

8 December 1952

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
To: Commanding Officer, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)

Subj: Action report of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE for period
20 October through 6 December 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Subject action report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the Action Report of the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) as required by reference (a).

2. Information, comments and recommendations are presented under the headings indicated below:

I MISSION AND COMPOSITION

II CHRONOLOGY

III ORDNANCE

IV DAMAGE

 Inflicted on the enemy.

 Damage to our aircraft.

V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

VI COMMENTS

 Operations and procedures.

 Summary of combat sorties by type and missions.

 Summary of average combat flight hours, average number of sorties by squadron.

 Maintenance and Material.

 Air Intelligence.

 Survival.

 Electronics.

H. P. Ady, Jr.
H. P. ADY, Jr.

ACTION REPORT
OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE
FOR PERIOD
20 OCTOBER - 6 DECEMBER

DECLASSIFIED

PART I

MISSION AND COMPOSITION

During the period 28 October to 1 November, Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE performed missions as outlined in Commander Task Force SEVENTY Operation Order 76-52.

During the period 1 November to 6 December, the primary mission of Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE was to fly close air support of ground troops, destruction of enemy military supplies in the North Eastern half of Korea, interdiction of enemy main supply routes, destruction of supply vehicles and enemy troops, air support of NGF, and support of East Coast Blockade and Escort Force. Photographic, night and weather flights were employed in support of these missions as required.

Composition of forces:

28 October through 6 December

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TYPE AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL A/C</u>		<u>PILOTS</u>	
		<u>10-28</u>	<u>- 12-6</u>	<u>10-28</u>	<u>- 12-6</u>
VF-11 CDR D. P. PHILLIPS	F2H-2	16	14	26	26
VF-721 LCDR F. R. ROBERTS	F9F-2	15	13	*24	22
VF-884 LCDR F. W. BOWEN	F4U-4	13	10	20	19
VA-702 LCDR H. C. MC CLAUGHERTY	AD-4, AD-4L	16	14	**28 1 pilot in hospital	27
VC-3 (Det FOX) LCDR R. F. KANZE	F4U-5N	4	4	5 1 pilot detached.	4
VC-61 (Det FOX) LCDR H. M. GARVEY	F2H-2P	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (Det FOX) LCDR M. G. BRAMBILLA	AD-4N	4	4	5 1 pilot detached	4
VC-11 (Det FOX) LT T. H. RIGGAN	AD-4W	3	3	5	5

* Includes Operations Officer, CVG-101.

** Includes Commander Carrier Air Group 101 and Administrative Officer, CVG-101.

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

10-20-52 to 10-27-52: Yokosuka, Japan. Upkeep.

10-28-52: Departed NOB Yokosuka, Japan enroute to Korean Theatre.

10-29-52: Enroute to Korean Theatre. Two ADN aircraft flew a mission to Itazuke, Japan and returned.

10-30-52: Missions were flown this date in accordance with CTF-70 Operation Order 76-52. A total of 51 sorties were flown by Air Group 101.

10-31-52: Enroute to Korean Theatre. Two ADN aircraft flew mission from Itazuke, Japan. 2 F2H-2P flew missions to K-3.

11-1-52: Morning heckler flights covered main supply routes West and North of Wonsan. One locomotive and several rail cars were damaged. One coordinated strike was flown in support of the front line troops employing AD, F4U and F9F aircraft. Two pilots were lost this date the first being LT C. O. GLISSON, an F9F pilot of VF-721. He reported a rough running engine and turned toward the east coast of Korea. He was last seen entering an overcast. His aircraft crashed into the water about ten miles from the shore line. The second pilot, LT R. G. RIDER, a VF-384 pilot of an F4U was hit by AA fire while diving on a target in the vicinity of CHUN-CHON. He was not seen to recover from the dive. Only 42 sorties were flown this date due to heavy sea conditions.

11-2-52: 93 sorties - Morning hecklers hit trucks and supply buildings along Main Supply Routes North of Wonsan and Hamhung. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in all sectors. AD's and F4U's flew strike missions in support of front line troops along the central sector. Naval Gun Fire spot was provided for the bombardment force in vicinity of WONSAN.

11-3-52: No air operations - Replenishment.

11-4-52: Morning hecklers covered recco routes in northern sector along coast line. Numerous trucks were destroyed in vicinity of SONGJIN. AD's and F4U's hit supply and build-up areas close to the front line in the central sector. Jet aircraft covered recco routes north and west of WONSAN and destroyed many supply buildings in that area. 103 sorties were flown this date.

11-5-52: 102 sorties. Morning hecklers covered recco routes north of WONSAN. Numerous trucks and rail cars were destroyed. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in all sectors and damaged bridges, rail cars and railroads in the target area. AD's and F4U's flew close support missions in direct support of the front line troops in the western sector.

CONFIDENTIAL

11-6-52: Jet aircraft covered Main Supply Routes north and west of WONSAN. Numerous supply buildings were destroyed or damaged. Late in the period jet aircraft coordinated with AD's and F4U's for close air support missions in direct support of the front line troops in the central sector. Excellent results were obtained. Low ceilings and restricted visibility cancelled air operations after a total of 63 sorties were flown.

