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From: Commander Air Task Group TWO
To: Commanding Officer, USS ESSEX (CVA-9)

Subj: Action Report of Air Task Group TWO for period of
25 November 1952 to 13 January 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INST. 3480.4 of 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the
action report of the USS ESSEX (CVA-9) as required by reference (a).

J. G. Daniels
J. G. DANIELS

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COMPOSITION OF FORCES

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL A/C</u>		<u>PILOTS</u>	
		<u>11/25</u>	<u>1/13</u>	<u>11/25</u>	<u>1/13</u>
VF-23 LCDR C.C. AIKINS	F9F-2	13	14	21	20
VF-821 CDR. D.W. COOPER	F9F-2	13	15	24*	23*
VF-871 LCDR. F.C. HEARRELL, Jr.	F4U-4	13	13	24**	23**
VA-55 CDR. L.W. CHICK	AD-4	12	14	21	20
VC-3 LT. C.W. CHAPMAN	F4U-5N	4	4	5	5
VC-11 LCDR. D.W. KNIGHT	AD-4W	3	3	5	4
VC-35 LCDR. E. H. POTTER	AD-4N	4	4	6	6
VC-61 LT. T.L. NEILSON	F2H-2P	2	2	4	4

*Includes CATG-2.


**Includes ATG-2 Operations Officer.

MISSION

The mission of Air Task Group TWO is that set forth in CTF-77 OP Order NR. 2-52. The mission of this Air Group is to perform close air support, reconnaissance interdiction and air bombardment missions in order to destroy enemy forces, communications, and installations in support of United Nations Forces.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 25 November - 6 December - Restricted availability during catapult repairs at Yokosuka, Japan.
- 7 December - Total Sorties - 76 - Operational refresher training flights.
- 8 December - Total Sorties - 51 - Joined CTF-77.
- 9 December - Total Sorties - 108 - Lost one AD due loss of oil pressure - pilot rescued after ditching near friendly forces.
- 10 December - Total Sorties - 96
- 11 December - Replenishment - No Air Operations.
- 12 December - Total Sorties - 86 - Lost one F4U-4 due rocket engine explosion - aircraft crashed on landing at friendly airfield, received strike damage. Pilot uninjured.
- 13 December - Total Sorties - 89
- 14 December - Total Sorties - 101
- 15 December - Total Sorties - 58
- 16 December - Replenishment - No Air Operations.
- 17 December - Total Sorties 96
- 18 December - Total Sorties 104
- 19 December - Replenishment - No Air Operations.
- 20 December - Total Sorties - 105
- 21 December - Total Sorties - 70
- 22 December - Total Sorties - 101
- 23 December - Total Sorties - 98
- 25 December - Total Sorties - 49 (1/2 day due to Xmas)
- 26 December - Total Sorties - 99
- 

- 27 December - Total Sorties - 101
- 28 December - Total Sorties - 98 - Lost one F9F-2 due flame out - pilot rescued uninjured.
- 29 December - Replenishment - No Air Operations.
- 30 December - Total Sorties - 109
- 31 December - Total Sorties - 98
- 1 January - Weather - No Air Operations.
- 2 January - Total Sorties - 92
- 3 January - Total Sorties - 98
- 4 January - Replenishment - No Air Operations.
- 5 January - Total Sorties - 52
- 6 January - Weather - No Air Operations.
- 7 January - Weather - No Air Operations.
- 8 January - Total Sorties - 84
- 9 January - Total Sorties - 49
- 10 January - Replishment.
- 11 January - Enroute Yokosuka - 45 ESSEX aircraft ferried to Atsugi, KING 3 and USS VALLEY FORGE.
- 12 January - Enroute Yokosuka.

OPERATIONS

PART II OPERATIONS

Flight Summary of Sorties

	F9F	F4U	AD-4	F4U-5N	ADW	ADN	F2H-2P	TOTAL
Strike	380	255	294	---	---	---	---	929
Recco	261	---	---	---	---	---	---	261
ASP (Day)	---	---	---	---	37	10	---	47
ASP (Night)	---	---	---	---	16	17	---	33
Night Heckler	---	---	---	55	---	49	---	104
NGF Spot	---	30	4	4	---	---	---	38
Photo	---	---	---	---	---	---	68	68
Photo Escort	70	---	---	---	---	---	---	70
ASP Escort (Day)	---	5	6	13	---	---	---	24
ASP Escort (Night)	---	---	---	1	---	---	---	1
CAP	234	---	---	---	---	---	---	234
TARCAP	55	---	---	---	---	---	---	55
CAS	---	81	73	---	---	---	---	154
RESCAP & Pilot Search	---	4	---	---	---	---	---	4
ECM	---	---	---	---	---	12	---	12
ECM Escort	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
AEW	---	---	---	---	3	3	---	6
OTHER	49	10	58	28	5	20	3	173
TOTAL	1049	385	435	101	61	111	71	2213

