

U. S. S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) FLEET POST OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

IN REPLY REFER TO

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From:

Commanding Officer

To:

Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Via:

Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet

Subj:

Report of Hunter/Killer Operations 8-12 December 1952

Encl:

(1) Task Organization

(2) Summary of Operations I Brief descriptive Narrative

(3A) Tabulated weather data

(3B) Tabulated Evaluation Submarine Attacks

N6-8

- 1. ASW Hunter/Killer Operations were conducted 8-12 December 1952 in assigned San Diego operating areas in accordance with:
 - a. Commander F1rst Fleet restricted dispatch 152004Z of October 1952.
 - b. U.S.S. BAIROKO Operation Order No. 5-52 dtd 24 November 1952.

Comments and Recommendations

- a. Naval Operations
 - (1) Surface

Comment

Turn signals were used in most cases to maneuver the force into the wind for launch or recovery of aircraft and the Screen was not recriented to the new course. Screen protection to the carrier was thereby decreased. Training of CIC and ship control personnel of the various Screening Ships would have been accelerated if Corpen signals had been used.

Comment (Commanding Officer U.S.S. BAIROKO)

Turn signals were employed mainly (1) for simplicity (2) on the assumption that the SS danger area was in the direction of the screen axis.

Recommendation

That Corpen signals be used to the maximum extent possible in Hunter/Killer training exercises to provide additional training opportunities for the personnel of the Screening Ships.




Comment

Numerous surface craft were encountered when operating in the Eastern pertion of the operating area. These contacts required checking by the airborne teams and as a result the teams spent too much time investigating contacts that were not involved in the exercise. Furthermore the force had to be maneuvered at times to avoid these contacts while trying to conduct air operations.

Recommendation

ASW Hunter Killer exercises in the San Diego area should be scheduled and conducted in the Western most portion, as far as practicable.





(2) Special Tactics

Comment

The use of the diving light at night by the submarines to provide the attacking ships of the SAU with a reference for evaluation of the run was quite effective. The light could not be seen unless a "Good" or "Excellent" attack was made, so that a ship making a poor attack could not use the light as a reference for reattack (thus placing the submarine at a disadvantage).

Recommendation

The continued use of the diving light by the submarines to aid the attacking ships in making an evaluation is indicated.





(3) Anti Submarine

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(a) Surface

Comment

In one instance the REDFISH stayed at periscope depth after it was apparent that the WILTSIE had commenced an attack run. The WILTSIE did not attack because of safety considerations. The REDFISH Commanding Officer later stated that he was aware of the attack, and that it would have been satisfactory for the WILTSIE to continue as he intended to wait as long as possible before going down, but would have been safely out of the way.

Recommendation

Attacking vessels should continue to be most careful in the interpretation and observance of safety precautions when working with the submarines. Submarine Commanding Officers should not take advantage of the attacking destroyers natural reluctance to press an attack home while a periscope is showing, and should go down as soon as it becomes apparent that they are being attacked.

Comment

The wisdom of maneuvering a SAU by turn signals frequently when entering a submarine contact area was amply demonstrated during the week. These turn signals have merit both defensive and offensively. In event 5 SAU-1 was executing a 40 degree turn to the right when BBB signal was received from CHARR by the WILTSIE on her port beam. This turn was an excellent defensive maneuver for the WILTSIE the port hand ship in the SAU. The CHEVALIER as center ship of the SAU turned toward the REDFISH and shortly after received BBB's from her. Sonar contact was almost immediately gained by CHEVALIER. The executed turn assisted the CHEVALIER to get set for an attack. The frequent turns also prevented the sub from ascertaining the base search course and picking an escape course midway between two ships of a SAU.

The series of turn signals were in addition to weaving, which was ordered upon approaching the contact area. Weaving may be considered entirely defensive, however, while the turn maneavers are both offensive and defensive.





Recommendation

That stress be placed on the high defensive and offensive merit of a SAU executing frequent turn signals when approaching a submarine contact area.

(b) Aircraft

Comment

Aircraft teams were not relieved on station at all times, and an insufficient period was allowed for turnover of information to the relieving team. Continuous surveillance of the search area must be maintained or submarine contacts may be missed as was the case in at least one instance.

Recommendation

All teams be relieved on station regardless of whether a contact is held or not, and sufficient time be allowed for complete turnover of information. The carrier element should be turned out of the wind between launch and recovery (if necessary to maintain a track or position) in order to allow sufficient time for proper aircraft relief on station.

Comment

It has been the policy of the BAIROKO in the past to require that the search teams be held under radar surveillance at all times thus limiting the flexibility of the teams. Continuous radio contact has also been required. Safety considerations and the ASW evaluator's need for continuous information as to the location of the teams indicated the above policy. It is now felt that the continued radar surveillance of aircraft is no longer necessary as long as the aircraft can maintain positive radio contact with the Group Combat Information Center, and as long as the ASW evaluator is kept advised of the position of the team when beyond the ship's radar surveillance.