11-7-52: No air operations. Replenishment.

11-8-52: 93 sorties. Propellor driven type aircraft coordinated with the jets to hit heavy artillery positions along the front lines in the central sector. Pilots reported the flak encountered was the most intense they had encountered since flying in the Korean area. One pilot, LCDR F. W. BOWEN, squadron commander of VF-884, was lost in the target area. Jet aircraft hit supply areas south of WONSAN with excellent results. Night hecklers covered MSR's north of WONSAN and destroyed trucks and damaged a small ship along the beach in vicinity of SONGJON-MAN.

11-9-52: Weather hampered flight operations over the target area. Jet aircraft flew weather recco. A total of 20 sorties were flown this date.

11-10-52: AD's and F4U's flew strike missions in the vicinity of the front line troops along the central front. Most of the targets assigned were troops and heavy gun positions. Jet aircraft covered MSR's in all sectors and destroyed numerous trucks and ox-carts. Weather conditions prohibited attacking targets in the most northern sectors. A total of 99 sorties were flown.

11-11-52: No air operations - Replenishment.

11-12-52: No air operations - inclement weather.

11-13-52: 6 sorties. Air operations restricted due to inclement weather.

11-14-52: No air operations - inclement weather.

11-15-52: 86 sorties. Morning hecklers destroyed numerous trucks and damaged two rail bridges. Jet aircraft covered recco routes north and west of WONSAN. Numerous ox-carts were reported destroyed and a small number of trucks. One jet strike hit a supply area west of WONSAN and obtained 50 percent coverage. AD's and F4U's flew strikes in the vicinity of the front lines in the central and western sectors. Naval Gun Fire Spot was furnished to the ships at the bomb line.

11-16-52: Morning heckler flights were diverted to RESCAP for a downed pilot. Jet aircraft covered MSR's north and west of WONSAN. Jet aircraft coordinated with propellor type aircraft in striking large supply areas west of WONSAN. Excellent results were obtained and 90 percent coverage was reported. A total of 100 sorties were flown this date.

11-17-52: 98 sorties. Morning hecklers destroyed many trucks and made two rail cuts. Naval Gun Fire spot was furnished to the ships in the vicinity of WONSAN. Jet aircraft covered MSR's and flew coordinated strikes with AD's and F4U's in the CHONGJIN area. Excellent results were obtained.

11-18-52: AD's and F4U's hit targets in the HOER-YONG area. Jet aircraft hit targets along the beach area between CHONG-JIN and the Russian Boarder; Numerous MIG sightings were reported in the area however no damage was done to friendly aircraft. A total of 43 sorties were flown this date.

11-19-52: No air operations - Replenishment.

11-20-52: 97 sorties, AD's and F4U's flew CAS in direct support of front line troops of central sector. Jet aircraft flew flak suppression with propellor driven aircraft. One jet strike was flown against a lumber mill north of HUNGNAM with excellent results. Night hecklers reccoed MSR's along coast North and West of WONSAN. One convoy was attacked with seven trucks destroyed.

11-21-52: 94 sorties, Naval Gun Fire spot missions were flown for the bombardment force in vicinity of WONSAN harbor. Propellor driven aircraft flew strike missions in vicinity of front lines with jet aircraft as flak suppression. Jet aircraft covered all recco routes North and West of WONSAN. One strike group consisting of propellor driven aircraft hit supply buildings West of WONSAN. A jet strike in vicinity of YANGDOK damaged a highway bridge. LCDR R. C. HOPPING, USN, Executive Officer of VF-721 was lost to AA fire over YANGDOK. Night hecklers reccoed coastal routes North of WONSAN and destroyed numerous trucks.

11-22-52: AD's and F4U's flew strikes in the vicinity of front lines. Jet aircraft were coordinated with these missions as flak suppression. NGF spot was furnished for bombardment group in vicinity of WONSAN. Jet aircraft covered supply routes in all sectors, destroying numerous trucks and ox-carts. CAS strike were flown for front line troops in central and western sector and were accredited with 100% coverages. Night hecklers covered recco routes North of HAMHUNG, one locomotive and train was destroyed, one convoy was hit and numerous trucks destroyed. A total of 96 sorties were flown this date.

11-23-52: Jet aircraft covered recco routes in all sectors. Jet aircraft attacked supply area in PYONGGANG, excellent coverage was attained. AD's and F4U's hit troop build-up and supply areas west of WONSAN in vicinity of MAJON-NI. One F9F was lost when the engine exploded upon catapulting. The pilot was recovered. Night hecklers damaged one locomotive and numerous rail cars. A total of 95 sorties were flown this date.

11-24-52: No air operations - Replenishment.

11-25-52: 60 sorties. Morning hecklers acted as weather recco and damaged several trucks. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in the HUNGNAM area, destroying numerous buildings. AD's and F4U's flew CAS and strikes in the central sector. Weather hampered operations throughout the day.

