somebody found a ladder, maybe we could use. You know, recently the space was under construction. For the most part, it just completed construction and there was some work, there was some spaces where workers had staged equipment, toolboxes, ladders and whatnot, that the doors were actually open. Somebody pulled a ladder, a big tall wooden ladder out of there. The ladder wasn't high enough. They'd have to not only jump out the space, but then land on this

wooden platform on the top of the ladder, which was even probably more dangerous than just jumping.

So I recall an Army Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel who I don't know his name, say, "Well, we're going to do this anyway." He picked the ladder up and he put it on his shoulders.

Q. (46:48) His shoulders?

A. His shoulders, and he put the bottom rung of the ladder up on his shoulders and he braced it up like that. A couple other of us braced, tried to brace the ladder up against the wall. OK? And I can't remember if we took a guy down that way or not. I think we tried to, but that didn't seem to be working out too much.

Q. (47:08) Turn this over

A. Yes. He was determined that, you know, you know, they were, there's Army folks up there. He was an Army Lieutenant Colonel, he was—I don't know where he came from. Have no idea. But he was determined to get those people out. We were too, but then someone came along and rolled up one of those big breakout boxes, toolbox. One of those big ones, those Knack (phonetic) boxes on wheels and turned that down on its side and put the ladder up on top of that and that wasn't, and that wasn't tall enough. The guy was still up there with the ladder on his shoulders. I was now down on the deck.

I went back into the room where they found it. I found a taller wooden ladder. We have a taller ladder and I gave that to them and they looked like they had plenty of help. There was lots, there was probably ten people pitching in at this point. There were all service people, maybe DPS,

perhaps even some other construction workers chipping in. There was an all out effort to get those people out of that space.

I recognized a couple of the people from TV where they were being interviewed in hospital. I did recognize a couple of them. The female Army black Lieutenant Colonel, I recognized her. The, I think the 55 or 66 year old lady, Asian, something like that, recognized her. Never saw the, I did the guy, the Army Lieutenant Colonel who put the ladder on his shoulders later on out in the parking lot, but I never did catch his name.

After that, I then kind of said where else can I pitch in. I saw guys, again, in the back of the NCC trying to pull people out of the NCC. They said they needed fire fighting type of equipment so I took off, went to the B ring, the halls of the B ring, any open space. I was in search of fire extinguishers, axes and anything else we could use to get in, because that's what they said they needed. So I kind of took a stroll over there.

Boy, I couldn't—I must have gone to about ten fireboxes before I found any equipment. You know, either someone had taken out or it wasn't there. But I eventually found a couple more fire extinguishers. Never did find the axe. There was no hoses in any of those fire stations, because I think they were not only fire box, but I think they were fire stations, where you, you know, have a hose there.

Q. (49:44) So there should have been a hose, but there wasn't? Don't know?

A. I, my immediately thoughts were there should have been, but now I don't, you know, I can't say positively that there was actually a valve there to hook up. I can't tell.

Q. (49:57) OK.

A. It's something we can go back and look at, you know, but got a couple of fire bottles, brought them back to the scene. On the way back I kind of had more of my wits about me and I got a chance to kind of survey the damage more. Saw some pretty gruesome things in there. Body parts, just destruction, damage. It was devastating.

Q. (50:27) Where was this again?

A. In the alleyway between the B and C ring in that corridor between 4th and the corridor. In that alleyway.

Another hole, a more round whole that had blown out the reinforced concrete bricks, was blown out further up forward of the NCC, almost towards the 5th corridor. That's where I saw some of the more gruesome things. But, when I got back we were being told to leave and it was my understanding from hearing from someone that there were still people in the NCC, and I don't think anyone would want to leave until, you know, until we got those people out. So there was kind of this reluctance. We'd been told to leave because there was another aircraft inbound. Deep down I kind of felt that this isn't safe because of back blow, you know, follow-on explosion whatever, you know. I saw the movie "Backdraft" and I kind of had that in the back of my mind, you know. This is going to blow out here and we're trapped in this corridor. We're going to die, but we stayed there and there had to be forty, fifty people back there now, I think maybe, thirty, forty, fifty people. Until finally, "No kidding, you've got to leave." There was an Admiral, Admiral Balisle was down there, and he was telling people to leave.

