

SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN  
 To: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)  
 Subj: Action Report, Carrier Air Group ELEVEN for period of 17 March 1952 through 18 April 1952  
 Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4 of 1 July 1951  
 (b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1 of 1 September 1951

1. In accordance with references (a) and (b), this report is submitted for inclusion in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for the same period.

PART I - MISSION AND COMPOSITION

The mission of Carrier Air Group ELEVEN is derived from CTF-77 Secret Operation Order No. 22-51 (2nd revision). It consists primarily of rail interdiction against the North Korean railroad network. It consists also of interdiction against the enemy's transportation, communication, industrial and supply facilities. Early morning and night Hecklers, Armed Reconnaissance, Photo Reconnaissance, and Naval Gunfire Spot missions were flown in support of the overall interdiction program. Defensive missions consisted of ASP and C...

COMPOSITION OF CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT			PILOTS		
		3/17	3/31	4/18	3/17	3/31	4/18
CVC-11 CDR J. W. ONSTOTT	None	-	-	-	7	7	7**
VF-112 CDR J. V. ROWNEY	F9F-2	17	17	17	24	24	24
VC-61 (Det. "C") LCDR R. L. NAIL	F9F-2P	3	3	3	4	4	4
VF-113 LCDR J. R. STRANE	F4U-4	18	18	18	26	26	26*
VF-114 LCDR G. D. BJORNSON	F4U-4	18	17	16	26*	26*	26**
VC-3 (Det. "C") LCDR A. G. RUSSELL	F4U-5N	4	2#	1	4	5	5
VA-115 CDR C. H. CARR	AD-4 AD-4L	11 2	9 2	8 1	26	26	26
VC-11 (Det. "C") LCDR R. D. BOTTEN	AD-4W	3	3	3	5 (Crews) 4	5 4	5 4
VC-25 (Det. "C") LT F. D. HOOKS	AD-4NL AD-2Q	3 1	3 1	3 1(Crews)	6 6	6 6	6 6

\* One pilot on emergency leave is included in this figure

\*\* One pilot in hospital is included in this figure

# One of the two aircraft was borrowed from the VC-3 detachment, USS BOKER, on 6 April and returned on 15 April

## PART II - CHRONOLOGY

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA with Carrier Air Group ELEVEN embarked remained at Yokosuka as ready carrier from 22 February to 17 March 1952 except for three (3) days operations to the south of Yokosuka for the purpose of refresher air operations. Due to inclement weather, only 132 sorties were flown during the three days.

17 March - Departed Yokosuka to join Task Force 77 off the east coast of Korea. No air operations conducted.

18 March - Enroute to Task Force 77. No air operations conducted.

19 March - The PHILIPPINE SEA took station in Task Force 77 at 10051 this date. Three Marine helicopters were launched for K-18. No other air operations conducted due to inclement weather.

20 March - Commenced air operations over northeastern Korea once again in support of the rail interdiction being conducted against the enemy by this force. Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Heckler, Photo, two jet strikes and three prop strikes. Total sorties 91, total rounds of ammunition expended 7,300 (20 MM)/ 14,600 (50 Cal.), total rockets fired 4, total bombs dropped 60 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 31 rail cuts, 5 boxcars damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 8 damaged, 1 highway by-pass destroyed, 1 railroad bridge destroyed, 1 small shipyard installation damaged and 58 small craft damaged.

21 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, two jet strikes and three prop strikes. Total sorties 97, total rounds of ammunition expended 6,500 (20 MM)/ 18,600 (50 Cal.), no rockets, total bombs dropped 59.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 48 rail cuts, 1 railroad car destroyed, 5 warehouses destroyed and 4 damaged, 7 buildings destroyed, 1 railroad bridge destroyed, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, and 1 storage area damaged.

ENS E. A. BERNARD, VF-114, ditched his Corsair in Wonsan Harbor when the oil line of his aircraft was hit by flak while he was flying along the coast just south of Hungnam. He was rescued by a helicopter from the LST 799.

22 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, two jet strikes and three prop strikes. Total sorties 87, total rounds of ammunition expended 6,300 (20 MM)/ 21,900 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 65.3 tons, total napalm dropped 5.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 39 railcuts, 1 railroad car destroyed and 3 damaged, 2 trucks destroyed and 3 damaged, 5 buildings destroyed and 12 damaged, 5 warehouses destroyed and 5 damaged, 1 railroad by-pass damaged and 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 span dropped.

23 March - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

24 March - No air operations conducted due to inclement weather.

25 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, NGF, and one prop strike. Due to large swells, air operations were restricted to prop type aircraft. There was a limited amount of flights this day because of sea conditions. Total sorties 24, total rounds of ammunition expended 3,800 (20 MM)/ 11,300 (50 Cal.) total bombs dropped 23 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 10 rail cuts, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 6 damaged, and 35 small boats damaged.

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26 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Heckler, Photo, two jet strikes and four prop strikes. Total sorties 86, total rounds of ammunition expended 5,300 (20 MM)/ 11,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 74 tons, total napalm dropped 2 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 43 railcuts, 1 railroad bridge destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 highway bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 3 trucks destroyed, 2 buildings destroyed and 4 damaged, 4 AA positions destroyed and 50 small boats damaged.

27 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, NGF, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties ninety (90), total rounds of ammunition 13,800 (20 MM)/ 10,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 64 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 47 rail cuts, 1 locomotive destroyed, 1 boxcar destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 truck destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 4 damaged, 1 AA position destroyed, 23 troops killed or wounded and 2 small boats destroyed, 59 damaged.

ICLR A. G. RUSSELL, VC-3 Det "C", ditched his F4U-5N in Wonsan Harbor at night when he developed engine trouble, probably caused by AA hit in the engine sector. He was rescued by a destroyer, the USS BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887).

ENS F. S. DUNNING, VC-3 Det "C" struck the ramp with his landing gear during a night recovery. The aircraft was a strike, ENS DUNNING was uninjured.

28 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties 90, total rounds of ammunition expended 4,800 (20 MM)/ 17,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 57 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 31 railcuts, 2 trucks damaged, 7 buildings destroyed, 2 railroad bridges damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed and 40 small boats damaged.