Recommendation

That the aircraft teams be allowed greater freedom of movement by not requiring them to be held under radar surveillance at all times as long as positive radio communications (either VHF or MHF) are established and maintained.





(c) Submarine

Comment

The term General Submarine Instructions is misleading in its connotations and it is believed that the term should be changed to General Submarine Restrictions which is more descriptive of the limitations imposed on the submarines maneuvers.

Recommendation

Change the term General Submarine Instructions to General Submarine Restrictions.

(d) Air Surface

Comment

Aircraft by their mere presence in the area of submarine operations are a mental hazard and a constant potential threat to the submarine commanding officer. This fact is well known and was exploited in full during search phases of the exercises in this operation. However, in a few cases, once the SAU had made contact the aircraft were allowed to continue on their search plan and did not remain in the general vicinity of the contact. During daylight hours particularly, an ASW air patrol working with and in the vicinity of the SAU might very possibly prevent a submarine from remaining at or returning to periscope depth for an attack. A well placed depth charge on a submarine at or near periscope depth would undoubtedly drive the submarine deep and force him at least to a less efficient method of firing at the SAU. This is particularly important because of the complete lack of offensive capability which the submarine has against aircraft, and the agressive offensive tactics which submarines are new employing against ASW ships as opposed to the passive defensive tactics of the past war.

Recommendation

Even after the SAU has definitely established contact with the submarine, the ASW air team should be maintained on patrol in the general vicinity to provide additional aid and protection to the ships of the SAU.

Comment

Due to the artificialities of the exercises, and in some cases the short period of time allowed between events,





particularly the first two days, it was very difficult to obtain a good separation between the carrier element and the submarines. As a result most of the contacts were made by the screen, and the aircraft did not enter into the picture at all.

Recommendation

Events should be scheduled with sufficient time allowed so that the force is adequately separated from the submarines. If this is done, the original contact will probably be made by the aircraft and there will be a greater number of opportunities for aircraft and the SAU to practice the very important phase of passing the contact area control from the aircraft to the SAU. Furthermore, the time consuming process of repositioning the main force to recommence the event would be shortened, thereby allowing even more time and opportunities for surface-aircraft coordination.





(4) Submarine

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(a) Offensive

Comment

In events 4 and 5, the submarines were employed in team tactics at an initial distance of 6,000 yards between submarines. In event 4 both submarines attacked the CVE plus one DD of the screen within a short period. In event 5, three attacks (2 on one DD) were made by the two submarines on a three ship SAU. Had each submarine been successful in its attacks, it is doubtful if the third DD would have remained in the vicinity. The employment of submarines in groups of two or more is a constantly improving tactic in the interest of mutual support and concentration of fire power. While a single submarine would probably attempt initially to evade a three ship SAU, it is almost a certainty that two submarines operating as a team would make every effort to deliver nearly simultaneous attacks on a three ship SAU.


Recommendation

Officers in Tactical Command and the Screen Commanders should be aware of the increased emphasis on team tactics to be used by the submarines, and the use of a four ship SAU should be seriously considered. SAU Commanders should become increasingly alert for simultaneous attacks as the datum point is approached, and be prepared to split the SAU on very short notice in order to handle the double threat presented.

(b) Defensive

Comment

The lack of effective evasion devices to assist the submarines in breaking contact was again felt. Only FTS's and FTC's both of which are known to be of little value, were available. Commander Escort Squadron Three reported that in at least two SAU actions the submarine's evasive measures were not effective.





Recommendation

Submarines operating in training exercises should be permitted to use advanced evasion devices to the maximum extent possible. It is not considered sufficient that such aids for evasion should be available for use under strictly controlled conditions. Every opportunity should be taken to provide the various submarine units practical experience in their use, and to acquaint participating surface ships with the characteristics of such devices. Possibly a peacetime sinking device could be incorporated for security in lieu of attempting recovery.

Comment

Event 9, a 24 hour transit exercise wherein the submarines were required to travel a distance of 180 miles, was beyond the capability of either the CHARR or the REDFISH. A 14 Sono-buoy barrier placed across the estimated track near the starting point was not effective, but heavy air cover maintained along the estimated track during the problem held the REDFISH down almost continuously, and forced the CHARR to proceed largely on battery and snorkel. Inasmuch as the initial departure area and the final destination of the submarines were known, and both the departure time and time of completion were previously established, a relatively small area was involved, and it was fairly easy to saturate that area with air cover.