Per Pilot Data

Per Pilot	F9F	F2H	F4U-4	F4U-5N	AD-4	AD-4N	AD-4W
Sorties	25	17.0	15.8	14.7	20	18	12
Flight Hrs	37	28.6	42.7	47.1	55.1	51	30.2
Carrier Land-ings	24.6	17.0	16.6	16.8	19	18	12.2

Grand Total for period 18 July 1952 to 11 January 1953

Total Sorties 7,606

Total Combat Missions 5,719

Total Hours 15,565

Total Bombs and Rockets 30,990

Total Tons of Ammunition 5,522

Total 20MM and 50 Caliber rounds fired 1,185,224

Damage Inflicted on Enemy

	Destroyed	Probably Destroyed	Damaged
Oxcarts	12	2	6
Tanks	3	--	--
Trucks	126	56	84
Troops	25	--	--
RR Cars	56	37	10
RR Locomotives	9	--	11
Boats	37	--	--
Buildings	129	194	77
Barracks	38	11	9
Troop Shelter	11	2	--
Warehouses	71	17	38
Factory Buildings	6	--	--
Shore Battery	--	--	--
AA Guns	28	18	15
Artillery/Mortar Pos.	--	--	--
Bunkers	28	16	31
Supply Dumps	5	--	14
RR Cuts	53	23	58
Marshading (Yds)	---	--	--
Radar Site	--	--	1
Trenches	305 Yds	--	--
Hwy Bridges	11	4	3
Round Houses	1	1	3

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DATE	SQDN	TYPE	BUNR	CAUSE	POSITION OF DAMAGE	CODE
DEC 12	VF871	F4U-4	96759	20MM	Port Wing starboard	D-1
20	VF23	F9F-2	123647	37MM Frag	Port wing starboard	D-3
20	VF23	F9F-2	123072	50 cal.	Leading edge	D-3
20	VA55	AD-4	126952	SA	Propeller Blade	D-3
20	VA55	AD-4	128925	SA	Engine cowl	D-3
20	VF871	F4U-4	81820	SA	Starboard horizontal stabilizer	D-3
20	VF871	F4U-4	81009	37MM	Port horizontal stabilizer	D-3
20	VF821	F9F-2	123405	37MM	Nose cone starboard wing stub	D-3
21	VA55	AD-4	129015	SA	Oil cooler cowl	D-3
21	VA55	AD-4	128949	SA	Lower dive brake	D-3
22	VF23	F9F-2	122588	37MM	Leading edge port wing	D-3
23	VA55	AD-4	128981	AA Frag	Starboard wing	D-3
26	VA55	AD-4	128963	AA Frag	Port wing	D-3
27	VA55	AD-4	128925	SA	Port aileron	D-3
27	VA55	AD-4	129013	SA	Starboard side fuselage aft.	D-3
27	VF23	F9F-2	127194	50 cal.	Port wing inspection plate	D-3
27	VF23	F9F-2	123513	SA	Trailing edge port aileron	D-3
28	VA55	AD-4	123811	AA Frag	Starboard wing	D-3
30	VA55	AD-4	128960	AA Frag	Starboard wing	D-3
31	VF821	F9F-2	123023	SA	Port side cockpit	D-3
31	VC61	F2H-2P	128826	37MM	Eppanage sec.	D-3
JAN 2	VF23	F9F-2	127139	37MM	Vertical fin	D-3
2	VF871	F4U-4	84141	50 cal.	Port aileron trim tab	D-3
5	VF23	F9F-2	127194	SA	Port wing tip tank	D-3
8	VA55	AD-4N	123704	SA	Starboard wing	D-3
8	VA55	AD-4N	125708	SA	Starboard wing	D-3

Loss of Aircraft

DATE	SQDN	TYPE	BUNR	CAUSE
Dec 9	VA55	AD-4NA	126927	Controlled water landing due to hit in oil line and loss of oil.
12	VF871	F4U-4	96759	Battle damage. Caused forced landing plane demelished on rough terrain
28	VF23	F9F-2	123435	Controlled water landing due to flame out.

