UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMMANDER CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE (CVG-12)

CVG-12/REW:rr
A16-13
Ser: 08
23 Apr 1953

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From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWELVE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34)

Subj: Summary Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWELVE for the period 28 October 1952 through 22 April 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. In accordance with reference (a), this report is forwarded as enclosure (3) for inclusion in the action report of the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) for the period 8 April 1953 through 22 April 1953.

G. P. CHASE

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SUMMARY OF ACTION REPORT
OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP TWELVE
FOR THE PERIOD
28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953

CONTENTS

PART I

ORDNANCE SUMMARY

1. During the period 28 October 1952 through 22 April 1953, The Air Group dropped 26,380 bombs totalling 4,604 tons. The jets expended 10,358 bombs (1,311 tons) while the propeller aircraft dropped 16,022 bombs (3,293 tons). The Air Group expended an average of 362 bombs (63.2 tons) per whole operating day. A total of 1,147,326 rounds of ammunition was expended.

2. Guns:

a. The performance of both the 20MM and .50 Calibre guns was considered excellent. The F4U-4's expended 462,320 rounds of .50 calibre ammunition with an average of 6,600 rounds fired per stoppage. The remainder of the Air Group expended 685,006 rounds of 20MM ammunition with an average of 1,100 rounds fired per stoppage. Disconnecting the gun and feed mechanism heaters produced no adverse effects. The majority of stoppages were attributed to link jams, broken belts, feed mechanism jams, and a loss of tension on the drive spring. A very small minority were due to gun part malfunctions or breakages. Guns were pulled and cleaned after every 1000 rounds, whether the guns had developed trouble or not. Daily maintenance consisted of swabbing out chambers and oil spraying guns, using E51 gun oil exclusively. Tompions were used on every flight.

b. A second safety wire was installed on the sear return nut of the 20MM gun in order to prevent the firing solenoid from becoming loose. It was found that one wire was insufficient and was continually breaking. Since these wires were subjected to much vibration, care was taken in their installation in order to prevent them from being overstressed.

c. After two accidental firings of 20MM guns during the first combat period, a breech blocking tool, invented by G. R. ADDY, AOU1, of VA-125, was employed with much success. This tool fits over the gas cylinder sleeve and barrel behind the yoke and in front of the push rods. The breech block is unable to go home and fire because it is held back by the push rods which are engaged by the tool. Since adopting this tool, only one accidental firing has occurred. This firing happened during the last operating period, while removing a jammed 20MM gun from an F9F-5 aircraft. The gun stoppage was caused by an empty cartridge case that had become wedged between the breech block and chamber due to an extractor failure. Repeated efforts failed to dislodge the empty case which blocked a visual inspection of the chamber. Due to the position of the breech block, the breech blocking tool could not be inserted. While removing the gun from the plane, the case became dislodged, allowing the gun to fire.

d. Due to the limited space and the work load imposed upon an Air Group while operating off a carrier, it is extremely difficult to accomplish bore sighting properly. It is recommended that deploying Air Groups make every effort to complete bore sighting before embarking. Replacement planes should be bore sighted by the supplying activity before delivery. Bore sighting patterns should be standardized as advised by the Fleet Air Gunnery Unit.

2. Bomb Racks and Rocket Launchers: Bomb racks and rocket launchers employed by this Air Group were the Mk 55 Mod I, Douglas Bomb Ejector, Mk 51, Mk 9 rocket launchers, and the Aero 14A combination bomb rack and rocket launcher. Satisfactory results were obtained from all racks, with the exception of the Aero 14A. Of the 122 hung bombs that occurred, 88 were on this rack. In most cases, investigation of these racks uncovered no apparent malfunctions or discrepancies other than the need for a stronger release solenoid and an access port to facilitate maintenance checks and inspections. Although the maintenance manual for this rack states that no lubrication is required, this Air Group has found it necessary to keep sway brace worm gears and arming solenoid plungers well lubricated in order to prevent them from sticking due to corrosion. No adverse effects due to cold weather operations resulted. ComFairJapan was advised and recommends the afore mentioned procedures.