Before that, I'd actually entered back into the 5th corridor. I went up to the 5th corridor to see if I could find a back entrance to the NCC. In fact, went down a corridor off the 5th corridor, went back in to see, and I went down. It's was completely dark. I was crawling and no sign of life. No,

yelling out the whole time. No voices, no return voices. I did see a firefighter in the 5th corridor, probably somewhere maybe where the D ring might have been, because that was a straight shot, and I called out to him and told him that we needed someone with fire fighting equipment, masks, something to go back. There's still people in the NCC, but then again, I didn't have a shirt on. You know, I was wearing my CNTs, my polyester CNTs.

Q. (53:16) Oh yes.

A. I took my shirt off, because I was kind of afraid that if I did get near fire and I'd melt, but another reason is I took my t-shirt off because the guys back in the, back in the NCC were asking for t-shirts and they were soaking them with water. There was several inches of water on the deck now in the alleyway, because of the sprinkler systems and whatnot. They're soaking those and passing those into the guys on the inside trying to, I guess, they put them on their heads or something. So I gave a t-shirt out. I took my shirt off because I didn't want that on. So I picked up, found my shirt back there, because I had my badges and everything else, so I thought it was a good idea to have that.

But eventually it was evacuated, and evacuated—we went down into the 4th corridor and then inbound toward center court.

Q. (54:06) OK.

A. Pass the escalators in the center court. No sooner get out in center court that they were further evacuating us outside of the Pentagon, because any—they—us, anyone that was coming in there, they were saying, they were sending us back out. So I went eventually, followed center court around to the, I guess it was the 2nd corridor and then got out of the building that way. Through

the 2nd corridor, first floor out into the South Parking area. And that's where I ran into that Lieutenant, that Army Lieutenant Colonel again. I wish I'd got his name, but, his name. We were pretty pumped up there. In fact, I even, I later interviewed with, later that night interviewed with FBI and DIS or something like that, and we actually saw a couple of guys running in the parking lot. We were kind of paranoid at this point, and who we—they were probably police, police guys, but, you know, tall guys running and running away, you know, from the scene, you know. You're suspicious. We actually ran after them across South Parking from like the 2nd corridor area back towards 27th, and then I lost them. They got into a, they got into a, like a suburban, like a police suburban that had lights on, and might have been some police guys.

Q. (55:23) (Chuckle)

A. So anyway, a little more excited there. I got out to the, got out there and how, the rest of the people—I didn't see much of the other two people, or the other people in the IP after that, after I left the alleyway. In fact I wasn't, I didn't really see that much. I knew they were there by their own statement, I knew they were there, but I didn't really see them. We kind of, we were all trying to, we were all on our own, really. But, I did hook up with them later on. When I got out to the end of South Parking and towards 27 (Editors Note: Route 27-Washington Blvd), they were shepherding people underneath the overpass, or the underpass, the road that goes out towards Navy Annex. I forget the name of the drive, but, and putting people underneath that overpass for protection, because there was again, follow-on threats of aircraft. They were setting up triage stations there, and while I was there, they were organizing the working parties.

So, I got on a working party and our job was to, we were stretcher, assigned stretcher bearings to the “Red” Triage team, whatever that was, and our job was to, once the people were triaged we were going to take them and there was a group of six of us I think, eight of us that were going to take them from triage to the life, the helicopters, the life flights or whatever they’re called.

Never did see any action there. We did move the triage station back and forth from underneath the, underneath the bridge abutment, the grass adjacent to that. Over closer to the Pentagon and back. We did that several times as these threats, the follow-on threats came in. Finally we did set up out in the middle of 27. It’s amazing, you know, over two Jersey walls, and which is astonishing to me, that they did that, but, and we stayed out there for several hours.

While we were waiting I hooked up with the people that were inside. The survivors in CNO IP, who left a different way in the Pentagon, but who had all kind of migrated back to that side of the building, which is kind of strange considering there is 25,000 people that work there.