11-26-52: Morning hecklers damaged one locomotive and several trucks. Jet aircraft covered MSR North of HAMHUNG. AD and F4U's hit supply areas west of WONSAN. One coordinated strike with prop driven and jet aircraft hit supply area in KILCHU, excellent coverage was obtained. A total of 101 strikes were flown this date.

11-27-52: 9 sorties - operations were restricted due to weather.

11-28-52: No air operations - Replenishment.

11-29-52: 107 sorties. Jet aircraft covered MSR's in all sectors, numerous ox-carts were destroyed. One strike hit supply area North of HAMHUNG with 75% coverage. AD's and F4U's flew CAS for troops in central sector. One coordinate jet and prop driven aircraft strike hit supply area in vicinity of PYONGGANG. Night hecklers damaged two locomotives and several trucks.

11-30-52: 8 sorties - operations restricted due to weather.

12-1-52: No air operations - inclement weather.

12-2-52: No air operations - inclement weather.

12-3-52: No air operations - Replenishment.

12-4-52: 8 sorties. Morning hecklers destroyed 1 locomotive, 3 railroad cars and 8 trucks. At 0948 departed for Yokosuka.

PART III

ORDNANCE

PERFORMANCE

a. GUNS

The 20MM gun performance has been good. A great percentage of the stoppages which occurred in these guns was due to link jams, ammo jams, and feed mechanism failures. Actual malfunctions and failures of the gun itself were few. Not one stoppage due to failure of a gun part was frequent enough to indicate any defective parts.

The .50 caliber machine gun performance has been excellent.

The explosion of a .50 caliber incendiary shell in the blast tube caused damage to the wing of an F4U-4 aircraft. It is believed that a hot barrel or possibly a faulty projectile caused the explosion initially. Then with the blast tube blown away and the gun continuing to fire, the muzzle blast caused rivets in a large area of the wing to pop out.

b. BOMBS AND BOMB RACKS

F9F and F4U-5N aircraft are equipped with MK 55 Mod 1 bomb racks. This rack has performed satisfactorily. Only one hung bomb could be attributed to mechanical failure of this rack. Two bombs came off during catapult shots. This was attributed to failure of the rack to lock properly when latched.

F2H, AD and F4U-4 aircraft are equipped with Aero 14A combination bomb rack and rocket launchers. The performance of these has been satisfactory. A limited number of Aero 14A rack failures have been responsible for hung bombs returned to the ship.

c. ROCKETS

Rockets were not carried in any great quantity by this air group. However, of those carried the number returned with broken pigtails remains a problem. Of the hung rockets returned to the ship, sixty percent were from this cause. Of this sixty percent, three of every four pigtails were cut by flying brass being ejected from .50 caliber guns on F4U aircraft. Deflector plates are inadequate and cannot be replaced as rapidly as they become ineffective during an operating period.

The remaining hung rockets were misfires, returning to the ship with no external evidence for not firing. The electrical circuits checked out in all cases.

ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES

a. 28 through 31 October.

During this period the only ordnance expended was 16 500 pound G.P. bombs. No hung ordnance was reported.

b. 1 through 30 November.

<u>TYPE ORDNANCE</u>	<u>ADA</u>	<u>AD4N</u>	<u>F4U4</u>	<u>F4U5N</u>	<u>F9F2</u>	<u>F2H</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
100 lb. G.P.	0	241	223	76	472	840	1,820
250 lb. G.P.	937	118	405	24	340	456	2,280
500 lb. G.P.	248	46	168	41	0	0	503
1000 lb. G.P.	303	0	40	0	0	0	343
2000 lb. G.P.	64	0	0	0	0	0	64
260 lb. Frag	293	15	131	146	605	481	1,671
5" Mk 25 rocket	126	0	96	28	20	30	300
3 1/2" ASAR	6	5	0	0	0	0	11
20mm	43,090	9,500	0	12,600	51,090	75,450	191,730
.50 Caliber	0	0	113,870	0	0	0	113,870
Napalm	36	0	8	0	0	0	44
Flares Mk 6	0	169	0	57	0	0	226
Flares Mk 8	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Total Pounds	883,520	80,875	296,050	76,030	292,300	327,260	1,956,035
Total Tons	441.76	40.44	148.03	38.02	146.15	163.63	978.02

34

HUNG ORDNANCE REPORT

<u>TYPE ORDNANCE</u>	<u>Aero 14A</u>	<u>Mk 51</u>	<u>Mk 55 Mod 1</u>	<u>Mk 9</u>	<u>Total</u>
100 lb. G.P.	4	0	1	-	5
250 lb. G.P.	8	0	2	-	10
260 lb. Frag.	9	0	2	-	11
1000 lb. G.P.	-	2	-	-	2
2000 lb. G.P.	-	1	-	-	1
5" Mk 25 ATAR	34	-	-	3	37
TOTAL	55	3	5	3	66