3. Bomb Handling Equipment: Bomb handling equipment is still a problem. The Mk 1 Bomb Skid now being used has proven to be inadequate for flight deck operations. Much time, effort, and energy is wasted in trying to push or pull these skids over arresting cables and barriers without upsetting the skids and bombs, bending the tail fins, or causing personnel injury. This is particularly apparent when the skids are loaded with 260 pound fragmentation bombs or smaller. The main body structure of this skid appears to be quite satisfactory, however, it is believed that the efficiency of this skid would be greatly improved if modified with larger wheels equipped with soft rubber treaded tires.

4. Re-arming:

a. It was found highly impractical to load AD's with the wings folded. After each recovery, the wings were left spread, allowing the wing stations to be loaded before folding the wings and tightening up the spot. This method proved most successful and greatly decreased the loading time for the AD's.

b. The F4U's and the F9F's were loaded with the wings folded, except when 500 pound and 1000 pound bombs were loaded on the F9F-5's.

c. Maintaining a bomb stockpile throughout the day forward of the island was mandatory to permit meeting all ordnance commitments.

5. The Mk 2 Mod 0 station selector switch used in the F9F-5 aircraft restricts the pilot as to the type of selective bombing that he may do. A seventh station for salvo was installed on this switch in one aircraft, using a modification conceived by F. A. ALBERSON, AOAN, of VF-122. Number six station selector was modified to energize only the two inboard racks, which prior to this, could be released first on salvo only. Plans for the modification of the selector switch and junction box are being forwarded by letter through the proper channels.

6. Aero 2C Controllers: The polarized relays contained in the Aero 2C and 2B controllers are unsatisfactory for prolonged usage. The majority of these relays have repeatedly failed to test properly.

7. Bomb Rack Testing: In order to facilitate bench checking the Mk 55 bomb rack, Mk 9 rocket launchers, and the Aero 14A combination bomb rack and rocket launchers before installing them on aircraft, R. A. LITTLE, AEAN, of VA-125, designed and built a rack testing set that would check both the mechanical and electrical operation of these racks. This device contributed directly to the saving of many man hours and much material while making the task of repairing these racks more simple. The plans and details describing this testing apparatus are being forwarded through proper channels.

8. Personal Equipment: From experience, the following items have been found to be essential to every ordnanceman:

a. Red filtered head lamp.

b. Proper foul weather clothing, including leather fingered gloves with suitable inner liners.

c. Tool belt kit equipped with electricians' pliers (8-10 inches) for fuzing instead of diagonals, a 5/8 inch socket wrench with 3/8 inch drive for winding in 20MM feed mechanisms, screw driver, rack cocking tools.

9. Ordnance Personnel: All ordnance loading commitments were met in time for every launch, except on four occasions. This achievement was accomplished despite fatigue and thoroughly unpleasant weather and because the ordnancemen exhibited the most industrious, driving will to meet a real challenge. These men were well trained and with experience, soon became proficient in their respective duties and in working as a team wherever and whenever the need arose, regardless of squadron affiliations. However, the complement of one ordnanceman per plane was barely adequate to perform all the ordnance work required and allowed no margin for sickness, accident, or emergency.

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TOTAL ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES (28 OCTOBER 1952 - 22 APRIL 1953)

TYPE ORDNANCE	VF-121 (F9F-5)	VF-122 (F9F-5)	VF-124 (F4U-4)	VA-125 (AD-3,4)	VC-3 (F4U-5N)	VC-35 (AD-4N)	TOTALS
2000# GP				268			268
1000# GP	2	8	243	1701	6	2	1962
100# SAP			5	49		2	56
500# GP	351	350	823	1155	154	97	2930
500# SAP			15				15
260# FRAG	1618	1555	374	961	765	143	5416
250# GP	2531	2659	3148	4084	104	372	12898
100# GP	733	551	148	856	62	346	2696
350# ADB			1	49	1	88	139
5" ATAR	485	557	427	215			1684
5" HVAR	16						16
3.5 AR			10	300		28	338
AN-M12 INCEN CLUS				24			24
NAPALM			17	20			37
MK5 MOD 9 FLARES					323	769	1092
20MM	232193	229044		87974	70100	65695	685006
.50 CAL			462320				462320