29 March - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

30 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and four prop strikes. Total sorties 95, total ammunition expended 14,100 (20 MM)/ 43,700 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 66.5 tons, total napalm dropped 4.5 tons.

Damage to enemy consisted of 24 railcuts, 4 boxcars destroyed and 20 damaged, 1 locomotive damaged, 23 troops killed or wounded, 14 buildings destroyed and 16 damaged, 30 fuel drums destroyed, 8 AA positions damaged, 12 trucks destroyed and 3 damaged, 3 warehouses destroyed and 31 small boats damaged.

LTJG W. J. COOPER, VC-3 Det "C", developed a flash fire in his cockpit shortly after take-off early in the morning before first light and flew his plane into the water. He was rescued by the destroyer, the USS IDWRY (DD770)

31 March - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike, and three prop strikes. Total sorties 91, total rounds of ammunition expended 12,400 (20 MM)/ 23,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 67.3 tons, total napalm dropped .8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 61 railcuts, 2 railroad cars destroyed, 1 locomotive damaged, 1 locomotive shelter damaged, 3 railroad bridges destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed and 1 damaged, 2 warehouses destroyed, 4 buildings damaged, 3 troops killed or wounded and 42 small boats damaged.

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1 April - Air operations, which were delayed until 1000 because of weather, consisted of the usual ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties 90, total ammunition expended 4,800 (20 MM)/ 8,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 61.3 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 39 railcuts, 2 boxcars destroyed and 3 damaged, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed, 1 truck destroyed, 4 AA positions destroyed and 1 damaged, 13 buildings destroyed, 8 troops killed or wounded and eighteen 18 small boats damaged.

2 April - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

3 April - Air operations against the enemy in northeast Korea consisted of ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, one jet strike and three prop strikes. Total sorties 89, total ammunition expended 6,100 (20 MM)/ 26,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 66.8 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 18 railcuts, 5 buildings destroyed and 11 damaged, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 highway bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 15 troops killed or wounded, 2 AA positions destroyed and 3 damaged, 1 truck destroyed, 1 armored car damaged.

LTJG John E GOENE ditched his AD approximately 10 miles from the Force when his engine failed. He was rescued by the helicopter from the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47).

4 April - Air operations were limited due to low overcast over target areas. Operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Recco, Photo, and three prop strikes. Total sorties 66, total rounds of ammunition expended 2,700 (20 MM)/ 15,200 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 35 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 17 rail cuts, 23 railroad cars damaged, 3 railroad bridges destroyed, 1 railroad bypass destroyed, 1 highway bridge damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 2 damaged, 2 tanks damaged, 1 AA position destroyed, 10 troops killed or wounded and 1 boat damaged.

LTJG W. R. CARTER received lacerations about the face when an AA shell burst shattered his canopy. He landed safely at K-18.

5 April - Air operations consisted of the usual ASP, CAP, Hecklers, NGE, six photo Reccos, and four prop strikes. Total sorties 83, total rounds of ammunition expended 5,500 (20 MM)/ 19,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 53.5 tons, total napalm dropped .8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 32 rail cuts, 1 railroad bridge destroyed 2 railroad by-passes damaged, 4 rail road cars destroyed and 24 damaged, 1 locomotive damaged, 1 warehouse damaged, 2 buildings destroyed. Four trucks damaged, and 1 fuel dump destroyed.

6 April - Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

7 April - Air operations against the enemy in Northeast Korea continued with ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, Jet reccos, and four prop strikes. Total sorties 94, total rounds of ammunition expended 14,700 (20 MM)/ 46,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 62.5 tons, total napalm dropped 8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 60 rail cuts, 1 locomotive damaged, 9 railroad car destroyed and 38 damaged, 10 trucks destroyed and 5 damaged, 23 buildings destroyed and 24 damaged, 1 AA position destroyed and 1 damaged, 6 high tension towers damaged, 17 troops killed or wounded, 1 jeep destroyed and 18 small boats damaged.

8 April - No air operations conducted due to fog.

9 April - No air operations conducted due to fog.

10 April - Air operations commenced again with ASP, CAP, Photo, Hecklers, NGF, jet recon, three jet strikes and four prop strikes. Total sorties 100, total rounds of ammunition expended 12,000 (20 MM)/ 13,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 56.3 tons, total napalm dropped 13.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 23 railcuts, 1 locomotive damaged, 5 railroad cars destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 railroad by-pass destroyed, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 1 truck destroyed and 1 damaged, 8 buildings destroyed and 13 damaged, 1 high tension tower damaged, 15 troops killed or wounded and 3 small boats sunk.

LCMR G. B. BJORNSON, CO VF-114, flew into the water shortly after take off when he ran to the slip stream of the aircraft ahead while at a very low altitude. He was rescued by the ship's helicopter.

LTJG P. S. SWANSON, VA-115, ditched his AD-4 in Wonsan Harbor when his plane was hit by AA in the vicinity of Wonsan. He was rescued by the helicopter from the USS ST PAUL (CA-73)

11 April - Air operations consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, NGF, four jet recon, and four prop strikes. Total sorties 72, total rounds of ammunition expended 9,500 (20 MM)/ 32,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 46.8 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 28 railcuts, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 12 damaged, 3 railroad bridges destroyed and 3 damaged, 18 trucks destroyed and 10 damaged, 7 buildings destroyed and 9 damaged, 1 transformer station damaged, 10 troops killed or wounded, and 15 small boats damaged.

12 April - Force Replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

13 April - Today this force gave the enemy an Easter Sunday Punch. The Air Group conducted two group strikes on Chongjin of maximum effort, and Air Group Two in the BOXER conducted two similar strikes. These were the first group strikes of World War II vintage that Air Group ELEVEN has executed against enemy targets in Korea. Total sorties 110, total rounds of ammunition expended 3,100 (20 MM)/ 3,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 95.8 tons, total napalm dropped 3.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 7 railcuts, 1 railroad bridge destroyed, 3 railroad by-passes damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 2 cranes damaged, 5 railroad cars damaged, 1 radio tower damaged, 1 truck damaged, 33 buildings destroyed and 5 damaged, and 2 small boats damaged.