Q. (57:51) Yes.

A. And, as well as some senior intelligence officers, who I knew who all wanted to know where I was, what I was doing. And I told them I was in IP, and I think they probably got wind that maybe that area was hit. But I hooked up IS2 Lhuillier with another senior intelligence officer to get the names so he could pass on the names of the people that were in there. Where they were sitting, where they were at the time.

Shortly thereafter, I went up to the Navy Annex, because the N, the N2s watch—N2 doesn’t normally have a watch, but the N2s office, if you will, and a watch they had just stood up was kind of reconstituted up in the Navy Annex. Well, here, in the Marine Corps G2 space, Marine Corps Intelligence space.

Q. (58:42) OK.

A. But they gave up some space and they set up shop up here.

Q. (58:48) Was that by design or was that done at the time?

A. At the time.

Q. OK.

A. Yes, out of necessity. So I came up here with Petty Officer Humbert (Editors Note: LT Humbert vice Petty Officer) was with me. Seaman Cole who was in the graphic shop was with me and we walked up the hill with Captain Ward and he was one of the senior intelligence officers I ran into.

Q. (59:11) He works—Seaman Cole and who else?

A. Seaman Cole, LT Humbert, and a guy named CAPT Ward. And we walked up here to the annex and we were able to eventually, Admiral (unintelligible 59:24) eventually arrived. We gave him a debrief, if you will, of what happened. Names, as much information as we could, that we felt was useful. Hung around. We were told that, then go home. I was now, by now it's four o'clock. I mean, this was an all day affair. We, on my way out now of the Annex, I run into my boss, Admiral McCabe, and his second, Admiral Channeck's (phonetic) and their aides, and they said, "Come with us." You know, at this point they had no idea what I'd just gone through. They thought I was just one of the many people who were up on the 5th floor who got out. Oh, by the way, all those people up on the 5th floor got out. The two people that received medical attention,

two people that had to be hospitalized, but they were treated and released. But all those people got out, because—the fire, and the damage, you know, they didn't see the after works. There was only minor structural damage and all got out safely, which is good.

So they said, they invited me to tag along, and of course I did, and we walked into the conference room up here and they had a teleconference with the CNO and all of his heavies. All of his director heads and, which was, I felt kind of privileged to be there. I was probably one of the junior, most junior guys in the room. Felt kind of out of place in my, my torn clothes and you know, slit clothes, and snagged uniform and shoes that looked like you wouldn't believe.

Incidentally, I pulled a chunk of glass out of the bottom of my shoe. I can't believe it. There was a huge gash in the bottom—I didn't even know it was there. Didn't feel, all day I was walking on this chunk of glass, and in fact, it wore down to like, you know, like a piece of glass you find on the beach?

Q. (01:01:14) Uh huh.

A. (chuckle) Cause, but it was there, the whole time. But, so anyway, out of the conference with the CNO came the direction to all his director heads that "I want a hundred percent accountability. I want you to go muster all your people," Not muster, account for them, "and report back to me at seven o'clock. " So –

Q. (01:01:35) PM?

A. PM.

Q. OK.

A. So, essentially we had an hour and a half, two hours to execute this OPNAV, you know, wide recall, which we did. I help the, in N78, I helped the aide, Admiral McCabe's aide and Admiral Channeck's aid to do that. We divided up the reg—the social rosters, two hundred and fifteen names on it, and we proceeded to call, you know call tree. We instituted a call tree. We picked a senior guy on the page, because this was sorted out by alphabetically. We picked the senior guy on the page and we'd have him call the rest of the members on the page, providing him names and numbers, because we didn't expect everyone to have a copy of the social roster. And it worked out pretty well. We contact—had a hundred percent contact in an hour and a half's time, which was an incredible feat. (chuckle) and we accounted for everyone of our people.

So, had a good report back to the boss at seven o'clock and he took that in.

Now the seven o'clock meeting was closed doors. I didn't get privy to that. So we stayed out-

Q. (01:02:39) Who was in that meeting?

A. That was again CNO, vice CNO, all the director heads. They weren't there. The CNO wasn't there. He was teleconferencing in from somewhere else. Most of the director heads were actually physically present.