TOTAL HUNG ORDNANCE

TYPE ORDNANCE	AERO 14A	MK 55 MOD 1	MK 51	MK 9 LAUNCHER	DOUGLAS BOMB EJECTOR	TOTALS
1000# GP					1	1
500# GP	14		6		1	21
250# GP	42	12				54
260# FRAG	12	8				20
100# GP	20	4	2			26
5" ATAR	98			15		113
5" HVAR	1					1
3.5 AR	3			4		7

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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DISPOSITION OF HUNG ORDNANCE

TYPE ORDNANCE	RELEASED BY MANEUVERING	REMAINING ON RACK	DROP OFFS ON LANDING	TOTALS
1000# GP		1		1
500# GP	9	12		21
250# GP	7	45	2	54
260# FRAG	5	14	1	20
100# GP		26		26
5" ATAR		102	11	113
5" HVAR		1		1
3.5 AR		5	2	7

ACCIDENTAL FIRINGS: 20 MM - 3
LAUNCH DROP OFFS: 250# GP - 1 (AERO 14A)

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ENCLOSURE (3)

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PART II

DAMAGE SUMMARY

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY 28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953:

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Ammo Stockpiles	1	3
Bridges, Highway	1	28
Bridges, Railroad	2	8
Boats	7	83
Buildings, Barracks	105	106
Buildings, Factory	30	49
Buildings, Storage or Warehouse	307	127
Buildings, Unidentified	480	855
Bunkers	49	88
Bypasses, Railroad	1	1
Carts, Ox	57	68
Cars, Railroad	79	204
Cars, Vehicle	6	3
Caves		6
Communications Center	1	
Cuts, Highway		25
Cuts, Railroad		166
Docks		1
Fuel Facilities	5	2
Gun Emplacements	48	39
Installations, Radar	2	5
Installations, Radio		1
Installations, Power	2	18
Locomotives	6	13
Marshalling Yards		3
MIG-15 Aircraft	2	1
Penstocks		4
Roundhouses	1	
Shelters, Personnel	85	47
Shelters, Supply	64	47
Shelters, Vehicle	45	41
Shops, Vehicle Repair		9
Snow Shed	1	
Supply stockpiles	27	43
Tanks	1	1
Trenches (In yards) Controllers' est.	1130	475
Troops Controllers' est.	224 KIA	130 WIA
Trucks	299	589
Tunnels, Highway		1
Tunnels, Railroad		10
Water Tower		1

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DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT 28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953:

CAUSES	F9F-5	F4U-4	AD-3,4	F4U-5N	AD-4W	AD-4N	F2H-2P	TOTAL
Lost, enemy action	3	2	6	0	0	0	0	11
Lost, operational	2	1	1	0	0	0	1	5
Lost, other	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Damaged, enemy action	28	29	5	1	0	3	0	66
Damaged, operational	18	7	1	4	2	2	3	37
Damaged, other	52	20	21	4	4	11	2	114

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PART III

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES SUMMARY

PERFORMANCE:

1. The performance of Air Group personnel is considered excellent. Morale remained at a very high level throughout the entire deployment period, in spite of severe weather conditions and a heavy work load. It is believed that four week periods on the line during the winter months should be considered maximum because the fatigue resulting from long strenuous hours then becomes quite noticeable. Bingo games sponsored by the ship's Welfare and Recreation organization, movies, the ship's band, news broadcasts by the ship's AIO office, boxing smokers, happy hours, the hobby shop, library, and religious services all contributed their part in maintaining morale at a high level while at sea. Squadron and division parties were held during in-port periods and reservations at Rest and Recreation hotels, operated by Army Special Services in Japan, were obtained for all officers and men desiring them.

2. The personnel availability by squadrons and detachments was as follows:

	On Board 11-1-52		On Board 5-1-53		Average Availability		Transferred		Received	
	Off	Men	Off	Men	Off	Men	Off	Men	Off	Men
CAG-12, Staff	12	18	11	17	12	17.5	3	3	2	2
VF-121	27	119	26	118	26.5	118.5	*1	10	0	9
VF-122	26	119	24	117	25	118	*2	13	0	11
VF-124	26	122	26	115	26	118.5	26	12	26	5
VA-125	27	138	23	136	25	137	*4	10	0	8
VC-3 Det "G"	5	34	5	30	5	32	0	7	0	3
VC-11 Det "G"	7	28	7	26	7	22	0	2	0	0
VC-35 Det "G"	9	44	8	35	8.5	39.5	1	10	0	1
VC-61 Det "G"	5	25	5	22	5	23.5	0	3	0	0
**VC-3 Det "GL"							3	23	3	23
**VC-35 Det "W"							3	16	3	16

* Killed or missing in action.
** These detachments reported to CVG-12 prior to deployment to WESTPAC and were based ashore at NAS, Atsugi, Japan.