Recommendation

It is recommended that future exercises of this nature allow the submarines more latitude of action in order to provide a more realistic problem for the submarines. In order to accomplish this it would appear necessary to allow the submarines a larger area of required location at the commencement of the problem, with the carrier element located 50 to 60 miles away from the submarines initial point at starting time.





(5) Combat Information Center

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Comment

The Combat Information Center on occasion would not leave aircraft on a contact long enough to complete evaluation, but would vector the team to continue search or return to ship in order to carry out recovery schedule.

Recommendation

Airborne teams should be given full opportunity to develop all contacts, and contact development should receive precedence over maintaining a prescribed search plan. Recovery schedules should be modified if practicable.





(6) Electronics Countermeasures

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(a) RADCM

Comment

RADCM in the form of intercept exercises produced meager results. At the commencement of each exercise radar silence condition One was put into effect for the first ten minutes of each fifteen minutes beginning on the hour and continuing until completion of the exercise. A target ship was placed at 10 to 15 thousand yards on the beam on parallel course. Few RENT reports were received, and in only a few cases was it possible to plot in the position of the target ship based upon RENT reports received.

Recommendation

All units take immediate steps to insure that all equipment is in the best material condition possible, and that RACCM exercises be conducted at every possible opportunity.





(6) Electronics Countermeasures

DECLASSIFIED

(a) RADCM


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Recommendation

All units take immediate steps to insure that all equipment is in the best material condition possible, and that RACCM exercises be conducted at every possible opportunity.





(7) Seamanship and Navigation

Comment

Under adverse weather conditions, navigational positions may vary widely between the various ships of the Group. If one definite reference position is not established it is difficult to carry out the exercises in the areas as scheduled.

Recommendation

The OTC should establish a best estimated reference position for use by the entire group at least once each day or prior to each exercise, and carry out the exercise in relation to that established reference point.





b. Communications

DECLASSIFIED

(1) General

Comment

Radio communications difficulties and equipment failures were prevalent during all phases of this operation. The communication checks scheduled in the operation order were not sufficient to insure reliable Task Group communications.

Recommendation

Conduct comprehensive communication checks involving, where feasible, the entire Task Group and commencing 48 hours prior to start of scheduled exercises. These checks should be continued until all units have their equipment operating properly, and have an assured capability of satisfactorily meeting all anticipated communication demands.


Comment

The number of circuits that the task group was required to guard or be prepared to come up on was considered excessive. A minimum amount of "backing up" of circuits was possible, thus decreasing reliability appreciably. The number and type of circuits to be used presents quite a problem when the destroyer element assigned is composed of mixed DD's and DE's with variations in the amount and type of communication equipment available.

Recommendation

That a Communications Officer planning conference be held prior to preparation of the basic communication plan with a view toward writing a communication plan within the effective capacity of all units, stressing the guarding of the minimum number of circuits possible rather than the maximum number that might possibly be used.





(2) Radio

(a) CW

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Comment

Circuit discipline and procedure on Task Group Common was below standard. A shortage of properly trained personnel, plus an absence of positive control considerably reduced the speed of this circuit. A need for closer supervision is indicated.

Recommendation

Added emphasis must be placed on training those lower rated men currently required to occupy supervisory billets. Only knowledge and experience will create the confidence necessary to properly man a busy circuit.

(b) Voice

Comment

It was noted that many ships failed to take adequate steps to reduce feed back and background noise, which in some cases almost completely blocked out transmissions.

Recommendation

Implement Bridge and CIC noise level reduction programs. Reemphasize (to all personnel concerned) the importance of handset and speaker volume control.

Comment

In spite of specific instructions to use plain language in contact reports, the use of specialized terms such as "goblin" and "sinker" from ACP 165 was noted on several occasions. The meaning of these and other specialized code words from ACP 165 is not a matter of common knowledge to all destroyer personnel, and their use results in some confusion and their exact meaning is ascertained only after searching hurriedly through ACP 165.

Recommendation

That plain language be used for initial contact reports. That ACP 165 be the subject of additional training in all units which might be assigned to H/K duties.





(3) Visual

Comment

The inability to clear traffic with reasonable speed when Nancy equipment was used, continues to point out the need for intensive training in this phase of visual communications.

Recommendation

Require the establishment and furtherance of Nancy (in port) drill circuits.