That meeting, fortunately somebody came by with some pizza, which was great. We ate pizza, talked about what's happened. I then told those other guys my story. They were astonished. And then whenever Admiral McCabe and Admiral Channeck (phonetic) came back, they had seen my, my drawing on the light board there, and I think more of the aides said, "Hey, he was there." You know, "Tell him what you just told us."

So I told them. Again, they had no idea that I had just gone through that. They thought that I was just one of the many people that got out. So I did that. Well Admiral McGinn N7, Vice Admiral,

he came in and of course, Admiral McCabe and Admiral Channeck (Phonetic) said, “Chuck, tell McGinn what you just told us.” So I repeated the whole story to him.

And then the FBI and not NCIS, DCIS, or DCS or whatever, they came in and I don’t know how they knew I was there, but they interviewed me. I think they actually interviewed the flag officers and one of the flag officers, and it was Admiral McGinn said, “You need to talk to this guy.” OK? So I told them what I knew.

Eventually we got out of there around ten o’clock. Nine thirty, ten o’clock, nearly. So one of the aides gave me a ride home. I normally take a, up to that point I was taking the bus in, and of course, there’s no bus running down toward, I didn’t have a car, I mean, it was a mess, you understand. He gave me a ride home.

I got home, my family was waiting for me. Oh, by the way, when I got out to the South Parking, after getting out of the Pentagon, I was able to track someone down that had a cell phone. This was now, probably about ten ‘til eleven, 10:50 AM. I asked that person if I could use his cell phone, because I wanted to call my wife, because invariably she heard about this and was worried about where I was, or how I was. I was able to get through miraculously on his cell phone, first call.

Q. (01:05:11) Really?

A. Yes. And –

Q. (01:05:19) You’re the first one we’ve talk to –

A. And I said, “Honey, I’m OK. I made it out. I’m OK. I can’t talk now, bye.” And then I called her later about 4:30 in the afternoon. Told her I was going to be a while. Still hadn’t told her what had happened and where I was. I didn’t want to alarm her.

Q. (01:05:33) Right.

A. And, but then when I got home that night and after we put the kids down, the kids were waiting up for me, they would have been in bed, but they were concerned. We put them down and I told her the story she was just, her jaw was just on the ground. She couldn’t believe it. So.

Q. (01:05:52) And for you, too, it was probably the first time you had to debrief, to decompress.

A. No, because I did. I was able to do with the admiral. Well, with Admiral Porterfield and later on with Admiral Channeck and Admiral McCabe and later on with Admiral McGinn, and with the FBI. So I told this story. I got pretty good at it. I told it about five times up to this point.

So on the way home, the aide that gave me a ride home was also giving Admiral Channek (phonetic) a ride home, he said, “Chuck, why don’t you take tomorrow off?”

So I took Wednesday off, which believe it or not, I kind of felt guilty about. I just said here I am we’re—we just got attacked and I’m, and it’s Wednesday and it’s kind of surreal and I’m at home. I felt bad about that, I you know, I’ve always been one in the Navy, I you know, I earn my leave. I’m going to use it. When it’s time to take leave, it’s time to take leave and I don’t feel guilty about taking leave, because I earned it. But it’s still funny, I’ve never really taken any days off without a leave chit. It’s kind of ridiculous, but I kind of felt weird about that. Here I am taking a day off, and we’re, I didn’t know we were at war, yet, but all this stuff is happening and surely there is something else I could be doing.

I had no office. The primary office, was to my knowledge destroyed. In fact the initial reports I got were that it had collapsed like the E ring, the E ring had collapsed. There's an expansion joint in, running half way through that big open bay.

Q. (01:07:21) Right.

A. Offices, and that collapsed, so half the office was gone. The rest was burned. So I had no office. I had no secondary office, which was CNO IP. Had no place to go. There were some contractors in our space that worked with us, permanent contracts, if you will, that, and they graciously opened up their spaces that they had, their satellite offices that they had at Crystal City, up to us, to at least provide us initially a place to go and meet and get together and figure out what we were going to do.