14 April - The force returned to its former operating area after yesterday's strikes on Chongjin, and continued rail interdiction. Air operations same as before - ASP, CAP, Hecklers, NGF, Photo, three jet recon and four prop strikes. Total sorties 82, total rounds of ammunition expended 9,500 (20 MM)/ 32,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 57.8 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 40 railcuts, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, 3 high tension line towers damaged, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 10 damaged, 4 supply dumps damaged, 2 trucks destroyed and 3 damaged, 4 warehouses destroyed, 2 buildings destroyed and 17 damaged, and 9 small boats damaged.

15 April - Air operations against enemy targets were hampered by low broken clouds in most areas. However, the following damage was inflicted in the enemy: 32 railcuts, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 railroad by-pass damaged, 1 large boaterane destroyed, 4 railroad cars destroyed and 16 damaged, 1 jeep destroyed, 2 buildings destroyed and 3 damaged, 10 troops killed or wounded, and 2 small boats destroyed, and 6 damaged.

16 April - Force replenished this date. No air operations. USS PHILIPPINE SEA left the Line; enroute to Yokosuka.

17 April - Enroute to Yokosuka. No air operations.

PART III - ORDNANCE

1. Comments on Ordnance Equipment

F4U-4

a. Air Group ELEVEN recently completed the installation of Aircraft Service Change 432 in 36 F4U-4 aircraft, during the ship's last inport period. A Vought representative made himself available to this air group to familiarize personnel with the installation of this change.

b. Two and one half days after the indoctrination of a twelve man crew, the first aircraft with the change installed was completed, and checked satisfactorily. Personnel from the AD and F9F squadrons were given instructions also. With the additional personnel, each F4U squadron was able to work on six aircraft at a time on a production line bases. Thirty four F4U-4 aircraft were fitted with Change 432 within a period of three weeks from the time the change kits were received on board.

c. The AERO 11A bomb rack is a tremendous improvement over the old MK V installation. However, the following difficulties have been encountered in actual operations:

(1) On one occasion the No. 5 station bomb rack sheared off while the aircraft was being towed aft for respot on the flight deck. The bomb rack was loaded with a 250 lb. GP bomb. An RULM was submitted by VF-113

(2) Due to the extreme deflection of the loaded bomb rack, considerable stress has been placed on the bolt that affixes the bomb rack to the wing. This has caused the bolt to "work" which in turn has necessitated constant checking of the bomb racks for looseness.

(3) Four breakages of the sway brace support occurred. In each case, failure occurred when the rack was loaded with wings in the fold position. RUDAOE was submitted by VF-114.

d. Aircraft Service Change No. 416 has not been incorporated in any of the F4U's assigned to this air group. Therefore, the buffeting of the folded wings in slipstream prior to launch may later have an adverse effect upon aircraft with the AERO 11A installation.

e. This air group has not fired any rockets since the installation of the AERO 11A.

AD-4

a. A total of 78,545 rounds of (20 MM) were fired, an average of 1785.1 rounds per gun. It was found that failure of the hydraulic system, gun charger etc. caused the most failures to fire. A total of 21, which includes suspect back pressure and improper lubricant.

b. It was found that once the initial round was fired, the operation was very good. A total of 33 malfunctions caused stoppages after the initial round was fired. They are as follows:

- (1) Feed operating lever disengaged - 2
- (2) Driving spring guide disengaged - 1
- (3) Calibration - 2
- (4) Faulty or dud ammo - 8  
Failure to extract - 8
- (5) Link jam - 7

(6) Failure of breech back lock - 3

(7) Tension, jammed belt, lost tension or the feed mechanism - 2

c. Omitting hydraulic charger, suspected back pressure and human error malfunctions, Attack Squadron 115 averaged approximately 3000 rounds per stoppage. The ship's supply did not carry enough E-51 univis or AXS 777 to provide maximum lubrication and upkeep.

F9F-2

a. In addition to firing over 66,00 rounds of (20 MM) ammunition since the last report, the squadron has dropped 914 bombs which required 1498 fuses. The following is a breakdown of the types of bombs and fuses expended: 319-100# GP, 567-250# GP, and 28-500# GP bombs; 840 AN-M139 Nose, 574 AN-M101A2 Tail and 84 T50E4 VT Nose fuses.

b. The number of sorties flown, and the heavy bomb and fusing schedule makes it almost impossible to do any more than reload and clear simple gun stoppages between flights. The long work day of the ordnancemen will make it necessary to initiate an ordnance night check crew in order to maintain the guns in satisfactory condition for substained operations. This will only be possible if there is an increase in the ordnance department allowance, since none of the men can be spared from the day operations.

c. Twelve bombs hung or released improperly from MK55 bomb racks. There were two reasons for the malfunctions. The squadron attempted to keep the wings as clean as possible for increased performance, so removed and reinstalled the racks every flight according to the number of bombs carried. Partly because of the rush between flights, and partly because of the flimsy construction of the airplane receptacles, many of the electrical connections on the airplane and many of the plug prongs on the MK55 racks were damaged to the point of failure; see WF-114, RUDUM 38-52 dtd 5 April 1952. The other reason for hung bombs on the MK55 racks was corrosion of the latch frame assembly which retarded the releasing action of the suspension lug. The racks are no longer removed between flights, and the latch assembly is periodically oiled and greased. Therefore, no recent failures have been experienced.

d. The ship's supply of low temperature gun oil and charger springs was depleted, and the men were forced to use driving springs as a substitute. Most of the charger spring failures were caused by crystallization within the middle four inches of the spring. The leather wipers in the charger piston swell when exposed to hydrolube and bind against the sides of the cylinder. Many stoppages that occurred seemed to be intermittent electrical failures, but because of the complexity of the charging system, still remain unexplained. The following is a breakdown of the types of stoppages encountered this tour: Total stoppages, 80; light struck primers, 29; undetermined (electric hydraulic charging system), 30; jams, 10; miscellaneous, 11. The charging system accounted for 74% of the trouble with the (20 MM) gun and is considered unsatisfactory.