C. Personnel

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(1) Adequacy

Comment

During this operation the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115) was designated as UTC and a staff was not on board to conduct the exercises. In the preparation for and in the carrying out of the operation it became apparent that the present allowance of officers for a Hunter/Killer CVE is not sufficient to permit adequate planning and execution of this type of operation concurrently with proper performance of assigned ship board duties. This condition is most noticeable in the Operations Department especially in connection with the preparation of the Operation Order, necessary liaison with other units assigned, and the actual conduct of the operation. The lack of sufficient qualified personnel to adequately perform the additional duties on the bridge in connection with OTC responsibilities also became very apparent, particularly when unexpected situations developed. The JOOD was assigned primarily as Tactical Communicator and secondarily to his regular duties. He was also required (1) to keep a communication and a raid Status Board, (2) maintain a Tactical Status Board and Plot. and (3) supervise the CCE-sub circuit in the absence of the submarine liaison officer. It was learned that these duties could not adequately be performed by the JOOD without special intensive training. One additional LCDR was assigned on temparary duty in the Operations Department to aid in preparation of the Operation Order, to assist in liaison and especially to provide necessary additional help in carrying out CIC and ASW evaluator functions. It is felt that the following officers are necessary to carry out adequately the functions of the Operations

CDR - Operations

a staff on board.

LCDR - Ass't Operation - Air Operations

LCDR - ASW Officer - CIC

LT - CIC - ASW

4 LTJG - Air Controllers (One alternates Air Plot Watch)

Department in conducting a Hunter Killer Exercise without


3 ENS - Junior CIC watch Officers

1 LT - Air Intelligence

1 LT - Communications

1 LTJG - Aerologist

6 ENS - CWO





Recommendation

A comparison of the present officer allowance of the Operations Department CVE type, with the recommended allowance set forth above indicates the need for two additional officers, a LCDR and a LTJG, if the CVE is to carry out Hunter Killer Operations without a Staff on board. It is recommended that the CVE officer allowance be modified accordingly.


Cemment

The submarine liaison officer aboard during this exercise aided the UTC materially in the efficient control of the submarines.

Recommendation

An experienced submarine liaison officer should be assigned the OTC for all Hunter Killer exercises being conducted without Staff supervision.





(2) Training

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
Comment

An officer from each ship of Des Div Ill was aboard the BAIROKO to act as observer during the Hunter Killer operation, and it is believed that those officers were able to gain valuable information concerning the coordination required between the CVE and the destroyers assigned in this type of an operation. The BAIROKO was not able to send any officers to the destroyers or submarines for observation of their operations during this period, but it is intended to do so if the opportunity arises.

Recommendation

It is felt that the practice of exchanging officers between various types provides very valuable training, and it is recommended that continued emphasis be placed upon this program.





3. Summary of Recommendations

- a. Corpen signals be used for maneuvering into or out of the wind incident to Air Operations to provide maximum training for screen.
- b. ASW Hunter Killer exercises in the San Diego area be scheduled and conducted in the Western most portion of the operating area.
- c. Submarines continue to use diving lights at night to aid attacking ships in making an evaluation.
- d. Submarines go down as soon as it becomes apparent that they are under attack and not delay at periscope depth thus causing destroyers to break off attack in the interest of safety.
- e. Stress be placed on the high defensive and offensive merit of a SAU executing frequent turn signals when approaching a submarine contact area.
- f. Aircraft teams be relieved on station if at all practicable.
- g. Requirement for continuous radar surveillance of airborne teams be eliminated if good radio communication exists.
- h. Change the term "General Submarine Instructions" to "General Submarine Restrictions".
- i. Maintain the airborne team in general vicinity of the SAU when surface action is in progress.
- j. Schedule and carry out events with sufficient time between events to permit good separation between Carrier Element and submarines.
- k. OTC and SAU Commanders be cognizant of fact that submarines may be operating as a team, and that present submarine doctrine places increased emphasis on offensive action.
- 1. Submarines be permitted to use advanced evasion devises to the maximum extent possible.
- m. Submarine transit exercises be set up to allow submarines a larger operating area and more latitude of action.
- n. Airborne teams be given full opportunity to develop all contacts.







- e. Continued heavy emphasis be placed on ECM training and exercises.
- p. OTC establish best estimated reference position for use of entire group in conducting each exercise.
- q. Conduct comprehensive communication checks at least 48 hours prior to commencing operation and continue until all communications are satisfactorily established.
- r. Communication officers hold planning conference prior to writing communication plan with view toward the resultant communications plan being mutually satisfactory and the simplest possible under the circumstances.
- s. Added emphasis be placed on training the lower rated communication personnel now required to occupy supervisory billets.
- t. Implement bridge and CIC noise level reduction programs.
- u. Stress the use of plain language for initial contact reports on tactical circuits.
- v. Establishment of and emphasis on Nancy in-port drills.
- w. Increase allowance of operations department officers by one (1) LCDR, and one (1) LTJG if CVE is to conduct Hunter/Killer operations without a staff aboard.
- x. Assign submarine liaison officer to aid OTC when CVE conducting Hunter/Killer operations without a Staff aboard.
- y. Continue the program of exchanging officers on a temporary basis between various types in order to further mutual understanding of problems involved in Hunter/Killer operations.