We met up on Thursday morning in Crystal City, Crystal Gateway North EWA spaces, Electronic Warfare Associates. We met up, I met up with the two sections, the two sections that primarily occupied that big office, 5D433. By section, N78, had the section heads got out to the people and said, "This is the plan. This is where we're going to meet." You know, Thursday morning. For the most part, I think everyone was off on Wednesday.

We worked out of some temporary space up at Crystal Gateway, up at Crystal City, until the Navy provided us spaces, more permanent space, which we are now working out of now, also in Crystal City.

Q. (01:08:50) Tenth floor?

A. Tenth Floor, Crystal City, National Center 2. So what was amazing was the, what I thought was kind of a testament to the, everyone involved was how quickly they were able to get desks,

phones, computers hooked up for thousand, thousands of people. I don't know how many that were displaced. That lost their offices.

Q. (1:09:20) Report from Captain Toti that it was 87% of the OPNAV footprint was taken out, was lost.

A. Yes, we just moved into, 4th, OPNAV staff just moved into the 4th and 5th decks of that wing, of that new wedge. Of course, the main command center was, I don't know how many people worked in that space. Eighty-some work in that space, I believe, normally, and there down on the first floor, so.

Q. (01:09:43) Yes, a good portion of NC were –

A. Displaced, so. But that's about it, I, that's kind of, I'm sure I'm leaving some things out. I mean if there's any questions that you have.

Q. (01:09:54) Think about lessons learned. Kind of two-fold. One is from the fire fighting rescue effort. Anything you can think of. God forbid something like this happen again, but what are some things that –

A. Well, one thing is, in this kind of nature, a SCIF, there's usually only one entrance and there's rarely any exit, emergency exit, and perhaps if there was an emergency exit somewhere in the SCIF, perhaps (emphasis) maybe more people could have gotten out. But that's a single point of entry and exit by design for security in a SCIF. The door is electronic, the locks electronic and even if we got one, who knows if we'd been able to get out?

Q. (01:10:37) Right. Should that be looked at?

A. I think, I think egress out of any SCIF out to be looked at, you know. I think people in general are going to think a little bit differently when they enter a new space and figure out a way to get out, evacuation routes, you know. Develop primary, secondary evacuation routes. I know, we didn't have one posted upstairs, but I certainly see them now in our temporary spaces, evacuation routes. Here's where, if you have to evacuate, here's a primary, secondary route here and we're going to muster outside the building. No, we didn't have that before.

The staging of the fire fighting equipment, perhaps if there's boy, I mean maybe there was enough. May be that every place that I went to had already been tapped, you know. But, you know, I think, I think, I know that if we had access to axes and perhaps some emergency breathing apparatus like we do on the ship, either the basic fire fighting control equipment that we have on the ship, if we'd had access to that in our work spaces, that we might have been able to get into more people in the back of the NCC. That was a problem.

Q. (01:12:03) Would it work having those in the various passageways, uniformly distributed throughout a building like that?

A. Yes, and I think there are, but I think there are, but nothing inside the space, to my knowledge.

Q. (11:12:17) So you would have them in the space as well.

A. Yes.

Q. Just so it's there.

A. Yes, if you can't get in the passageway, it's not, also to get out. Perhaps, if you had to get out, emergency lighting like a battle lantern, if you will, You know. That would have come in help, that would have come in handy where we were. Couldn't see a thing except for that light, that eventually found out that it was a hole, but what if we did have a light. Maybe we could have found a different way out. I don't know. I just said, the walls and everything came collapsing in, we could eventually crawled out. Some, maybe some other way. I don't know.

Q. (01:12:49) What about fire doors?

A. Fire doors? Stamp?

Q. (01:12:50) Yes, did you know about the new dampers that were in the new wedge?

A. No.

Q. (01:12:57) Could—you had gone out a whole different way? That's right.

A. Yes, I didn't go out a door. (chuckle)

Q. (01:13:04) What about a lessons learned from a reconstitution. Obviously, you say it's gone real well there with everybody brought back together. You and the computers, the office folks.