2. Ordnance Expenditures

<u>Ordnance</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>
2000 # GP	Mar	0	0	0	0
	Apr	0	0	27	27
		<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>27</u>
1000 # GP	Mar	0	34	329	363
	Apr	0	154	243	397
		<u>0</u>	<u>188</u>	<u>572</u>	<u>760</u>
500 # GP	Mar	0	226	14	240
	Apr	28	321	9	358
		<u>28</u>	<u>547</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>598</u>

<u>Ordinance</u>	<u>Month</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>
260 # Frag	Mar	0	42	16	28
	Apr	<u>0</u>	<u>206</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>226</u>
		0	248	36	284
250 # GP	Mar	110	917	1040	2067
	Apr	<u>457</u>	<u>219</u>	<u>822</u>	<u>1528</u>
		567	1136	1862	3595
100 # GP	Mar	136	192	78	406
	Apr	<u>183</u>	<u>1268</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1647</u>
		319	1460	82	2053
5" HVARS	Mar	0	4	0	4
	Apr	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
		0	4	0	4
Napalm Tanks (Full)	Mar	0	29	12	41
	Apr	<u>0</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>42</u>
		0	39	44	83
20 MM	Mar	19037	4935	43385	67357
	Apr	<u>47293</u>	<u>4580</u>	<u>43385</u>	<u>95258</u>
		66330	9515	86770	162615
50 Cal.	Mar	0	213510	0	213510
	Apr	<u>0</u>	<u>369716</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>369716</u>
		0	583226	0	583226
MK 6 Flares	Mar	0	48	54	102
	Apr	<u>0</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>52</u>
		0	68	86	154
MK 8 Flares	Mar	0	0	8	8
	Apr	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>
		0	0	28	28

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Battle Damage to Enemy

	<u>March</u>		<u>April</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dams</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dams</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dams</u>
Railcuts		334		292		626
Locomotives	1	2	1	2	2	4
Railroad Cars	13	36	32	133	45	169
Railroad Bridges	8	6	8	7	16	13
Railroad By-passes	2	4	3	7	5	11
Tanks	0	0	0	2	0	2
Trucks	18	9	35	25	53	34
Warehouses	15	9	4	1	19	10
Buildings	36	48	88	84	135	132
Storage Dumps	0	1	0	4	0	5
Fuel Dumps	0	0	1	0	1	0



	<u>March</u>		<u>April</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>	<u>Des.</u>	<u>Dam.</u>
Highway Bridges	1	2	1	4	2	6
Highway By-passes	8	0	0	0	8	0
Locomotive Shelter	0	1	0	0	0	1
Shipyard	0	1	0	0	0	1
AA Positions	5	8	8	5	13	13
Troops	0	49	0	85	0	134
Small Boats	2	315	5	69	7	384
High Tension Wire Towers	0	0	0	11	0	11
Cranes	0	0	1	2	1	2

## 2. Battle Damage to Own Aircraft

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bu. No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Location</u>
VF-112	27 Mar	F9F-2	127130	Small Arms Fire	Port Stabilizer & Rudder
	1 Apr	F9F-2	127176	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing & Flap
	4 Apr	F9F-2	127197	Flack	Canopy & Windshild
	4 Apr	F9F-2	127130	Flack	Port Wing & Flap
	7 Apr	F9F-2	127202	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Side Fuselage
	7 Apr	F9F-2	127209	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Elevator
	7 Apr	F9F-2	127130	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Bomb Rack
	10 Apr	F9F-2	127176	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	10 Apr	F9F-2	127201	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	14 Apr	F9F-2	127205	Flack	Fuselage & Port & Stbd Wings
	15 Apr	F9F-2	127179	Flack	Port Wing
	15 Apr	F9F-2	127195	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	VF-113	20 Mar	F4U-4	81176	Flack
21 Mar		F4U-4	82170	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
22 Mar		F4U-4	80827	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank
22 Mar		F4U-4	82170	Small Arms Fire	Empenage
27 Mar		F4U-4	81306	Small Arms Fire	Port Wheel Well
27 Mar		F4U-4	81037	Flack	Stbd Wing
30 Mar		F4U-4	81317	Flack	Port Wing
30 Mar		F4U-4	97106	Flack	Belly Tank & Port Wing Stub
30 Mar		F4U-4	81835	Flack	Empenage
30 Mar		F4U-4	82163	Small Arms Fire	Main Fuel Cell
1 Apr		F4U-4	80948	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Side Fuselage
3 Apr		F4U-4	81308	Small Arms Fire	Rudder
3 Apr		F4U-4	81176	Small Arms Fire	Hyd System
4 Apr		F4U-4	82170	Flack	Canopy
7 Apr		F4U-4	80948	Small Arms Fire	Port&Stbd Stabilizer & Port Elevator
7 Apr		F4U-4	81835	Small Arms Fire	Empenage
7 Apr		F4U-4	97179	Bomb Blast	
10 Apr		F4U-4	82170	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring & Cylinder
13 Apr		F4U-4	81037	Small Arms Fire	Port Stabilizer
13 Apr		F4U-4	81308	Small Arms Fire	Accessory Cowling
14 Apr	F4U-4	81152	Flack	Port Wing	
14 Apr	F4U-4	97179	Flack	Port & Stbd Wing Stubs	
15 Apr	F4U-4	81176	Flack	Port Wing	
15 Apr	F4U-4	81251	Small Arms Fire		