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
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11.5	Hunter/Killer Group			CAPT L. T. MORSE	(1488)
	(a)	11.50	CARRIER ELEMENT	CAPT L. T. MORSE	(1488) 1 CVE
			BAIROKO (CVE-115) VS-23 Helicopter Unit Plane Guard Destroyers	CDR J. C. ZIRKLE	(1488) (5409) 18 TBM
	(b)	11.51	DESTROYER FLEMENT	CAPT C. M. DALTON	(1163)
			ComDesRon 11	CAPT C. M. DALTON	(1163)
			DesDiv 111 WILTSIE (DD-716) THEODORE E. CHANDLER (DD-717)	CDR C. A. BERRY CDR D. M. RUBEL	4 DD (4036) (5612)
			HAMNER (DD-718) CHEVALIER (DDR-806)	CDR W. S. FINN CDR J. D. REILLY	(3951) (4417)
			FECHTELER (DD-870)	n CDR F. GRIME Jr.	(5412) 1 DD
			ComCortRon 3	CDR M. S. SCHMIDLI	NG (2886)
			CortRon 3 GEORGE (DE-697)	ICDR C. E. MCMULLE	l DE N (10476)
			ROMBACH (DE-364)	ICDR W. T. DAVERN	(9379) 1 DE
	(c)	11.52	SUBMARINE ELEMENT	CDR B. A. CLAREY	(2653) 2 SS
			REDFISH (SS-395) CHARR (SS-328)	LCDR J. P. BIENIA LCDR R. B. POAGE	



Enclosure (1)




Event 1 Unopposed sortie from San Diego.

080640U - 081400U (7 hours, 20 min.) Duration

Narrative The sortie was completed by 0809000. Circular screen formed. The FECHTELER joined the screen at 11200 from Long Beach.

Formed bent-line screen 206 at 1330U.





Event 2 Exercise 15-3. Task Group search for and Hunter/Killer Operations against submarines in a general area.

Duration 0814000 to 0823000 (9 hours).

Results
SS contacts - 6 (3 air, 2 sonar, 1 surface, visual).
Destroyer Attacks - 32 (9 excellent, 1 good, 17 fair, 5 poor).
Submarine Attacks - 5 (2 excellent, 2 good, 1 fair).

Narrative

- Exercise commenced. The Task Group proceeded with bent-line screen. Launched and maintained 2 VAW-VA teams airborne throughout the exercise (search plan 4 MB). Numerous radar contacts were made and investigated by the A/C, however none were developed into SS contacts.
- Initial contact with SS occured when the CHARR made two successive attacks on the BAIROKO and the CHEVALIER.

 SAU-1 was detached as the Task Group turned away.

 SAU-1 remained separated from the force and in the contact area for the remainder of the exercise, during which time, 17 attacks were made. Contact was lost 10 times, and regained through the use of Operation Tomato, area and spiral searches. At 2103 SAU-1 ceased making attacks, and surfaced the submarine. The CHARR conducted 5 (4 DD, 1 CVE) attacks during this 7 hour period. A/C search and attack teams did not contribute to the results of SAU-1's operations.
- SS REDFISH visually sighted the ship's masts after first sighting smoke from one ship. With periscope and radar (SV) mast up, the REDFISH tracked and attempted to close the T.G. At 1700 A/C closed to 700 yards without detecting the REDFISH who was in position to observe launching operations aboard the CVE. At 1741 the REDFISH surfaced, but submerged again at 1745 as A/C closed. Attack aircraft were unable to make any contacts following radar contact by the GUPPY.
- 1810 The GEORGE sighted a light ahead of the ROMBACH which was investigated and reported to be a flare. At this time the GEORGE heard BBB on its sonar, signifying attack by SS. The GEORGE gained sonar contact at 1820 and C.T.G. 11.5 directed detachment of a 3 ship SAU. SAU-2 conducted repeated attacks on the REDFISH during the next 2 hours, at which time contact was lost. A/C search and attack teams did not contribute to the results of SAU-2's operation.






Event 3 Night Steaming and ECM Exercise.

<u>Duration</u> 082300 - 090500 (6 hours.)

Narrative The U.S.S. HAMNER was designated as target ship. Radar silence condition one was set to be effective for the first ten minutes of each fifteen commencing on the hour. Twenty four reports were requested from the 3 reporting ships, for a total of 72 possible RENT reports. Fifteen reports (or 19%) were received and two reports did not include bearings.





Event 4 Exercise 15-1. Task Group Transit of Submarine Patrol Area.

<u>Duration</u> 090800U - 091100U (3 hours).

Results Submarine Contacts - 2 (sonar).

Destroyer attacks - 21 (4 excellent, 3 good, 4 fair,

3 poor. 7 not evaluated).

Submarine attacks - 2 (1 fair, 1 excellent).