A. Yes.

Q. (01:13:12) Anything, lessons learned there?

A. Well, you know, we learned a lot about, you know

Part one stops

Part two begins

Q. (00:01) OK.

A. Yes, you know, there was probably a significant amount of working data that was lost, but we've learned our lesson and you know, people are—now one thing I would like to say that we we've always been under the constant scrutiny by the, the LAN system administrators to keep our storage on the servers down to a minimum and I would contend that there's not enough room on the servers to do that. We're always in this constant data management, server maintenance mode, because we're only allotted "x" magabytes of data storage and if we want to make sure that our data, or our work is recoverable, then I think we ought to be given, allotted more server space in order to save that stuff to. Even now, even post, even post accident, or post attack we, we're still being asked to trim down our server, you know, our space and that's kind of tough to do.

Q. (01:17) Anything they're doing differently or even discussion-wise. Again looking at this from those that write the historical account, what is the thought process. Maybe this is down the road a little bit we ask this question, but thought process of the retrieval of data, or being sure you have redundancy.

See I know that's different and unique in the intelligence world, because you have so much compartmentalized.

A. Yes.

Q. (01:43) How now but not lose it, kind of thing.

A. Well, backups, I mean, you know, and that's tapes, backups, tape backups, I really can't speak to that. I'm not in that line of the LAN. Where as there's experts out there I'm sure are giving this a lot more thought than I am.

Q. (02:01) What about -?

Q. (Another questioner) What were the users primarily, some users.

Q. (First Questioner) How about some others to talk to. Who else should we talk to?

A. Well, I think that the other people in the space. I think LT Humbert would be a good source. PO Lhuillier a good source. Perhaps some of the enlisted folks that were in the graphics shop. The three enlisted folks that got out of the graphics shop. Those would be good people.

Q. (02:30) Do you remember their names?

A. You would ask me that. Seaman Cole is one.

Q. OK. Get that to me.

A. PO Polaschek (phonetic) is one. Polaschek (phonetic) and the other one was PO Keith Gully, (phonetic) or Seaman Gulley, I'm not sure. One or the other.

Q. (02:47) Polaschek (phonetic) Spell Polaschek (phonetic)

A. P-o-l-a-s-c-h-e-k, or something like that.

Q. OK.

A. These are all –

Q. (02:55) IS3, IS2?

A. IS3, IS3 I think. IS3 I think. I think Gulley's a sea—Cole is a Seaman and Gulley, I believe is a, maybe an IS3.

Q. OK.

A. These are all ONI employees. Office of Naval Intelligence employees who work on an occasional basis out of CNO IP. They, thus, they pencory (phonetic), they've reconstitute the CNO IP watch over in Suitland, Maryland at ONI.

Q. (03:24) OK.

A. Office of Naval Intelligence. If you want a contact for those folks, I'd recommend going through—I can even get you a phone number.

Q. That'd be great.

A. OK, remind me. I'll get you a phone number for the watch officer, the OINC, the new OINC.

Q. OK.

A. They could probably get you in contact with these people.

Q. (03:56) That would be great. Any others?

A. Admiral Balisle's perspective, a flag officer's perspective would be good. B-a-l-i-s-l-e. I think that would be good.

Q. (04:09) OK.

A. Admiral McGinn's aide, LT, I think, yes he was there. He was there, kind of down there in the thick of it as well. There was a CDR Perez from N7C.

Q. We talked to him. Stan Perez, right.

A. I saw he was, he was deeply involved in that rescue effort in the NCC there. The one where I gave my shirt to them, the t-shirt. That one. No, I can't think of any right off hand. Maybe a couple of the guys that were maybe in my space up at 5D453.

Q. (05:07) Can you suggest some names?

A. Mark Turner would be a good one, LCDR Mark Turner, he's a good guy. He was one of the last guys to leave the space. Captain Tom Joyce. These are N78 guys. I don't know if you want to talk to one of the guys that got injured up there. He was sitting in the far back corner and the wall came crashing down on him. Took a cinder block in the head. I don't know if he remembers much. (chuckle),

What's his name, he's a new guy. I can't remember his name.