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>	<u>Location</u>
VF-114	20 Mar	F4U-4	81784	Flack (Plane ditched at Sea)	Accessory Section (Oil loss)
	26 Mar	F4U-4	81443	Flack	Fuselage & Wheel Well
	31 Mar	F4U-4	80848	Flack	Fuselage
	3 Apr	F4U-4	80877	Flack	Empenage & Stbd Wing
	5 Apr	F4U-4	80845	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Stub
	10 Apr	F4U-4	97201	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank & Wheel Well
	11 Apr	F4U-4	81219	Flack	Port Flap
	11 Apr	F4U-4	97191	Flack	Port Wing
	15 Apr	F4U-4	80822	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
VA-115	20 Mar	AD-4	127875	Flack & S. Arms Fire	Stbd Wing & Fuselage
	21 Mar	AD-4	127861	Flack	Fuselage & Stbd Dive Brake
	22 Mar	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Elevator
	25 Mar	AD-4	123995	Flack	Port Wing
	25 Mar	AD-4	123984	Flack	Port Dive Brake
	28 Mar	AD-4	128922	Small Arms Fire	Cowling
	28 Mar	AD-4	127863	Flack	Port & Stbd Stabilizer
	28 Mar	AD-4	127862	Flack	Stbd Wing
	30 Mar	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Rudder Stbd Flap & Port Wing
	30 Mar	AD-4	128922	Flack	Port Wing & Port Wheel Well
	30 Mar	AD-4	127878	Flack	Port Wing
	31 Mar	AD-4	123984	Flack	Speed Ring
	31 Mar	AD-4	127877	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	1 Apr	AD-4	127861	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring & Stbd Wing
	3 Apr	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring
	3 Apr	AD-4	127878	Flack	Port Stabilizer
	3 Apr	AD-4	128922	Flack	Stbd Wing & Port Flap & Port Elevator
	4 Apr	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Speed Ring
	5 Apr	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Port Elevator
	7 Apr	AD-4	127865	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing & Aileron
	10 Apr	AD-4	127863	Small Arms Fire (Plane ditched at Sea)	Oil Cooler
	10 Apr	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Flap
	11 Apr	AD-4	127861	Flack	Fuselage
	13 Apr	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	13 Apr	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing Stub
	13 Apr	AD-4	127861	Flack	Fuselage
	14 Apr	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing Stub & Stbd Stabilizer
	15 Apr	AD-4	127865	Small Arms Fire	Rudder
	15 Apr	AD-4	127861	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	15 Apr	AD-4	127874	Flack	Port Elevator
VC-3 Det. "C"	7 Apr	F4U-5N	122185	Small Arms Fire	Prop & Speed Ring
VC-35 Det. "C"	11 Apr	AD-4NL	124747	Flack	Fuselage
	11 Apr	AD-4NL	124749	Flack	Fuselage & Horizontal Stabilizer

3. Loss of Own Aircraft Due to Operational Causes

<u>Date</u>	<u>Type A/C</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Cause</u>
27 Mar	F4U-5N	124722	Engine Failure - ditched at sea
30 Mar	F4U-5N	122017	Fire in Cockpit - ditched at sea
3 Apr	AD-4	123984	Engine failure - ditched at sea
10 Apr	F4U-4	96958	Crashed at sea shortly after take off due to slip stream

## PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Personnel Performance

a. Medical report of air group personnel will be found in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA for the same period under the above heading.

## b. Squadron Comments:

(1) VF-112 - Performance Satisfactory

(2) VF-113 - It is recommended that the enlisted personnel allowance for VF-113 for pay grades E-2 and E-3 of the Group IX ratings (non-rated) be increased from 42 to 50 men. These additional eight men are considered necessary to relieve the shortages of men caused by the delay in replacements. Non-rated men under supervision can temporarily fulfill critical jobs when the reliefs are slow in arriving in the forward area.

It is further recommended that activities under the ~~command~~ of Air Pac, operating in WESPAC, submit to ComAirPac a list of expected losses of personnel by transfer for the next quarter. This list should include the expected date of transfer, destination, and rate of personnel. Such a report could be used as a basis for furnishing reliefs for men who are expected to be transferred to shore duty or for separation, etc.

(3) VF-114 - Performance Satisfactory

(4) VA-115 - Performance Satisfactory

(5) VC-3 - Performance Satisfactory

(6) VC-11 - Morale remained high, performance of officer and men was very satisfactory.

(7) VC-35 - Performance Satisfactory

(8) VC-61 - Performance Satisfactory

2. Casualties

a. ENS E. A. BERNARD, 506693, USN, VF-114

On 20 March 1952, ENS BERNARD's F4U-4 was hit by an explosive shell just south of Hangnam which put three holes in the cockpit and punctured the oil tank. He was forced to ditch about 15 miles North of Yodo Island. He received no injuries and was rescued by the helicopter from the LST 799.

b. LCDR A. G. RUSSELL, 99731, USN, VC-3 Det. "C".

On 27 March 1952, LCDR RUSSELL's F4U-5N was hit by ground fire while on a night heckler mission. Which caused engine malfunction. He was forced to ditch his plane in Wonsan Harbor and was rescued by the USS BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887). He suffered no injuries.

c. ENS F. S. DUNNING Jr., 508354, USN, VC-3 Det. "C".

On 27 March 1952, ENS DUNNING's F4U-5N struck the ramp upon making a night landing. The plane ended up a strike, but ENS DUNNING received no injuries, except for being shaken up.

d. LTJG W. J. COOPER, 478099, USNR, VC-3 Det. "C".

On 30 March 1952, just after LTJG COOPER was launched on an early morning heckler mission a electrical fire developed in the cockpit which temporarily blinded him, and he flew his F4U-5N into the water. The napalm he was carrying exploded. However, LTJG COOPER was rescued by the USS LOWERY (DD-770) having received only very minor burns about the face.

e. LTJG J. DE GOEDE, 513000, USN, VA-115.

On 3 April 1952, LTJG DE GOEDE's AD-4 developed engine trouble shortly after leaving the task force on a strike mission. He attempted to return to the ship, but the engine failed, and he was forced to ditch his aircraft 10 miles NW of the force. He was rescued by the helicopter. He suffered no injuries.

f. LTJG W. R. CARTER, 485995, USN, CAG-11.