DISPOSITION OF HUNG ORDNANCE

<u>TYPE ORDNANCE</u>	<u>REMAINED ON RACK</u>	<u>DROP OFF AT LANDING</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
100 lb. G.P.	5	0	5
250 lb. G.P.	10	0	10
260 lb. Frag	11	0	11
1000 lb. G.P.	2	0	2
2000 lb. G.P.	1	0	1
5" Mk 25 ATAR	37	0	37
TOTAL	66	0	66

c. 1 through 4 December

<u>TYPE ORDNANCE</u>	<u>FAU-5N</u>	<u>AD-4N</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
100 lb. G.P.	0	12	12
250 lb. G.P.	0	9	9
500 lb. G.P.	3	3	6
260 lb. Frag	18	0	18
3"25 ASAR	0	4	4
Flares Mk 6	8	20	28
20 MM	2,000	1,000	3,000
Pounds	6,180	5,250	11,430
Tons	3.09	2.63	5.72

NO HUNG ORDNANCE

PART IV

DAMAGE

Damage inflicted on enemy 1 November to 4 December

<u>TARGET</u>	<u>DESTROYED</u>	<u>DAMAGED</u>
BOATS	6	71
BUNKERS		77
BUILDINGS	275	265
FACTORIES	2	7
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	28	32
HIGHWAY BRIDGES		9
LOCOMOTIVES	2	7
OXCARTS	50	19
POWER INSTALLATIONS		4
RR TRACK CUTS		48
RR CARS	29	51
RR BRIDGES		10
RR BY-PASSES		4
RR TUNNELS		2
SUPPLY DUMPS		23
TRUCKS	156	178
TANKS		1
TROOPS	KIA 118	WIA 21
WAREHOUSES	4	9
PIERS		3
TRENCHES IN YDS	130	300
SIGNAL TOWER		1
SEARCHLIGHT	1	1
LIGHTHOUSES		2
PERSONNEL SHELTERS		4
SUPPLY STACKS	12	8
RADIO TOWER		1
RADIO STATION		1

DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

a. AIRCRAFT LOSSES:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>
1 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123586	Engine Failure
1 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	97255	Enemy action
8 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	97100	Enemy action
21 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	125145	Enemy action
23 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	127175	Caught fire on take-off - ditched.

b. AIRCRAFT DAMAGED BY ENEMY ACTION:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
4 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123574	AA	Repair stbd stub wing
4 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	128922	AA	Repair stbd wing
4 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	81317	AA	Repair stbd wing - Change windshield

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
6 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125649	AA	Change tail cone
8 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	122568	AA	Change stbd wing
10 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123838	AA	Change stbd wing
10 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125649	AA	Repair both wings
15 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123580	AA	Repair stbd wing
15 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125675	AA	Change port tip tank
20 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123833	AA	Repair stbd wing. Change stbd elevator
21 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	97293	AA	Repair port wing
21 Nov	VC-61	F2H-2P	128861	AA	Repair stbd stub wing Change lock pin assy.
21 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123928	AA	Repair stbd wing
21 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123831	AA	Change engine
23 Nov	VC-35	AD-4N	125715	AA	Change cylinder
26 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	127129	AA	Repair stbd wing
26 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125674	AA	Repair horiz. stabilizer
26 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	82046	AA	Change port oil cooler
26 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	97046	AA	Change port oil cooler
29 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123580	AA	Repair stbd wing, horiz. stabilizer, change rudder
29 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123078	AA	Repair stbd wing
29 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123876	AA	Change propeller, repair wing spar and engine

c. OPERATIONAL DAMAGE:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
6 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125068	Landing*	Broken port wing tip light
15 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123574	Landing	Broken nose wheel strut
16 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123833	Taxiing	Nosed up on flight deck, propeller change
29 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123964	Landing*	Engine & Propeller, Port lig port wing

*Engaged barriers.

d. OTHER DAMAGE:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
27 Oct	VC-61	F2H-2P	128858	Barge transit to ship.	Change stbd elevator
27 Oct	VC-61	F2H-2P	128862	Barge transit to ship	Change rudder, tail cone and tail light
27 Oct	VC-61	F2H-2P	128881	Barge transit to ship	Change port photo glass & L.G. Micro switch
30 Oct	VC-11	AD-4W	125780	Handling	Repair port elevator
31 Oct	VF-721	F9F-2	123636	Handling	Change stbd elevator tip