3. The following average number of personnel were assigned to ship's divisions from the Air Group:

Mess Cooks	25
Ship's Cooks	4
Stewards	13
Ship Servicemen	3

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Corpsmen	4
MAA Force	4
Disbursing Clerks	2
Compartment Cleaners	13
Flight Surgeon	1
TOTAL	69

4. Summary of Pilot Man Days Lost:

a.	(1)	Planes lost, enemy action, pilot killed, not recovered	3
	(2)	Planes lost, enemy action, pilot missing, not recovered	2
	(3)	Planes lost, operational, pilot killed, not recovered	2
	(4)	Planes lost, enemy action, pilot recovered, minor injuries	3
	(5)	Planes lost, enemy action, pilot recovered, uninjured	3
	(6)	Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, injured	2
	(7)	Planes lost, operational, pilot recovered, uninjured	1
b.	(1)	Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons	50
	(2)	Pilots permanently grounded for medical evaluation	0
	(3)	Average number days pilots grounded	7.9
	(4)	Total man days lost	395

c. The above statistical summary does not reflect the true state of health of the Air Group pilots, as several were grounded over protracted periods as a result of incapacitating ailments as follows:

(1) EGAN, Henry William, LTJG, USN, 521417, VF-122, grounded from 2/2/53 until 2/14/53 when he was transferred to U.S.N.H. at Yokosuka, for FFT to U.S.A. because of fractured patella (12 days)

(2) GUNDERSON, Allen Herbert, LCDR, USN, 130123, VA-125, grounded from 1/15/53 to 3/2/53 for a fractured right ankle (46 days)

(3) KUMMER, Edwin Lawrence, LT, USNR, 403121, VF-124, grounded from 3/6/53 to 3/13/53 when he was transferred to U.S.N.H. Yokosuka for FFT to U.S.A. because of multiple injuries sustained during a bomb explosion aboard carrier (7 days)

(4) MICHEEL, John Carl, CDR, USN, 85362, VA-125, grounded from 12/4/52 to 1/20/53 for palliative treatment and excision of inflammed hemorrhoids (47 days)

(5) MOORE, William Vincent, LTJG, USN, 513169, VF-121, grounded from 2/14/53 to 4/18/53 for treatment and excision of inflammed hemorrhoids (63 days)

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(6) TALBOTT, Rodger Albert, LT, USNR, 337765, VF-124, grounded from 2/19/53 to 3/17/53 for an elective circumcision complicated by an ethmoid sinusitis (26 days)

(7) The six pilots listed, were responsible for a loss of 201 man days of flying, over half the days lost for the entire Air Group. From this, it is evident that the health of the remainder of the Air Group pilots was excellent during the period of this cruise, with the majority being grounded for minor upper respiratory infections.

5. Enlisted personnel allowances were adequate, however, the ordnance, plane captains and electronics technician rates assigned are considered the absolute minimum, with no margin for sickness, accident, or emergencies. A small increase in such rates, particularly ordnance men and plane captains, would result in apparent increased operating efficiency and safety.

6. Pilot allowances for the jet squadrons were adequate, however, several pilots in the propeller aircraft squadrons were required, on various occasions early in the period, to fly two missions in one day, which was considered excessive. Two missions per day in jet aircraft was not considered a hardship on the pilots and was rarely required. A pilot allowance for a jet squadron of a minimum of 1.25 and a maximum of 1.5 pilots per aircraft is considered adequate, whereas the propeller aircraft allowance should be 1.75 minimum and 2.0 maximum per plane. The pilot utilization will vary according to many factors, but the major factors are type operations, plane availability and length of combat tour.

CASUALTIES:

1. The following is a breakdown of the casualties sustained during the entire combat period:

a. VA-125 (923) (AD-3/AD-4 Aircraft)

11-4-52: ENS. J. L. RIKER III, 558337, USNR - Probably Enemy Action. Parachuted from aircraft. Missing in action.