On 4 April 1952, LTJG CARTER received multiple lacerations about the face when an AA shell exploded nearby and shattered his canopy of his F9F-2. With the assistance of his wingman to help guide him, LTJG CARTER made an normal landing at K-18 and was admitted to the hospital ship, USS HAWAN, for treatment. His return to duty will be approximately 20 March 1952.

g. LCDR G. B. BJORNSON, 98495, USN, VF-114c

On 10 April 1952, LCDR BJORNSON ran into the slip stream of an aircraft ahead just after he had taken off with his F4U-4 heavily loaded with bombs and napalm. At that low altitude he was unable to regain control of the Corsair before hitting the water. His napalm exploded, but he managed to stay clear of the fire until rescued by the ship's helicopter. He received lacerations about the head, legs, and arms, and broke his right knee cap. He also suffered from mild exposure because his MK III exposure suit was torn in three places. His return to duty is estimated to be 25 May 1952.

h. LTJG P. S. SWANSON, 521907, USN, VA-115.

On 10 April 1952, LTJG SWANSON's AD-4 was hit by AA in the vicinity of Wonsan, and he was forced to ditch his aircraft in Wonsan Harbor. He was rescued by the helicopter from the USS ST PAUL (CA-73) with out delay. He received no injuries.

#### PART VI - OPERATIONS

##### 1. F4U-4

a. Most rail strikes consisted of 4-8 F4U's and 4-8 AD's. All aircraft proceed to the assigned target area together. It has been found that in areas where little or no flack is likely to be encountered, it is desirable to split the combination between the AD's and the F4U's, each group taking a preassigned section of track to work on. In cases where there are 8 F4U's assigned, these can be a further split into two 4 plane divisions, each assigned to a different section of track. A 4 plane division is considered the ideal number to work over a section of track for rail cutting when no flack is encountered. It is highly desirable to take photographs of a section of track that is to be cut, both before and after the attack is made. In some cases, there is an AD-4 with a K-25 camera attached to take photographs after an attack. However, in view of the above, it is recommended that the K-25 camera and attachment be made available to the F4U's squadrons, so that additional pictures for accurate damage assessment may be taken.

b. It is believed that the installation of the AERO 11A bomb rack has had some effect on the flight characteristics of the F4U-4. Some pilots have noted a tendency of the aircraft to roll to the port at speeds in excess of 300 knots. Others have noticed a loss of aileron control at slower speeds approaching a stall condition. Additional maintenance has been required in checking torque tube linkage and trim of the aircraft. It is believed that the above conditions are not applicable to all F4U-4 aircraft having the AERO 11A installation.

## 2. Flu-5N

a. During April, pilots of the VC-3 Det. flew with VF-113 and VF-114 in order to maintain flight proficiency, due to the loss of own aircraft in rapid succession.

b. It is noted that all gun camera film exposed to date at night has failed to produce any intelligible results. The film was exposed under the varying light conditions found between sunset and sunrise, with and without flares. It seems obvious that the Super XX film (Index 100) is too slow for such adverse lighting conditions. It is recommended that this subject be reviewed by interested activities and that efforts be made to provide film suitable for night fighter missions.

## 3. AD-4

a. Tactics employed during the period of this report were the same as were used, and commented on, in the last action report. Coordination between jets, prop VF and VA squadrons continues to improve. In addition, there was marked increase in bombing accuracy.

b. As will be noted in other paragraphs of this report, operations of the VA squadron were considerably hampered by lack of replacement aircraft. At the end of this period Attack Squadron 115 had only nine operational aircraft, with five replacements in sight, but not yet delivered.

c. For Attack Squadron 115, the K-25 camera has come of age. Improved maintenance, better servicing, and increased knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the K-25 has resulted in overall excellent results. The value of photographs taken immediately after a strike cannot be overstressed. With photo coverage, there can be no doubt of the damage inflicted, and the knowledge that photographs will be taken has been an incentive to pilots to make every effort to get that "hit". Within Attack Squadron 115 a photo plane is launched with each strike group. This plane then makes a photo run after all ordnance runs have been completed. Coverage has been excellent and is improving with each strike.

## 4. Comments on MK III Exposure Suit by VA-115

a. During this combat tour Attack Squadron 115 lost three aircraft due to engine failure. All three of the aircraft were ~~successfully ditched~~ ditched in water of temperature ranging from 42 degrees to 60 degrees. Two of the three pilots were wearing MK III Exposure suits and made full and successful use of them.

(1) LTJG Stanford BAINFORTH ditched in the inland waters off the coast of Japan. The water temperature was 60 degrees and the air temperature was approximately 68 degrees. This pilot was not wearing an exposure suit. However, full use of Mae West and life raft were made. Due to the higher water temperatures in around the southern coast of Japan, the exposure suit was not deemed necessary.

(2) LTJG John DE GOEDE ditched his aircraft approximately fifteen miles from the Task Force while operating off the coast of Korea. The water temperature was reported as 42 degrees and the air temperature was 46 degrees. This pilot experienced considerable difficulty getting himself free of the aircraft which sank immediately due to unexpended bombs. The exposure suit was not torn. However, the cover for the "G" suit adapter hole was loose and it allowed some water to enter the suit. The pilot, when recovered, was wet from the waist down. Despite this, LTJG DE GOEDE did not experience any serious discomfort due to cold. The rubber gloves recommended for use with the MK III exposure suit were not worn on this occasion, with the result that the pilot experienced numbness of the fingers and hands. An air bubble formed in the back of the neck of the exposure suit forcing the pilot's face down into the water. This pressure was relieved by rolling in the water and tugging at the suit. The buoyancy of the suit was sufficient to allow the pilot to reach the surface of the water from a depth of approximately ten feet, while still attached to the parachute, without having to inflate the Mae West. The life raft was not used, for the helicopter recovered the pilot before it became necessary to inflate it.

(3) LTJG Peter SWANSON, ditched in Wonsan Harbor after being hit by AA followed by subsequent loss of oil pressure. The water temperature was reported as 42 degrees and the air temperature as 48 degrees. He experienced no difficulty getting clear of the plane, however he tore the left cuff of his exposure suit in the process. Only the lower part of his shirt sleeve was wet. The buoyancy afforded by the exposure suit was such that only half of the Mae West had to be inflated. The life raft was lost and not used. The rubber gloves and their liner recommended for use with the MK III exposure suit proved to be ample insulation against the cold water; mobility of the fingers was not lost. Warmth and comfort were amply provided by the suit. The pilot only remained in the water for approximately 7 minutes before being picked up by helicopter.