Narrative

O800 The Task Group proceeded with bent-line screen and 2 search and attack teams airborne throughout the exercise. "Submarines" submerged and positioned themselves for coordinated attack. At O917, the CHARR sighted a DD and sent a contact report to the REDFISH, whereupon both SS commenced approach.

O937 The CHAN DLER made initial contact with REDFISH when she sighted a green flare. The CHAN DLER commenced an urgent attack, as the REDFISH simulated an attack on the BAIROKO (evaluated fair). SAU-1 was designated and dispatched. Initial sonar contact with the REDFISH was made by the GEORGE at 0953 and SAU-1 attacked and reattacked the REDFISH until 1119 when the OTC directed "Cease Exercise". A/C played no contributing part in SAU-1's operation.

The WILTSIE (in the screen) made initial sonar contact on the CHARR and commenced an urgent attack as the CHARR conducted a simulated attack on the BAIROKO (evaluated excellent). The WILTSIE broke off reattack on the CHARR as the subs periscope remained visible. At 1044 the CHARR simulated an attack on the WILTSIE (evaluated excellent), as the WILTSIE commenced a deliberate attack. The WILTSIE continued single ship attacks on the CHARR until the end of the exercise at 1119. Only 3 DD attacks were completed. (1 excellent, 2 poor). A/C search and attack teams played no contributing part in the WILTSIE's operation.





Event 5 Exercise 15-3. Task Group search for and Hunter/Killer operations against submarines in a general area.

<u>Duration</u> 091200U - 092300U (11 hours).

Results Submarine contacts - 13 (9 air, 4 sonar).

Air attacks - 1

Destroyer attacks - 8

Narrative

1200 The Task Group continued with a bent-line screen formation, and 2 search and attack teams airborne conducting search plan 4 MB throughout the exercise.

The CHARR and REDFISH submerged, the CHARR to snorkel and the REDFISH to simulate snorkeling by remaining at periscope depth with periscopes and SV mast extended. A GUPPY A/C made a series of radar contacts, but due to sea return was unable to hold until an attack A/C reached scene. At 1520 following one of these intermittent radar contact the GUPPY visually sighted the CHARR at 1000 yards and the attack A/C made an immediate class A attack (evaluated successful).

Upon receipt of the attack report from the A/C, the OTC 1523 directed SAU-1 to be formed and detached. SAU-1 formed abreast, separation 3000 yards, and proceeded to contact area, receiving an "on top" mark from the A/C at 1537. Two minutes later CTU 11.51.1 assumed command of the contact area and started Spiral Search Plan 7H. Shortly thereafter the REDFISH simulated firing torpedoes into the left DD of the SAU (the WILTSIE) as she turned toward the SS. The REDFISH then turned away, presented stern tubes and simulated firing 2 MK 28 homing torpedoes at the WILTSIE. The CHEVALIER and the CHANDLER commenced weaving when the WILTSIE was detached. At 1557 the CHARR simulated an attack on the CHEVALIER and at 1558 sonar contact was gained on both the REDFISH and the CHARR by the WILTSIE and CHEVALIER respectively. The REDFISH fired a false target shell at this time, however, SAU-1 was able to hold contact on both Submarines until they were ordered to break off attacks and surface the submarines at 1620.


1636-1645 The submarines were surfaced and the entire group was repositioned to recommence the exercise.





An attack plane made radar and then visual contact on submarine but due to malfunctioning of searchlight, no attack was made. The aircraft were unable to develop any further contacts and the submarines were unable to close to attack the force as the exercise ended at 2300. The sea state and searchlight malfunctions contributed largely to the inability of aircraft to locate and successfully investigate suspicious radar contacts.





Event 6 Night steaming and ECM Exercises.

<u>Duration</u> 092300U - 100500U (6 hours).

Narrative The CHEVALIER and the HAMNER acted as target ships.

Radar silence Condition One was set as in Event 3.

Twenty four RENT reports were requested from the 3 ships, a total of 72 possible reports. Sixteen reports (or 22%) were received. One report did not include bearings.





Event 7 Exercise 15-3. Task Group Search for and Hunter/ Killer Operations against submarines in a general area.

Duration 100800U - 102200U (14 hours).