11-15-52: LT G. A. GAUDETTE, Jr., 453144, USNR - Probably Enemy Action. Killed in Action.

12-22-52: LTJG J. A. HUDSON, 532903, USN - Probably Enemy Action. Killed in Action.

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2-1-53: CDR J. C. MICHEEL, 85362, USN - Probably Enemy Action. Killed in Action.

b. VF-122 (783) (F9F-5 Aircraft)

3-22-53: LTJG R. E. MEW, 394627, USNR - Operational. Crashed at sea. Killed in Action.

4-13-53: LTJG R. (n) TAYLOR, 401295, USNR - Operational. Crashed at sea. Killed in Action.

c. VF-121 (781) (F9F-5 Aircraft)

4-20-53: ENS R. T. SCOGGIN, 551739, USNR - Probably Enemy Action. Crashed at sea. Missing in Action.

d. The following Air Group casualties resulted when an F4U-4 landed aboard on 6 March with a hung bomb which exploded:

LT E. L. KUMMER, 403121, USNR, of VF-124 - wounds in both legs, left arm and shoulder, and first and second degree burns of the face.

BROCKMEYER, R. C., AN, 318 84 87, USN, of VF-122 - left forearm lacerated by a missile.

RODGERS, L. A., ADl, 386 04 17, USN, of VC-3 Det "G" - Chest penetrated by a missile.

DUNION, H. J., AN, 417 79 49, USN, of VC-3 Det "G" - suffered a blow on his chest.

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PART IV

OPERATIONS SUMMARY

1. Resumé: During the period 28 October 1952 through 22 April 1953, Air Group TWELVE completed a total of 7,001 flights and flew 14,948 hours during seventy-three scheduled operational days. The ship was in the combat operating area one hundred eleven days. Approximately seventeen days' operations were cancelled because of weather. The Air Group averaged ninety-six flights per whole operating day and completed ninety-seven percent of all its scheduled commitments. The average total number of flights per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was fifty-five and for the jet pilots was sixty-six. The average total flight time per pilot for the propeller aircraft pilots was 152 hours and for the jet pilots was 104 hours.

2. Aerial Combat: On 18 November 1952, three VF-121 (781) F9F-5's were engaged by four MIG-15's. LT Royce WILLIAMS and LTJG John MIDDLETON were each credited with one MIG-15 kill and LTJG David ROWLANDS with damaging one. Sound defensive tactics and an alert look-out doctrine were employed. In spite of the MIG-15's obvious performance advantages, aggressive pilots, fighting their aircraft to the maximum of their combat potential and taking full advantage of mistakes made by enemy pilots, demonstrated the superiority of the best fighting man when he is opposed by an inferior opponent with better equipment.

3. Flak-Suppression: Jet flak-suppression for propeller aircraft strikes against the most heavily flak protected enemy targets was tremendously effective. Well coordinated, aggressive flak-suppression flights that had been jointly briefed with the propeller aircraft pilots, particularly when pin-point photographic coverage of known enemy gun positions near the target was available, invariably succeeded in greatly reducing the enemy anti-aircraft firing and denied it any accuracy.

4. Night Strike: The use of the night fighters as pre-briefed strike aircraft against a vital and heavily defended target during favorable moonlight and weather conditions was most successful. Experience indicates the enemy's anti-aircraft fire control systems are rarely effective at night and it is believed that the use of night strike aircraft against vital, clearly-defined targets would gain much that might be very costly if accomplished by propeller aircraft in daylight.

5. Rescap: The rescue of a pilot shot down in enemy territory is largely dependent upon the alertness, aggressiveness, and the exercise of most skillful judgment and accepted doctrine by the members of his own flight. They must keep the distressed pilot in sight until he is able to conceal himself on the ground and that location noted for easy identification with reference to an outstanding topographical feature. The Task Force

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Commander must be kept informed by the Rescap flight leader. Relief of the Rescap must be on station by either Navy or Air Force aircraft. Time is paramount and every possible effort should be made to effect the helicopter pick-up before dark, knowing that the chances for a rescue the following day are slim.