1. JET Operations (Summary)

a. CAP - Most CAP hops were flown at 20,000 feet. As the hops were usually 1 1/2 hours a fairly high power setting of about 87% could be carried and the flight would still land with 2,000 pounds of fuel. The formation used was a section trail. Section was maintained by either an ellipse or a figure eight.

b. RECCO.

Four plane reccos were flown. In this squadron two planes flew low and two high. Both sections flew as very loose elements with a three dimensional separation of 300 to 500 feet. The recco was flown so as to cover 3 or 4 miles either side of the route. The major portion of the flight was parallel to the route but not down the MSR. Base altitude varied between 1,000 and 3,000 feet. The latter altitude was the safer as far as flak was concerned and provided better navigational information for the flight leader. However camouflaged objects could be more easily detected at the 1,000 foot level. By continual evaluation on this cruise, it is believed that a very efficient recco can be conducted using 3,000 feet as the base altitude. However, pilots must be trained along these lines, if they are to realize any practical benefits from the higher altitude search.

c. STRIKES.

1. For strikes it has been the policy to make only one run on heavily defended targets. Approach altitude varies between 10,000 and 20,000 feet, using the sun for cover when practicable. A dive angle of 35 to 40 degrees was used with excellent results with a power setting between 82 and 90 percent. This usually gave a speed of 430 to 470 knots.

2. On poorly defended targets 2 to 4 runs were made with a different type of approach and retirement for each run.

d. COORDINATED STRIKES.

On coordinated strikes, the jet mission normally was flak suppression. One division or section would immediately precede the propellar aircraft. If the flak positions were known the other jets would go in with the props. If the flak positions were not known the remaining jets would go in behind the props and cover the flanks during the retirement. On occasions when the target was not easily detected, the lead section of jets was used to mark the target.

e. **TARCAP.**

For TARCAP's on the strikes near the Manchurian Border, 4 plane elements were used with stations 10 to 15 miles from the target in the direction of expected attack. Station was maintained by using a section trail figure eight parallel to the border. Base altitude was usually 22,000 feet and base speed 260 to 290 knots. No enemy aircraft were encountered although several sightings were made in the WONSAN and NAJIN area. In all cases the MIG's remained above 30,000 feet.

2. **SCHEDULING.**

a. **LENGHT OF TOUR.**

A 20 to 25 day operating tour would be desirable from the pilots and maintenance view point. This Air Group has had 3 tours of over 30 days each. By the end of the third week the pilots are tired and their efficiency drops. About the same time, the aircraft also get tired and the availability drops. On the last tour on the line, usually 4 days were flown followed by a replenishment day. On the fourth day of flying, availability was usually down 15 to 20 percent from the third day.

b. **FLIGHT SCHEDULING.**

The 1 1/2 hour jet flight presents no problem for the F9F-2. However, there are many cases where a little simple navigation prior to scheduling would readily reveal the desired launch separation of prop and jet aircraft conducting coordinated strikes. Numerous cases in recent weeks have arisen where the distance to the target was 35 to 40 miles and the jets were launched 40 minutes after the props. For strikes under 50 miles, they could easily be launched in one continuous launch. A recommended table of launch separation is as follows:

<u>DISTANCE PIM TO TARGET</u>	<u>JET LAUNCH AFTER PROPS</u>
Under 50 Miles	0 Minutes
50 - 100 Miles	20 Minutes
100 - 140 Miles	30 Minutes
140 - 170 Miles	40 Minutes
170 - 200 Miles	50 Minutes

Strong upper winds will require minor modification in these times.

J. COMMUNICATIONS.

a. CALLS - The four digit call system is at best cumbersome; to abbreviate it results in confusion. When operating on our own ship land launch which was used for strikes over the beach, we used the squadron color plus a number - e.g. WHITE 1, WHITE 2, etc. It is recommended that a study be made to improve the present naval aircraft call system using one syllable words only as few of these as possible.