Q. (05:45) I think we're going to get some of that from the Pers 6 folks as well, so.

A. OK.

Q. They were tracking some of the people that were hospitalized.

A. Good. Good.

Q. (05:53) I have a CDR Brian Nicholson's name. Do you know Brian?

A. I do know him, but I don't know his –

Q. (06:02) CAPT. Saya (phonetic) gave me his name as a potential point of contact to go through, but.

A. Oh, as a point of contact. I know Brian Nicholson, but I don't know if he was, how he was involved in this.

Q. Right, he just might be some help to coordinate some of the ONI folks.

A. Yes.

Q. Because I had originally talked with a—it was Dale Rilich (phonetic)?

A. Yes, he's the DNI's deputy aide. LCDR Rilich. I don't know what Nicholson's role in this area, this was.

Q. OK. Right.

A. I don't know, you interested at all in any of the perspective from folks that were working with the families of the –

Q. (06:47) Absolutely, Casualty.

A. A good source, a good friend of mine who is a mutual friend of Vince Tolbert, who died, his name is LCDR, his name is CDR Todd Ross. He was assigned as the, not the CACO, but more like a caseworker to be with the family.

Q. (07:10) Family of?

A. The family of Vince Tolbert,

Q. Oh.

A. In the weeks following the attack to take care of them above and beyond what the CACO process provides.

Q. (07:20) Was that ONI specifics or was that-?

A. This was, the DNI assigned him to that family and then they tried to assign a common, I call it the caseworker, I don't know if it's the best word, but they assigned someone who knew the family, and he knew the family. So he was the perfect guy for the job and he, I think you'll—he has—he'll probably give you a real interesting perspective of some of the things –

Q. (07:47) Yes, that would be ideal –

A. That are above and beyond what the CACO maybe provides.

Q. Sounds great.

A. He's a great guy.

Q. Can you get me his number as well?

A. I will, yes. I'll tell you, let me see, let me write down the names of the people that I told you I'd get you numbers for.

Q. OK.

A. I'll get you CNO IP number. I'll get you Ross, Turner, Joyce. I think that's about it. But he wrote that, you know, it's funny, during the memorial service at the Pentagon, I guess the SECDEF was impressed with Todd's eulogy, because Ross wrote the eulogy for Vince Tolbert to give at his funeral and he must have been impressed with some of the words, because—I wasn't at the memorial service. I listened to it on the radio, but I heard verbatim a portion of the eulogy that Ross had wrote for Tolbert, and the SECDEF said it, kind of on behalf of all the guys. All of the services.

Q. (09:01) Yes. Wow.

A. Yes, he's a good guy. I hope he can get over here and talk to you.

Q. (09:05) Oh, definitely. That'll be great. SPRINT Team, have you had any dealings with the SPRINT Team at all? Are you familiar with them?

A. Yes, I am, and they had, I think near a hundred percent contact in my organization N78.

Q. Great.

A. But embarrassingly every time they set up one of these things, I never went to one. I was busy and, and it started and I didn't want to go in, because it was half an hour into it and I just said,

“Nah.” So I got the kind of the, you know, *Reader’s Digest* version from my co-workers, but I should probably go talk to them.

Q. (09:48) It would be a great group to talk with, just, I gained a lot of appreciation for what I did not even realize that they did, until I went down.

A. Yes.

Q. (09:56) Five months post *Cole* incident and talked with, up and down the chain of command, of the, how invaluable that understanding is, just from a standpoint of being a leader and knowing, you know, what they offer, but also –

A. Yes.

Q. (10:13) Helping to put it in perspective.

A. It’s just been in the back of my mind, cause I kind of, I don’t want to put myself on report, but everyone was suppose to go and I didn’t.

Q. Yes.

A. Couple of other guys did, I didn’t, but I’ll try to go down there.

Q. (10:28) I’ve got, there’s a guy, we’ve talked to some of those guys and there’s a CDR John Knolls, who’s fabulous.

A. John Knolls?

Q. (10:34) In –

A. They still have an office down here?

Q. (10:35) They're not here, but their over at Bethesda, but John Knolls was the OIC.

A. Yes.

Q. And he was, his number is 301-

A. OK.

Q. [REDACTED].

A. The next time I want to get out of the office early, I'll –

Q. (10:50) Let me tell you he would be just a dynamite guy to talk with. You tell him that you've had, you know, you talked to me and I recommended that.