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>
4 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125027	Handling	Change port elevator trim tab
4 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125017	Handling	Change port elevator
4 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125501	Handling	Repair trailing edge, port stub wing
4 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	127129	Handling	Change port elevator
6 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	125145	Handling	Change port elevator tip
6 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	127174	Handling	Change stbd elevator tip
6 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	125117	Handling	Change stbd elevator tip
7 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	125145	Handling	Change port elevator
7 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123576	Handling	Change stbd stabilizer tip
8 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123887	Handling	Change port stabilizer tip
8 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123845	Handling	Repair stbd elevator
11 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	81871	Handling	Change stbd cowl flap
13 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	122565	Handling	Change stbd flap
13 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	125117	Handling	Change port elevator and stabilizer tip
15 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123636	Handling	Change port elevator
15 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	122568	Handling	Change stbd elevator
17 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123845	Jumped chocks during severe ship turn	Change both elevators, rudder, horiz. stabilizer
17 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	97293	Handling	Change rudder, port elevator
20 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	123636	Handling	Repair port elevator tip
20 Nov	VC-35	AD-4N	125709	Handling	Repair stbd elevator
20 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123887	Handling	Repair stbd flap
21 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	123887	Loose gear fell from Hangar deck overhead	Change canopy
22 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	127175	Handling	Repair stbd elevator tip
25 Nov	VF-11	F2H-2	125060	Handling	Change stbd elevator tip
26 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	82046	Handling	Change port elevator
27 Nov	VF-721	F9F-2	127129	Handling	Change rudder
29 Nov	VA-702	AD-4	124888	Handling	Change rudder
29 Nov	VF-884	F4U-4	97338	Accidental gun firing	Repair fuselage, change generator
1 Dec	VC-11	AD-4W	125780	Handling	Change port elevator
1 Dec	VF-884	F4U-4	81502	Handling	Change stbd elevator
1 Dec	VF-884	F4U-4	82177	Handling	Change port elevator
2 Dec	VA-702	AD-4	123924	Fuel tank fell from hangar deck overhead	Change rudder
2 Dec	VC-11	AD-4W	125780	Handling	Repair stbd fin
3 Dec	VF-721	F9F-2	123574	Handling	Change stbd elevator tips & horiz. stabilizer tip
3 Dec	VC-61	F2H-2P	128865	Handling	Change radome
3 Dec	VF-11	F2H-2	125668	Handling	Repair port stub wing
3 Dec	VC-11	AD-4W	125771	Jumped chocks in rough sea	Change rudder and stbd elevator

PERFORMANCE

a. Minor cold weather operations have been encountered, and to date, have not noticeably hampered the working efficiency of Air Group personnel. Their performance in all respects has been quite satisfactory due to fullest coordination of all departments. The most critical shortage of rates are still Ordnancemen and Metalsmiths.

b. The current breakdown of Air Group personnel assigned to ship's division remains unchanged from previous Action Report with the exception of 12 men assigned to the Air Department.

CASUALTIES

11-1-52: LT C. O. GLISSON, USN of VF-721 was lost this date. Piloting an F9F-2 aircraft, he reported a rough engine and turned toward the east coast of Korea. He was last seen entering an overcast, and the aircraft is presumed to have crashed into the sea ten miles from the beach.

11-1-52: LT R. G. RIDDER, USN of VF-884 was on a strike mission in the vicinity of CHUN-CHON. His F4U was hit by AA in a dive from which it did not recover, and crashed.

11-8-52: LCDR F. W. BOWEN, USN, C.O. of VF-884 was lost on this date. His F4U did not recover from dive on target and it is believed he was hit by AA.

11-21-52: LCDR R. C. HOPPING, USN, Executive Officer of VF-721 was lost this date on a strike over YANGDOK. His F9F was seriously damaged by AA and crashed following an attempted dive recovery.

PART VI

COMMENTS

OPERATIONS:

a. FLAK SUPPRESSION TACTICS

Effective flak suppression for the strike group continued to be one of the most important problems facing the jet fighters. The increase in enemy flak along the front lines made the development of sound flak suppression tactics a "must". Although several methods were tried, the following plan, with minor variations, appeared to give most satisfactory results: One division of jets preceded the strike group in on the target area by approximately 15-30 seconds. Strafing was commenced high and was continuous throughout the run. Known gun positions were points of aim for both strafing and fragmentation bombs. The remaining division(s) of the flak suppression team remained near the pushover point. Section attacks were initiated upon sighting flashes from flak batteries,

or if none were apparent, sections made flanking runs, parallel to the strike group dive path. Half the remaining jet sections entered dives with the last of the bombers; half entered dives behind the last of the fighter-bombers. In the event that only eight jets were assigned for flak suppression, the first division would recover from the initial attacks and tail in behind the last of the strike group to cover the pullout of the last propeller planes.

b. AIR-TO-AIR TACTICS

On 18 November a CAP of four Banshees was vectored north of the force at 30,000 feet to intercept bogies reported at 25,000 feet. The formation maintained by the CAP throughout the encounter consisted of sections spaced abeam at 600 feet, and with wingman four plane lengths to the outside of section leaders, and well up on the beam. This formation allowed maximum visual coverage of the opposite section, and paid large dividends before the flight was completed. After a short time out on vector two MIG's were sighted at 12 o'clock down, eight miles, on course paralleling the CAP's vector. At speed of approximately 0.82 mach, the CAP was able to close the two aircraft slowly. When the separation was two miles, the two MIG's increased speed and moved away rapidly.

The CAP was then ordered to resume station. As a left turn was started, the CAP leader sighted eight MIG's two o'clock up, eight miles. This situation indicated the possibility of a trap using the first two MIG's at lower altitude as bait. The CAP maneuvered to keep these eight MIG's in sight for approximately five minutes after which the latter departed the area on a northwesterly heading.

The CAP resumed a southerly vector for station. After approximately one minute on course, two MIG's were sighted by the leader in a run on the second section from five o'clock high. The second section was to starboard of the lead section. The leader ordered the second section to stand by for a break to starboard, and then began a right turn for interception. The MIG's immediately broke off the attack to the right before entering firing range, and climbed away from the CAP rapidly. The CAP was then ordered to return to base.