JET PHOTO COMMENTS

1. This unit has successfully located the K-18 and K-38 24" camera in the aft bay, without alteration of the basic design, so that it can be rotated from the cockpit, from the vertical position to any of the four oblique positions. The use of a 24" camera with a 9 x 18" negative offers the advantages of increased scale, longer slant ranges and the addition of orientation coverage to pinpoint obliques.
2. The incorporation of a forward firing camera in all photo configured aircraft is strongly recommended. A forward firing camera should have at least a 24" focal length in order to get large scale photos from relatively high altitudes. The reconnaissance mount in the F2H-2P could be easily adapted to interchange a forward firing 24" camera with the 6" camera presently mounted in the forward bay by modifying the nose of the F2H.
3. In using the forward viewfinder in the F2H-2P when operating a 36" camera, difficulty was experienced in estimating the areas of coverage due to the lack of a 36" template. It is recommended that a 36" coverage template similar to the 6" and 12" templates be installed in the forward viewfinder.
4. Fulfilling the 90% forward overlap requirement of oblique photography is presently a matter of guess work. In order to correct this defect it is recommended that the Interval Computer in the F2H-2P be modified to permit the selection of either 60 or 90% forward overlap for any slant range (altitude) and ground speed combination.
5. Several instances of camera failure in flight have been caused by the blowing of the camera power fuze located in the nose section. The relocation of this fuze in the cockpit would enable the pilot to replace it and preclude the loss of this vital circuit.

NIGHT ATTACK

The launch and recovery times of night hecklers remained

approximately the same this tour as last, however, the shorter day at this time of the year allowed hecklers to have more time over the beach during hours of darkness, thus increasing their effectiveness and value to the night interdiction program.

ASW COMMENT

In order that ASW teams may maintain a high state of teaming, an exercise with a fleet submarine should be scheduled at regular intervals. It is recommended that once each 30 days would be sufficient.

ORDNANCE COMMENT

a. The use of ATAR's on one run targets with a split load (Bombs and Rockets) is ineffective due to lack of suitable targets and the lack of training in this type of run as has been commented before the training period should include at least four flights using split loads on a one run target.

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PART III ORDNANCE

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

TYPE ORDNANCE	AD4	F4U4	F9F2	AD4N	F4U5N	TOTAL
2000 #GP	38					38
1000 #GP	729	58				787
500 #GP	329	276		56	44	705
250 #GP	1276	896	1467	119	80	3838
100 #GP	376	132	1164	288		1960
350 #Depth Bomb	2	3			16	21
260 #Frag	266	250	1026	57	382	1981
3".25 ASAR	15	24		114	66	219
5". ATAR		132	86			218
1000 # SAP	8					8
500 # SAP		4				4
NAPALM	12	4				16
MK 6 Flares				250		250
20MM	54,684		105,466	13,950	22,500	196,600
.50 Cal.		155,000				155,000

TOTAL						
LBS	1,583,684	610,560	889,244	134,827	171,855	3,389,869
TOTAL						
TONS	791.5	305.5	444.	67.5	86.	1694.5

HUNG ORDNANCE REPORT

Type Ordnance	AERO 14A	MK 51	MK 55-1	MK 9	TOTAL
ATAR	2			12	14
260 #FRAG	1		10		11
250 #GP	4		9		13
100 #GP			10		10
500 #GP		1			1
TOTAL	7	1	29	12	49

DISPOSITION OF HUNG ORDNANCE

TYPE ORDNANCE	REMAINED ON RACK	TOTAL
ATAR	14	14
260 #FRAG	11	11
250 #GP	13	13
100 #GP	10	10
500 #GP	1	1
TOTAL	49	49

ORDNANCE

1. 20MM and .50 Caliber Guns

The performance of all guns installed in aircraft has continued to be excellent. Very few stoppages occurring could be attributed to cold weather. Cold weather had some effect on 20MM links causing them to become brittle and more subject to breakage. An occasional slippage of 20MM feed mechanism occurred. As soon as this was detected, feed mechanisms were removed and relubricated with specified winter lubricant as specified by BuOrd Material Letter GU 18-15. No shortage of .50 Cal. and 20MM gun parts were noted.