A. OK.

Q. And John Kennedy is another one. He's a LCDR, doctor type and when we asked the *Cole* sailors and leadership to name some of the ones that stood out, who were some of the heroes of the *Cole* effort, John Kennedy's name came up, over and over, and over again.

A. Really.

Q. (11:16) You know you wouldn't think that, but, you know, I think, particularly from some of the senior leadership many times they think, "Oh, these guys are tough. They don't need that."

But it's really something. They just get an understanding of what they can, the perspective they can put on it, which is really helpful.

Anything else you want to add for the historical records?

A. No, other than the fact, boy, you know, three rings into the Pentagon was last place I ever expected to be the subject of an attack. I mean, I've been on several operational tours. I've been in harms way, particularly during the Gulf, during attack or worse. Battles in the, an escort opera—tanker escort operations. It you remember those. We would, the role of the battleship was to mask the tanker, tanker convoy from the coastal cruise missile threat from Iran. So we put ourselves in harms way, and certainly I would have expected back then to be, you know, attacked, or to be put in the situation I was put on in September 11th, not in the Pentagon. The last place you ever possibly think that this would happen and it happened. Worse yet, it's a pretty big building, a real big building and I don't think I could have been any closer to it without being dead, and walk away and tell about it. So, you know, what I was telling you, tempted death there. Stared death in the face.

Q. (12:53) Right at it.

A. Right at it.

Q. Right at the edge.

A. So I'm happy to be alive and I feel really bad for everyone that didn't make it, and I attend the funeral services and memorial services for seven of my shipmates.

Q. (13:05) Wow.

A. And, you know, it's, words can't describe that.

Q. Yes, no, you can't.

A. You know, the feelings of sorrow for the families and children and everything. I lost my father at an early age. When I was fifteen he died in an accident. In a drowning accident. We were actually on vacation in Europe, in Scandinavia, in Norway as a matter of fact, and he died in a drowning accident. So I kind of, and shortly after that I lost all my grandparents in immediate years following, and I kind of became somewhat immune to death for a while. I never really had anyone close to me die for a long period of time. I've had some distance relatives die. Been in a couple of funerals, but no one real close and you know, the funerals and memorial services kind of took on a whole different meaning. As, not only was I close to some of these people, but I was part of what they went through.

Q. Right, right.

A. And, that was tough, so any of my initial feelings of sorrow and they turn to, quickly after about the second and third one of these, turn to vengeance, that I want to do everything I can so long as I'm in the Navy to, to make up for it, and kind of carry that with me. Carry it on my back, I think. I don't know if that's right or not, but you know, so that's about it.

Q. (14:59) What about your children, you've got a –

A. Nine, six.

Q. Nine, six, and twenty months.

A. Yes, they're you know, they're, my daughter's pretty inquisitive.

Q. (15:07) She's nine?

A. Yes, she's, and I haven't told them that daddy almost died.

Q. Wow.

A. So they don't know that. I'm just trying to keep her, her level, informed of what's going on. Remarkably they catch on to it. There are some people out there that want to do bad things to us, and this is the man, this is their leader, and we're at war right now in Afghanistan because this is the country that's harboring this leader. And that this, not everyone in Afghan—we're not at war with the Afghanistan people, the Afghanies, but just a certain group of Afghanies that are harboring this very bad person. And you know, she's caught on to that. The six year old I think he's too young to really understand any of that, but we're keeping her in the game. Keeping her informed, so. You ought to strike a careful balance there of what their seeing on TV.

Q. (16:04) Yes.

A. We find ourselves turning off the TV sometimes, because we don't want them to hear certain things, but at the same time, knowing that we have to tell them some day. We want them to hear it from us, rather than someone else. But when they talk some about some of the more gruesome things, they don't need to hear that.

Q. Yes, they don't need to hear that, yes. Wow. Chuck thanks so much for your time.

A. Yes. Anything I can do to help.

Q. You've done it.

A. Good.

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