During this entire incident the CAP managed to maintain an up-sun position, which gave the F2H aircraft a definite visibility advantage. The CAP pilots reported that the silver finish of the MIG's made long range sightings quite easy under such sun conditions.

c. ADM (NIGHT ATTACK)

No new tactics were developed. The predawn heckler launch was more effective however, than it was on the first Korean cruise. This was due primarily to the fact that the launch was earlier and all operations over the beach were during hours of darkness. As a result, more rolling stock targets were found and destroyed.

Communication difficulties were noted. Both Subtract and Clansman frequently could not be contacted on any assigned frequency. These ships, in large measure, form the basis of Air-Sea rescue, in their areas, for the night pilots. Consequently, when they could not be contacted the AAR program for the night pilots was seriously jeopardized. Reports have been made to CTF-77.

SUMMARY OF COMBAT SORTIES BY TYPE AND MISSIONSa. 28 through 31 October

	<u>F2H</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD-4N</u>	<u>AD-4W</u>	<u>F2H-2P</u>
ASP (Day)							1	
Photo								11
CAP	4	7						
SPECIAL	14			12		5		
OTHER				1				
TOTAL	28	7	0	13	0	5	1	11

No planes or pilots were lost this period.

b. 1 through 30 November

	<u>F2H</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD-4N</u>	<u>AD-4W</u>	<u>F2H-2P</u>
STRIKE	120	141	149	251				
RECCO	110	102						
RR HECKLERS					21	20		
ASP (DAY)						6	40	
ABP (NIGHT)						6	9	
HECKLERS (NIGHT)					21	20		
NGF-SPOT			16	5	5			
PHOTO								58
PHOTO ESCORT	59							
CAP	112	102						
ECM						17		
CAS			50	37				
SPECIAL			9	5	6	11	7	
RESCAP			2			3		
TARCAP								
OTHER		10	16	48	6	12	2	1
TOTALS	401	355	242	346	59	95	58	59
TOTAL	1,615							

c. 1 through 4 December

A total of 8 sorties were flown this period.

1 AD-4W	ASP (NIGHT)
1 AD-4N	ESCORT (NIGHT)
3 AD-4N	HECKLERS (NIGHT)
3 F4U-5N	HECKLERS (NIGHT)

Total 8 Sorties

Summary of average combat flight hours, average number of sorties by squadron:

a. 28 October through 4 December:

PER PILOT DATA

	<u>F2H</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD-4N</u>	<u>AD-4W</u>	<u>F2H-2P</u>
Sorties	15.6	15.5	12.2	11.8	11.5	24.1	11.6	13.8
Flight hours	25.9	24.7	36.7	36.8	47.0	64.3	33.4	23.8
CV Landings	15.6	15.6	12.4	12.3	13.8	19.3	11.4	13.6

Group Average

Sorties
Flight hours
CV Landings

14.5
36.6
14.3

Aborted Sorties this period

AD-4 3
F4U-4 7
F2H-2 4
F9F-2 7
AD-4N 1
F2H-2P 1

23

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

a. The continued lack of aircraft spare parts generated by unfilled shortages and inadequacy of Section "B" Allowance lists required continuing cannibalization of dud aircraft and rotation of certain parts between aircraft undergoing periodic checks in order to maintain satisfactory availability. This condition is becoming progressively aggravated, especially with the Corsairs. Further, it was noted that a number of the overhauled spare parts drawn for support of the F4U's were unusable due to being overage and/or in excess of allowed tolerances.

b. The following aircraft were AOG during this period:

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>NR. DAYS</u> <u>AOG</u>	<u>STOCK NR.</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>
F2H-2	125668	8	R82-MDA-15-79213-301	1	Yoke Assy.
F2H-2	125668	17	R43B-37662	3	Bolt
			R43B-35838	3	Bolt
F2H-2	125649	3	R16R-2436-5	1	Receptacle
F2H-2	125008	20	R17P-4431-88	1	Plug
F2H-2	125022	Out-	R83AIR-80052	1	Refrigeration unit
		standing			
F2H-2	125022	"	R82K-F2H-CH158	1	Change #158
F2H-2	125649	"	R82K-F2H-CH158	1	Change #158
F2H-2P	128861	"	R17H-7999-250	2	Switch housing
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-78310-30	1	Support Assy
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-11207-4	1	Fitting
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-11265-2	1	Sleeve Assy
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-10130-3	2	Link, Aft
F2H-2P	128861	"	R16R-2436-4	1	Receptacle, Antenna

Summary of average combat flight hours, average number of sorties by squadron:

a. 28 October through 4 December:

PER PILOT DATA

	<u>F2H</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD-4N</u>	<u>AD-4W</u>	<u>F2H-2P</u>
Sorties	15.6	15.5	12.2	11.8	11.5	24.1	11.6	13.8
Flight hours	25.9	24.7	36.7	36.8	47.0	64.3	33.4	23.8
CV Landings	15.6	15.6	12.4	12.3	13.8	19.3	11.4	13.6