2. Bomb Racks and Bomb Ejectors

All bomb racks with the exception of the MK 55. Mod 1. racks have given satisfactory service. Four bombs were dropped during catapult launch from these racks. In all cases, wear and rounding of the shoulder on the trigger release caused rack failure. Sway braces of the M^A 55-1 rack still showed a marked weakness and many breakages occurred. Fahnstock clips in current supply are of a very poor quality. About one fourth are faulty and cannot be used. The spring tension of clips vary to such extent that pull required to extract two clips from arming wire will range from 6 to 20 pounds. Clips of this type make it impossible to assure bombs will drop safe or if arming wire will be held safely prior to drop from aircraft. Clips are difficult to install on arming wires and use of tools to install clip makes them all the more unreliable.

Several douglas bomb ejector foot assemblies have been lost during combined operating periods. Excessive wear on the piston assemblies and piston assembly retaining keys has been the cause of the majority of these losses. A RUDM has been forwarded to BuOrd concerning metal fatigue of these parts.

3. Rockets and Rocket Launchers

Very few rockets were used during this operating period. No noted difficulties were experienced.

MAINTENACE PART IV

1. JETS

Many TJC's were changed in December due to unexplained surging of engine R.P.M., most noticeable on throttle retardation. While the cause was not definitely determined, it is believed the failures were caused by malfunction of either the governor or regulator valves. Many of the replacement TJC's were overage in preservation and failed to check-out. It is recommended that steps be taken to remove from the supply system any remaining overage TJC's. The difficulty encountered earlier in the cruise with sticking aneroid shafts seems to have been corrected by installing new aneroid shafts and bushings lubricated with "lubriplate" where failures occurred. Three high pressure pumps were changed in December. The commonest failures for the entire cruise were malfunction of the amplifying system, causing pressure spillage, and leaks past the motor shaft chevron seals or through the overboard drain.

Several instances have been noted where sections of wiring which lie near the commonest sources of hydraulic leaks have in time been liberally doused with hydralube (H-4). This water-base fluid attacks the insulation over a period of time and can destroy the wiring. In high-time aircraft, the condition of the wiring could well be the limiting factor in the service life of the aircraft. Accordingly, it is suggested that both the hydraulic and electrical systems of F9F aircraft receive special attention in overhaul with particular attention being paid to the condition of all cannon plugs.

A high number of tailhook point changes continued to be necessary due to chips, cracks, nicks, and one complete failure in which the hook point split and came off, permitting the aircraft to go into the barricade. One double-wire engagement occurred. This was the first time in three such engagements experienced by this squadron in which the hook point bolt did not experience a tensile failure. RUDMS have been submitted in all cases.

2. AD's

Maintenance problems of the AD-4, AD-4N, and AD-4W aircraft were not unusual. Availability, computed in accordance with the Naval Warfare Reporting Manual, has declined under that of the last period because of non-availability of spare parts. ACOG's issued six (6); flight days lost twenty-one (21). Several instances of rough running engines were reported, but were decreased by pilot indoctrination on the proper utilization of

alternate air and engine cylinder head temperature control. The AD without the nose cowl flaps is not recommended for use during the winter in Korea. Oil dilution was not used during this period; however at each shut-down the oil diverter valve was closed for easier starts. APU's were not required for all aircraft but were used on each for the early morning plane captain warm up start. Ignition harness trouble has been nil since drilling vent holes in compliance with ComAirPac R-3350 Engine Technical Bulletin No. 16. Some moisture is still being found in the distributor bowls, indicating that a better design is required. AD armor plate saved another aircraft from loss or strike damage.

Inspection of the landing gear spindle at the knuckle in accordance with the request of ComFairJap was not accomplished in all aircraft because of the pressure of operations, the lack of hoisting and jacking space and the inherent danger of a jacked up aircraft during carrier operations and rolling seas.

ELECTRONICS

1. Electronics maintenance remained at a high level for the tour. No major discrepancies appeared. There was a rise in the number of reported malfunctions to the actual break downs. There was also a slight rise in normal maintenance required to keep equipment available during this last period of cruise.

2. Electronic personnel have experienced no major break downs of equipment this cruise which has resulted in an excellent state of readiness for the entire period in WesPac.

PART V

AIR INTELLIGENCE

Comments and Recommendations.

1. Comments.

a. The Air Intelligence Officer of CAG-9 reported aboard the USS ESSEX (CVA-9) for a period of five days to study the methods of the Air Intelligence team under actual combat operating conditions.

b. Air Group FIVE sent a detachment of nine officers aboard for a period of seven days for indoctrination and participating in flights. These pilots, (CO's, XO's and Operations Officers), were given several comprehensive briefings by Air Group Air Intelligence Officers as well as by the Squadron Commanding Officers. This group of officers spent their "spare time" gathering information and ideas from pilots which were recently experienced in Korean combat, and also preparing maps and procedures for assistance to their own squadrons.