(4) Four other flyers from Air Group ELEVEN ditched their planes during the same period. The temperature of the water varied between 36 degrees and 42 degrees. Of the four MK III exposure suits involved, two functioned perfectly, affording the wearer warmth, comfort and dryness. As for the other two, one of the suits fitted loosely around the neck allowing about two gallons of water to enter. The pilot claims that despite this, the buoyancy provided by the suit was sufficient so that no difficulty was experienced in remaining afloat. The water temperature in this case was 38 degrees, and the pilot remained in the water for approximately thirty minutes, experiencing no extreme discomfort. In the fourth situation the pilot ripped the suit in both knees and both elbows while extricating himself from the plane. Buoyancy was provided by the Mae West only, as the suit was filled with water. The pilot remained in the water approximately ten minutes before being rescued by helicopter. The water temperature was approximately 42 degrees.

(5) In none of the above cases were rubber gloves worn. The pilots involved claimed that they retained enough mobility of the hands and fingers to inflate Mae Wests and adjust the Rescue Sling around themselves, but could do nothing more with the fingers after a few minutes. One pilot couldn't even tear the tab off his dye marker.

(6) It is recommended that pilots wear their rubber gloves. If the warm air temperatures make them uncomfortable, the gloves should be carried in the pockets.

(7) Snaps should be placed on all pockets to keep from losing their contents upon ditching.

## 5. AD-4W

a. During the operating period, 17 March to 18 April, Unit "Charlie" was assigned 70 missions. All missions were accomplished with the exception of those that were cancelled because of weather. Of the 53 missions accomplished, 52 were ASP and the remaining one was a weather recon.

b. Each flight used the AN/APS-20A as air and surface search radar. There was no instance of radar failure in flight. There was one radar failure during pre-launch check on the flight deck. The flight did not launch but the mission was carried out by the AD-4W of Unit "Charlie" that was airborne at that time. This caused the aircraft to be airborne for a total of 4.5 hours. The pilot felt no more fatigued than on a 3 hour flight, but the air controller expressed that he did not feel that he could be as efficient as is required.

c. "Bellhop", AN/ART-26, was utilized on all flights and excellent results were obtained until the ship board antennas became defective. On one instance while escorting an F4U to K-18, the P.O. presentation was satisfactorily received until the AD-4W was at a range of 60 miles and at an altitude of 4,500 feet. It was received intermittently at a range of 80 miles as the aircraft was returning from K-18.

d. "Middleman", AN/ARC-28, was used several times between the strike control ship and the strike aircraft. Excellent communications were maintained between the Force and the strike aircraft with the AD-4W aircraft on station.

e. On March 27, the NASP had an intermittent contact that was also held on the AN/APS-31B of the AD-4NL (Gator). Flares were dropped, but no visual identification would be made. The surface attack unit, consisting of one ED, was vectored to the scene. Investigation by SAU revealed that contact to be a large school of fish.

f. On April 7, the predawn ASP held an intermittent contact that was evaluated as a possible submarine. No positive identification was made. The ASP on the next flight also had unidentified air contacts. The AD-4NL "gator" aircraft was vectored for intercept, but was unable to overtake the bogeys. Visual contact was made, but the excessive range prevented positive identification. The bogeys were described as similar in appearance to an F6F and could possibly have been two IA-9 aircraft.

g. On 11 April the pilot of an F9F-2P reported sighting a submarine submerging eight miles from the force. The AD-4W held the contact when 15 miles away from the area and vectored the AD-4NL to the area. Identification was established as a whale.

h. The tactics of the ASP and escort have remained the same; 20 miles modified box search around the force, with the exception of the predawn flight. An ECM search is conducted by the AD-4NL until dawn. The AD-4W flies a wing position, and both aircraft leave their radars off. It is believed that this type search is superior to standard search tactics, as this is the most likely time of finding a submarine.

## VII - MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL

### 1. F9F-2

a. During the present tour in the forward area the squadron was scheduled for 563 flyable missions, of these 545 were completed for a percentage of 96.8%. The total flyable missions assigned to the squadron during the two tours it has spent in the forward area were 829. Of these 794 were completed for a percentage of 95.7%.

b. In an effort to more efficiently refill low oxygen bottles, two oxygen trailers, (stock number R58-T-165) were obtained and utilized during the past tour. On one occasion seven bottles were replenished in ten minutes, while under the previous system the same operation would have taken approximately one hour.

c. An average of fourteen planes can be serviced prior to replacing the 200 cubic foot capacity bottles mounted in cascade on the oxygen trailer. This method of replenishing the low oxygen bottles has proven highly satisfactory in all respects, and for use on carriers not having the oxygen refill lines connected on the flight deck is considered to be extremely practical.

d. On two occasions the arresting gear tail hook points split and parted from the hoop upon engagement with the cross deck pendants. They had previously been replaced in accordance with F9F Aircraft Technical Bulletin number 19 (revised) and the mishaps occurred during the subsequent first and sixth landings of the aircraft involved.

e. Both approaches were well controlled as to height over the deck, airspeed, and line up with the center line. The cut speed was approximately 112 kts with the wire engagement at approximately 104 kts. In both cases the engagement with the Davis barriers and the jet barricade was successful and the aircraft sustained minor damage.

f. Compliance with ComAirPac Aircraft Technical Bulletin number 9 (revised) has been completed with negative results. In no case was the landing gear actuating cylinder found to be in a condition that would cause a malfunction. However, in complying with the bulletin, the down-lock indicator switch assembly and the plunger on the actuating cylinder had to be removed. In the reassembly of the unit, an excessive number of man-hours had to be devoted to the readjustment of the subject parts.

g. A letter recommending the discontinuance of this bulletin is being initiated by VF-112.