Group Average

Sorties
Flight hours
CV Landings

14.5
36.6
14.3

Aborted Sorties this period

AD-4 3
F4U-4 7
F2H-2 4
F9F-2 7
AD-4N 1
F2H-2P 1

23

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

a. The continued lack of aircraft spare parts generated by unfilled shortages and inadequacy of Section "B" Allowance lists required continuing cannibalization of dud aircraft and rotation of certain parts between aircraft undergoing periodic checks in order to maintain satisfactory availability. This condition is becoming progressively aggravated, especially with the Corsairs. Further, it was noted that a number of the overhauled spare parts drawn for support of the F4U's were unusable due to being overage and/or in excess of allowed tolerances.

b. The following aircraft were AOG during this period:

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>NR. DAYS</u> <u>AOG</u>	<u>STOCK NR.</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>
F2H-2	125668	8	R82-MDA-15-79213-301	1	Yoke Assy.
F2H-2	125668	17	R43B-37662	3	Bolt
			R43B-35838	3	Bolt
F2H-2	125649	3	R16R-2436-5	1	Receptacle
F2H-2	125008	20	R17P-4431-88	1	Plug
F2H-2	125022	Out-	R83AIR-80052	1	Refrigeration unit
		standing			
F2H-2	125022	"	R82K-F2H-CH158	1	Change #158
F2H-2	125649	"	R82K-F2H-CH158	1	Change #158
F2H-2P	128861	"	R17H-7999-250	2	Switch housing
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-78310-30	1	Support Assy
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-11207-4	1	Fitting
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-11265-2	1	Sleeve Assy
F2H-2P	128861	"	R82MDA-15-10130-3	2	Link, Aft
F2H-2P	128861	"	R16R-2436-4	1	Receptacle, Antenna

<u>MODEL</u>	<u>BUNR</u>	<u>NR. DAYS</u> <u>AOG</u>	<u>STOCK NR.</u>	<u>QTY</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>
F4U-4	81317	7	R82-CV-VS37380	1	Windshield
F4U-4	81871	4	R82CV-VS42702R	1	Cowl Flap
F4U-4	80863	Out-	R82CV-VS40238	1	Battery Access Door
F4U-4	80863	standing	R82CV-VS42800	1	Enclosure Assy
F4U-4	80863	"	R82CV-VS37013-1	1	Wing, Left
F4U-4	97338	"	R82CV-VS40333	1	Fuel Cell
F4U-4	81502	"	R83HR-8503896	1	Gasket
F4U-4	80863	"	R82CV-VS41013R-2	1	Elevator Bracket
F4U-4	80863	"	R82CV-VS41013L-2	1	Elevator Bracket
F4U-4	80863	"	R82CV-CVC 1000-70	1	Elevator Drive Chain
F4U-5N	121891	4	R86ST-6482-390940-18	1	Carburetor
F4U-5N	122185	4	R86ST-6482-390940-18	1	Carburetor
AD-4	123924	5	R82DG-52541-30-500	1	Horiz. Stabilizer

c. On 29 November, AD-4, BUNR 123876 was damaged by an explosive anti-aircraft shell while recovering from a bombing run. The shell apparently exploded when it struck one propeller blade, and fragments penetrated the wrap cowling, cowl flaps, and wing spar. The propeller blade was nearly severed; however, the aircraft remained airborne for about fifteen minutes after being hit and landed at K-18, where 105 holes were counted in the airplane. The external armor plate, Part No. 5433837-505 and -507 was severely damaged, preventing loss of the airplane and serious if not fatal pilot injury, and justifying the weight penalty imposed by the armor installation on AD aircraft.

d. One instance of an F2H main gear door emergency release cable fouling on the aileron control centering arm during wing spread was experienced. F2H ASC 155 is on order for the seven affected aircraft in this group, and it is anticipated that installation of this service change will prevent further occurrence of this trouble.

e. Two instances have been discovered of cracks in F2H engine aft inboard trunnion mounts. These two aircraft have been grounded pending receipt of F2H ASC 158. Six other kits are on order for the remaining affected aircraft.

f. During this period five J34 engines were removed and sent to overhaul. Two of these engines were changed due to high time (over 400 hours), while the remainder were changed because it was impossible to remove the turbine shaft nut to perform necessary routine inspection. Although the shaft nut loosened quite easily, it seized completely after one turn, indicating that insufficient anti-seize compound rather than improper torque was responsible.

g. Four J34 engines were repaired and returned to service. On two of these engines the combustion chamber lines were changed, and the turbines were replaced on the remaining two. The services of Mr. F. C. Fimmel, Westinghouse representative have been extremely valuable in maintaining optimum performance from the J34 engines.

h. It is recommended that consideration be given to the following proposed procedure for outfitting deployed squadrons with special clothing.

(1) Squadrons submit requirements for special clothing to the Supply Officer of the supporting air station 60 days prior to deployment.

(2) Special clothing be issued directly to the squadron 30 days prior to deployment, thus insuring proper quantities and sizing.