2. Recommendations.

a. It is recommended that Air Group Intelligence Officers be ordered to the most experienced carrier on the line, for a period of two weeks, to benefit from the experience gained by a seasoned Air Group.

b. It is believed that a group of pilots, (CO's, XO's and Operations Officers), benefit greatly from active participation in strikes and the intelligence briefing received, based on recent experiences. It is recommended that the practice of sending such a group of pilots aboard for a period of active participation be continued.

MEDICAL

PART VI

1. Performance.

Performance has been excellent and morale outstanding during this period of operation. However, during the phase of this period in which the prop pilots were required to fly two combat missions per day, the effects of fatigue on the various pilots personalities began to become evident, and the morale of these pilots suffered somewhat of a drop. This was corrected by starting the policy of allowing only one combat hop per day to the prop pilots.

2. Illness.

a. There have been 52 pilots grounded for this period of operation; 22 for periods of 7 days or more, 30 for shorter periods of time. The predominant reason for grounding was respiratory illness.

b. There have been 6 aircrewmembers grounded for short periods of time during this period of operation. The predominant reason for grounding was respiratory illness.

3. Casualties

a. Wounded in Action - LTJG Gordon "H" FARMER 498155/1310, USN, received medical treatment for multiple lacerations and abrasions about the right eye and contusions of the right shoulder which he suffered as a result of flying debris or missiles striking his plane on a combat mission over Communist Territory, North Korea, 22 December 1952.

b. Missing in Action - There have been no personnel declared missing in action during this period.

4. Psychiatric Disorder.

a. One pilot was grounded during this period for excessive nervousness and apprehension resulting from marked drop in motivation.

5. Venereal Disease.

a. There were 12 cases of venereal disease; 10 of which were gonorrhoea, 2 of which were chancroid.

6. Deaths.

a. There have been no deaths reported for this period.

7. Recommendations.

a. It is recommended that a more satisfactory arrangement be made regarding the wearing of exposure suits. It is assumed that many of the respiratory illnesses encountered were predisposed by the rapid temperature changes involved in going from Ready Room to aircraft plus going from aircraft to Ready Room while perspiring freely.

b. It is further recommended that, if at all feasible, the policy of flying prop pilots only one combat hop per day be adopted at the beginning of the cruise. It is strongly believed that the fatigue associated with two combat hops per day greatly influenced the health of the pilots. The predominance of illness was found among the prop pilots.

PART VII

1. Personnel

In consideration of the high incidence of sickness incurred during winter operations and the heavy requirement of squadron personnel by the ships TAD requirements, it is recommended that the squadron non-rated allowance be increased by 15 men. This increase in complement would allow 1.5 men per assigned aircraft as plane captains. This is considered by this unit to be the minimum number compatible with efficient operations.

AD's - The recent policy of CTF-77 on restricting the pilots of the AD and F4U's to one combat (over enemy territory) flight per day during the winter months while wearing the exposure suit will require from 175% to 200% pilots per plane in order to fulfill present scheduling requirements. This will be noticed more particularly when the three jet, one AD squadron, Groups arrive in the area.

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SURVIVAL

1. The requirement for all pilots to wear oxygen masks, when over enemy territory has paid dividends. One pilot, shot down in flames, had an oxygen mask casualty on the flight and was not wearing his mask and suffered facial burns of greater intensity than on his hands which were covered by gloves. It is noted that this pilot hasn't had any trouble with his mask since that time. Another pilot very severely burned about the collar line, would have been fatally burned without the mask. The burns he suffered about the face were inflicted after the burning mask was removed. Another pilot suffered minor facial lacerations through the mask when shrapnel entered the cockpit. His wounds would have been serious without the additional mask protection.

2. The MK 3 exposure suit is barely satisfactory - comment on it is not made because it is known that the MK 4 is now being furnished to fleet units. However, cockpits of modern aircraft that are to be used by pilots wearing exposure suits must have all projecting knobs, bolts, and levers smoothed off or eliminated to prevent damage to the suit or accidental actuation of mechanisms due the baggy fit of the suits.

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