## 2. AD-4

a. preliminary report from FASRON ELEVEN on the R3350-26WA engines of the 531000 series which were changed by this squadron during the last in-port period (after discovery of silver metal particles and gear teeth in the magnetic sump and outlet strainers) attributes failure to the following factors:

(1) Sludge contained in the oil after the use of oil dilution was due to the stripping of silver plate from rear balance weight sleeve and scoring of the tailshaft, prop-end journal shaft, and plug assembly.

(2) This resulted in failure of all three impeller driven secondary outer pinions, the impeller inner shaft rear bushing, the impeller intermediate gear bushing, and the impeller drive secondary pinion carrier bushing.

b. Due to information gathered from past experience on R3350 engines, ComAirPac made the following operational recommendations:

(1) The changing of engine oil after the first flight following the use of oil dilution if oil dilution had not been used within the past 30 hours.

(2) Changing oil every 60 hours when oil dilution is being used consistently.

(3) Checkage of rear sump and main engine oil strainer each 15 hours for presence of silver particles, gear teeth, or excessive sludge until satisfied further trouble is not apparent.

e. Departing Yokosuka with four aircraft requiring engine run-ins, the maintenance department scheduled 10 hours of slow-time for each, which was completed by 21 March. No trouble was encountered, and the planes were placed on the regular flight schedule.

d. The reverse-current-relay on the normal generator of V-512 went bad. The plane flew the first week on alternate generator with no ensuing trouble until a replacement generator was available.

c. The second week found the PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) encountering rough seas, which had a direct effect on the AD situation. V507 tore out tie down lines and bounced off the flight deck into the port catwalk, suffering structural damage which will necessitate transfer to a shore facility for repairs. V505 rammed forward into the rudder of V516, but the only required repair was a rudder change on the latter. A 30 cal. bullet hole pierced the trailing edge of the main spar at the root of the starboard wing on V503 during a combat flight. After thorough inspection, it was determined that the damage was not major, and repairs were affected by the squadron. V508 received AA damage to the main torsion or strength support of the engine. The aircraft was placed in a down status until returning to port, at which time an inspection by the Douglas Representative will determine whether or not it must be off-loaded for repairs. V504 had engine failure en-route to the target and was subsequently ditched. The apparent loss of power is undetermined, the pilot being able to maintain only 23"/2700 RPM at full throttle. Immediately prior to the time the plane hit the water, the engine was observed to catch on fire. The next week, V514 suffered a hit in the engine sector while over the target resulting in the loss of oil. With failing engine, it was ditched shortly thereafter in Wonsan Harbor.

## 3. AD-4W

a. One AD-4W has been AOG since 15 February 1952 for landing gear struts. For complete details, see the Aviation's Supply section in the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for this period.



b. The only difficulty encountered in engineering, was the inability to procure a landing gear actuating cylinder for the AD-4W. Also, they were three electronic parts that were unobtainable. They are:

- (1) Inertia test switch
- (2) Wing tank fuel quantity gauge
- (3) 303 Light bulbs

#### 4. F4U-4

a. During this period maintenance of aircraft presented no special problems provided spare parts were available. However many shortages in the USS PHILIPPINE SEA aircraft spare parts stock reduced aircraft availability and caused unnecessary delays in bringing AOG aircraft in an "up" status. The following are items that seem to be short in supply:

Nomenclature	Stock No.	Ordered	Rec'd	Delay
1. Pump oil scavenger	R85-PW-135810	3/10/52	3/11/52	1 Day
2. Fitting, right arm assy.	R82-EV-VS-12256R	3/28/52	4/6/52	9 Days
3. Wing Assy, port	R82-CV-VS-11903 R82-CV-VS-37013-1	3/28/52	4/10/52	13 Days
4. Hose, oil cooler	R33-4-343-380	4/12/52	4/14/52	2 Days
5. Wing assy, port	R82-CV-VS-37013-1	4/13/52	OBL.	INDEF.

b. It is recommended that ships supply officers review their spare part stocks and provide adequate spares parts for all type aircraft on board. This should be reviewed both before leaving the continental limits and during each availability period at Yokosuka, Japan.

#### 5. F4U-5N

a. An engine change on NP-18, BuNo. 124517, was necessary due to supercharger low-coupling being inoperative. This engine change was completed in twenty-three hours.

b. The maintenance on AN/APS-19 & 19A equipment has improved considerably since out last time on station as evidenced by four to six mile targets on the intercept function, great ranges on land and sea targets, and better over-all availability. This is due to the fact that the men are better checked out on the equipment and that the series "E" magnetrons have been received and installed. Previously we have been issued magnetrons of the "A" and "B" series, none of which were accepted by the Navy after 1945. All of the earlier series showed poor output. A great majority of the trouble in the gear at the present time is tube trouble. Catapult launches seem particularly hard on the gear. Instances have occurred where the gear worked perfectly prior to launching but failed entirely in the air. As many as three tubes have been found with open filaments under these circumstances. The only conclusion that can be reached is that the filaments were opened during the launch.

c. The rest of the electronics gear has functioned satisfactorily.

#### 6. Aircraft Availability (During the Period 3/17/52 to 4/18/52)

Squadron	Average A/C on Board	Average A/C Available	Percent
VF-112	17	13.6	80
VF-113	18	14	77.7
VF-114	16.7	13.4	80.2

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Average A/C on Board</u>	<u>Average A/C Available</u>	<u>Percent</u>
VA-115	12.3	9.7	78.9
VC-3	3	2.2	73.3
VC-11	3	1.7	56.7
VC-35	4	3.5	87.5
VC-61	3	2.6	86.7

## PART VIII - FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

I. Numbers & Types of Sorties For The Period 20 March Thru 15 April 1952

	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>F4U(N)</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>AD(N)</u>	<u>AD(W)</u>	<u>Total</u>
ASP						52	52
CAP	210	10	8				228
Strike	25	576	5	251			857
RECCO	196				2		198
Heckler			21		21		42
Photo	28						58
Photo Escort	61						61
Gator					52		52
NGF		30	5				35
Special Missions		25	3		2	1	31
<u>Total</u>	<u>550</u>	<u>641</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>251</u>	<u>77</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>1614</u>

J. W. ONSTOTT

E. F. VERDERY  
By direction