(3) The supporting vessel fill requirements only for surveyed special clothing and for personnel assigned to the squadron in the forward area.

i. Aircraft availability for the period was as follows:

VC-35	99.9%	VA-702	87.1%
VC-11	98.2%	VC-61	87. %
VF-11	94.6%	VC-3	86.6%
VF-721	90. %	VF-884	84. %

AIR INTELLIGENCE

NO MAJOR DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED ON THE SECOND TOUR ON THE LINE.

a. Due to necessity of exactly locating targets on Cherokee strikes, Mosaics 18" x 24" were used for briefing and 1:50,000 scale charts were put to greater use by outlining targets and issuing one to each pilot.

b. Greater emphasis was put on flak plotting with effective range circles drawn on 1:50,000 charts for heavy and medium AA positions and strike targets. It was found that this gives the pilots a more accurate graphic aid for planning approach and retirement altitudes and courses.

c. AMSL:250,000 scale charts were substituted for WAC charts on ready room brief boards as it was found that this chart is more accurate, demonstrates terrain better and shows MSR's more prominetely.

d. There is still a need for sliding panels with adequate lighting at front of ready room. (This has been made the topic of ~~seperate~~ correspondence.)

SURVIVAL

Only one survival incident occurred on this tour on the line. The pilot ditched at sea and was recovered by helicopter.

Due to reports of the ADSK-1 chute blossoming while on the airborne aircraft, it was decided not to carry it on regular missions but have it ready at the ship if needed.

Again it was found that emergency radio batteries have a shorter life than is claimed.

A metal aircraft engine shipping container was set up on end on the hanger deck and filled with water for the testing of exposure suits.

SECRET

The electric lift with a sling was used to simulate helicopter lift from the tank and a dummy packed chute was used to give the pilots experience in getting out of harness while in the water. This was well received by pilots and affords an opportunity to test equipment and give practical experience while at sea.

All pilots were required to wear the MK-3 exposure suit during this tour on the line. Neck seals and wrist seals had to be replaced numerous times due to their ripping. It was necessary to test exposure suits frequently as leaks at seams and holes developed quite readily.

It is recommended that a warmer glove be made for the exposure suit.

Due to difficulty experienced by pilots in removing parachute after ditching, it is recommended that steps be taken to develop quick releases. Air Group policy is for pilots to have straps loose or unbuckled during launches and landings. In cases of pilots of large stature it is impossible to keep straps loose due to the shortness of straps, and space in cockpit makes it extremely difficult if harness is unbuckled, to secure it in flight.

In making helicopter pick-up slings it must be realized that the size must be in relation to size of largest pilots wearing heavy and bulky flight gear.

AVIATION ELECTRONICS

a. General.

During the second tour on the line in Korean waters, the Aviation Electronics personnel continued to perform their assigned tasks with the utmost efficiency. Excessive amounts of failures were encountered with the Electron Tube 6AK5. It is contemplated that these failures will be reduced when the new Electronic Tubes 5654 are received. Difficulties with the cable harness on the AN/-APS-19 in the F4U-5N aircraft were encountered, in the form of the wires shorting and burning. Since two cases of this nature occurred, it is suggested that a closer check be made by overhaul activity handling this equipment. The cables in the above mentioned aircraft were in poor condition when the aircraft were initially brought aboard.

An AN/ARC-1 transceiver in one aircraft, received from activities in Japan, was not crystallized according to COMFAIRJAPAN INSTRUCTION 03110.1 dated 7 July 1952. This aircraft was received with a defective crystal and a crystal missing. It is suggested that a closer check be made by activities transferring aircraft,

b. Testing.

Tests were conducted using deck edge power for the AD-4 aircraft with the following conclusions:

(1) One generator is adequate for starts with normal weather conditions. When the cold weather is encountered, it is likely that two generators will be needed.

(2) The handling of cables (rolling and unrolling) has proven to be more troublesome than using APU's. As a result, the use of deck edge power has been very limited.

c. XJ-3D and Mk 2 Mod 0 Destructor Tester:

In order to inspect and test the XJ-3D and Mk 2 Mod 0 destructors, used in the APX-6 gear, in compliance with NAVORD INSTRUCTION 8060.1, a tester was constructed.

(1) Equipment used:

(a) A metal drum (stock R42-C-22030-20) was modified as follows:

1. The cover was inverted and hinged on one side.

2. The container was lined with 3/4" wood to absorb any fragments in event of a detonation.

(b) Test leads were made 7 feet long, terminating in alligator clips.

(c) A Simpson 260 meter is used for the resistance checks.


(2) Procedure:

(a) Personnel concerned with the testing are instructed in safety precautions.

(b) Tests are conducted on flight deck during replenishment periods. Tests are not incorporated in maintenance checks because operations preclude use of clear area on the flight deck.

(3) Results:

(a) To date, nine (9) destructors have been found to be defective (resistance over 11 ohms). An additional seven (7) destructors were found to be defective due to bad threads. These were turned over to Ordnance for disposal. No detonations have occurred.


H. P. ADY, Jr.