Results
Submarine contacts 7 (3 sonar, 4 air).
Sonobuoy patterns 1
Destroyer attacks 16

Narrative

- 0800 The first launch was delayed due to weather (fog).
- 0930 Launched 2 search and attack teams (search plan 4 MB).
- 1318 The REDFISH made visual contact on the force and at 1330 a GUPPY A/C made radar contact on a submarine 8 miles ahead of the screen. This information was reported to the other team, located nearer the contact. The second GUPPY gained and then lost radar contact but saw the submarine submerge.
- 1339 SAU-1 was detached, and at 1346 reported "Contact Hot". Transfer of information between A/C and SAU Commander was effected, and at 1359 Operation RADISH was started with 2 DD's while the third began an Operation Tomato. The ROMBACH made contact at 1404 and SAU-1 conducted a series of 2 coordinated attacks before losing contact at 1420. Operation Tomato was conducted and the ROMBACH regained contact after which four successive attacks were made on the REDFISH prior to her surfacing at 1511.
- 1530 The problem resumed and from 1530 1920 the A/C received and investigated 3 radar contacts, and attempted unsuccessfully to confirm them with searchlight. It was not until 1920 that an attack plane dropped a sonobuoy pattern to prove its observation. The sonobuoy pattern produced no substantiating information and both A/C teams resumed normal search plan at 1936. Earlier during this period the REDFISH observed a searchlight probing the water off his port bow.
- 2030 The CHARR sighted the Task Group bearing 238 distance 9 miles and commenced an approach.
- 2032 Attack A/C made four search-light runs following radar contacts by the GUPPY, but failed to sight the submarine.





- The REDFISH made radar contact on an A/C closing. She turned on a submerged floodlight on the bow which was visually sighted by the aircraft, however the A/C was unable to identify due to in-operative searchlight.
- Aircraft were ordered to investigate a contact bearing 340 distance 12 miles which was identified as a submarine on the surface, course 190 speed 10 knots. At 2205 the GEORGE made radar contact on a surfaced submarine which was identified by the A/C as the REDFISH as the problem ended.






Event 8 Night steaming and ECM Exercises.

<u>Duration</u> 102300U - 110500U (6 hours).

Narrative The U.S.S. HAMNER acted target ship.

Radar silence Condition One was set as for previous ECM Exercises. Twenty four RENT reports were requested from each of the 3 ships taking part, a total of 72 possible reports. 26 reports (or 36%) were received, and several fixes were obtained.



Event 9 Exercise 15-2 Task Group Search for and Hunter/Killer operation against submarines.

<u>Duration</u> 110800U - 120800U (24 hours).


Results Submarine contacts - 17 (12 air, 5 sonar).


Air attacks - 2 Sonobuoy patterns - 5

Destroyer attacks - 8

Narrative


- 0800 The exercise commenced with the REDFISH located within a circle 30 miles in diameter, 170 miles from its destination, while the CHARR was located within a similar circle, but 188 miles from the same destination. The centers of each circle were 18 miles apart and the Task Group was located within a circle 25 miles in diameter whose center was midway between the centers of the submarine circles. Two search and attack teams were launched to drop and patrol a sonobuoy barrier pattern. This pattern consisted of 14 sonobuoys spaced 2 miles apart and extending along a tangent to the near edge of the REDFISH's circle. This drop was completed by 0825, but there were no indications of submarine transit of the pattern. There was one unsubstantiated report of belllike noises on one sonobuoy.
- O830 Between completion of the initial sonobuoy drop and 1830, numerous radar contacts were made by A/C teams but, although sonobuoy patterns were dropped on two separate occasions, no contacts were developed.
- 1830 The aircraft picked up a radar contact which immediately disappeared and was evaluated as a submarine. A sonobuoy pattern was laid at point of submergence and although no cavitation was heard, machinery noises were identified at 1835.
- 1844 SAU-1 composed of HAMNER, CHANDLER and WILTSIE, was detached to investigate contact held by aircraft. Contact was established with the aircraft and information was exchanged.





- 1948 The REDFISH made contact on approaching SAU-1 and shortly after went down to 200 feet. As SAU-1 entered the contact area command, the WILTSIE was detached to investigate possible sonar contact to East of estimated datum point while the CHANDLER and HAMNER continued on to the datum.
- The WILTSIE evaluated the contact as a submarine and commenced D/C attack. From 2006 to 2016 the WILTSIE completed 3 attacks against the REDFISH. (One excellent, one fair, and one poor). At 2014 the HAMNER was directed to assist the WILTSIE while the CHANDLER conducted an area search. The WILTSIE and the HAMNER conducted coordinated attacks reporting contact "hot" until 2021. The aircraft were conducting a box area search during the above action.
- 2032 Contact was lost by SAU-1, and after commencement of Operation Tomato contact was reported "cold." At 2108 SAU-1 commenced an area search and resumed weaving. SAU-1 continued to search without success until 0013 when it was directed to rejoin the force and investigate a surface contact enroute which a search team had discovered but had been unable to develop. This contact was eventually evaluated as weather and SAU-1 rejoined the force at 0352.
- 0005 An airborne team made radar contact at 8 miles from the force and investigated without success. The contact was evaluated as a submarine. Future developments proved this contact to be the CHARR. SAU-2 composed of the ROMBACH and the GEORGE were detached to investigate the above contact. At 0046 SAU-2 marked datum time and commenced Operation Tomato which was completed without contact. At Oll5 the aircraft working with SAU-2 made contact again and were investigating while SAU-2 commenced Operation Radish. At 0204 SAU-2 ceased Operation Radish and proceeded to investigate the contact held by the aircraft. SAU-2 passed the new datum point at 0230 and commenced another Operation Radish., From 0300. when CHARR recommenced snorkeling, until 0626 when SAU-1 relieved SAU-2 the GEORGE held intermittent radar and sonar contact on the CHARR at ranges varying from 3 miles to 1400 yards, but could not identify due to lack of illumination. Aircraft teams vectored to the scene were not effective due to radio and radar failures. The GEORGE also was having only intermittent sonar operation, and the CHARR did not take full evasive measures because of non-metalic return on sonar contact.





- O600 SAU-1 composed of the WILTSIE and the HAMNER were detached to replace SAU-2 which was now composed of only the GEORGE due to detachment of the ROMBACH at 0400. SAU-1 relieved SAU-2 at 0626 and was immediately attacked by the CHARR. The HAMNER and the WILTSIE completed 4 D/C attacks and 1 ahead thrown weapons attack. At 0705 SAU-1 broke off the attacks and surfaced the CHARR.
- The REDFISH submerged due to approaching aircraft and at 0649 a class "A" attack was delivered ahead of wake by attack aircraft. Two practice depth charges were dropped, followed by a 5 buoy sonobuoy pattern. No cavitation was received from the sonobuoy pattern, and the team resumed search pattern at 0712. No SAU was sent to this contact due to approaching end of exercise.
- 0800 End of Event 9.
- 0804 REDFISH surfaced.







WEATHER CONDITIONS DURING HUNTER/KILLER OPERATIONS FOR THE PERIOD 8 DECEMBER THROUGH 12 DECEMBER 1952

Event	Date/Time (Uncle)	Position (32° N. Lat.)	SKY	CEIL.	VIS.	WIND	SEA	REMARKS
1	Underway from Har	bor	Broken	3500	15	E 8	Slt.	
2	08/1400-2200	118-119°W.	Setd.	Unl.	10	N.N.W.	Mod.	
3	08/2300- 09/0500	118-1200W.	Clear	Unl.	10	15 N.N.W. 18	Mod.	
4	09/0800-1100	120°W.	Clear	Unl.	8	N.N.W. 18	Mod.	Lgt. Haze
5	09/1200-2300	120°W.	Clear	Unl.	10	N.N.W.	Mod.	
6	09/2400-	120 ° W.	Clear	Unl.	10	N. 20	Mod.	
	10/0300 10/0300-0500		Broken	Unl.	2	N. 20	Mod.	Fog. & Stratus.
7	10/0800-1009	122°W.	Broken	600	3	N. 18	Mod.	Fog & Stratus.
	1000-1400 1400-2200	122 ° W. 121 ° W.	Broken Broken	-		N. 16 N.N.W.	Mod.	Wind to 25
8	10/2300-	121°W.	Broken	Unl.	8	N.N.W.	Mod.	Max. Wind 26
9	11/0500 11/0800-1100 11/1200-1400 11/1500-1900 11/1900-12/0500	122°W. 122°W. 121°W. 121°W. 119°W.	Sctd. Broken Cléar Clear Clear	Unl. 800 Unl. Unl. Unl.	10 10 10	N.W. 18 N.W. 18	Mod. Mod. 10 Mod.	Max. Wind 26 Slight Haze Slight Haze
Fly-a	-way 12/1000U		Clear	Unl.	2	N. 10	Mod.	Slight Haze

Enclosure





TABULATED EVALUATION OF SUBMARINE TORPEDO ATTACKS

DATE/TIME	EVENT NO.	SUBM ARINE	TARGET	SUBMARINE'S EVALUATION
081448	2	CHARR	BAIROKO	FAIR
081502	2	CHARR	CHEVALIER	EXCELLENT
081517	2	CHARR	CHEVALIER	EXCELLENT
081758	2	CHARR	UNK DD	GOOD
081811	2	CHARR	UNK DD	GOOD
081814	2	REDFISH	UNK DD	EXCELLENT
090942	4 *	REDFISH	BAI ROKO	FAIR
091040	4 *	CHARR	BAIROKO	EXCELLENT
091044	4 *	CHARR	WILTSIE	EXCELLENT .
091549	5 *	REDFISH	WILTSIE	FAIR
091552	5 *	REDFISH	WILTSIE	EXCELLENT
091557	5 *	CHARR	CHEVALIER	GOOD

^{*} The two submarines operated as a team during all of EVENTS 4 and 5

Enclosure 3(B)