6. Jet Bombers: The F9F-5 type aircraft utilized as a bomber on many occasions proved to be a potent weapon. The bomb load carried was as much as 2500 pounds of bombs per airplane, using the Mk-8 catapult for launching. Four F9F-5 airplanes of VF-122, carrying two one thousand pound bombs, attacked the heavily defended HAMHUNG Bridge and scored six hits out of a total of eight bombs dropped, making three large, complete cuts in the bridge.

7. Landing Signal Officer: Early in the period, it was found that reliable and readily available voice radio communication on various frequencies between the L. S. O. and landing pilots was highly desirable. On an experimental basis, an AN/ARC-1 was installed in radio eight, with the control box and antenna located near the L.S.O. platform. The channels available in Primary Fly were duplicated. The L.S.O. wore a headset with attached lip microphone and had the transmitter key in the handle of one paddle. This arrangement was repeatedly demonstrated to be exceedingly desirable. The L.S.O. was continually aware of the status of all emergency landings in the fleet and he was able to give helpful, confidence inspiring instructions and assurance to the pilots. In addition, the L.S.O.'s verbal instructions to the pilots were most helpful during landings under the following, not infrequent, conditions:

a. Rough seas causing a badly pitching deck.

b. Aircraft landing with obscured windshields.

c. Night landings under extreme conditions of darkness, pitching deck or material failure.

d. When the L.S.O. was between the sun and the landing aircraft.

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SUMMARY OF FLIGHTS

28 OCTOBER 1952 THROUGH 22 APRIL 1953

MISSION	VF-121 F9F-5	VF-122 F9F-5	VF-124 F4U-4	VA-125 AD-3,4	VC-3 F4U-5N	VC-11 AD-4W	VC-35 AD-4N	VC-61 F2H-2P	AIR GROUP
OFFENSIVE:									
Strike	479	463	829	846					2617
Recco	307	314							621
Flak Suppression	152	157							309
NGF			75	12	19		4		110
ECM			22	16	1		51		90
Photo								239	239
Photo Escort	115	105							220
CAS		4	179	223					406
TAR CAP	61	51	6						118
Heckler					142		125		267
RES CAP			11	6	1		2		20
SWEEP	8	7							15
Strike Escort	4	4							8
TOTAL OFFENSIVE	1126	1105	1122	1103	163	—	182	239	5040
DEFENSIVE:									
CAP	509	524			6				1039
ASP				1		186	5		192
ASP Escort			4	103	6	10	72		195
AEW						3			3
AEW Escort				2			1		3
Mine Coverage			2		2				4
TOTAL DEFENSIVE	509	524	6	106	14	199	78	—	1436
MISCELLANEOUS:									
Survivor Search			6	2		2			10
Test			18	22	4		2		46
Ferry	5	2	30	26	36	2	47	1	149
Refresher	41	36	44	44	10	8	8	9	200
TOTAL MISC.	46	38	98	94	50	12	57	10	405
ABORTS:	21	35	9	27	13	5	4	6	120
TOTAL FLIGHTS	1702	1702	1235	1330	240	216	321	255	7001
Average Flights Per Pilot	68	68	52.5	58	48	42	64	51	60.5
Average Flight hours per pilot	104	105	141	162	155	117	177	80	129

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PART V

AIR INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

1. When a well defended target was scheduled for two or more days consecutively, interpreted photographs of all known defending anti-aircraft gun positions were made available to the flak-suppression pilots. The flak suppressors were then able to locate and pin-point the guns with the result, reported by the propeller pilots, as highly effective flak suppression.

2. The Task Force depended a great deal upon its own intelligence sources and emphasized this fact to all concerned. Air Intelligence Officers and pilots were impressed with the necessity of supplying the Task Force Commander with accurate, immediate, evaluated reports. Repeated stress was placed on the importance of contact reports and immediate voice radio transmissions by pilots to the Task Force of all militarily significant sightings of enemy activities. The debriefing of returning pilots by the A.I.O.'s was devoted to extracting all the accurate, pertinent intelligence possible, with the object of obtaining sufficient intelligence to permit effective evaluation of the data.

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PART VI

SURVIVAL SUMMARY

1. MK-4 Anti-Exposure Suit:

a. This Air Group has used the Mk-4 Anti-Exposure Suit since the last of October 1952. All pilots are convinced it is an excellent item of cold weather survival equipment. At present, all suits have had approximately 150 hours of wear and are in need of extensive renovation before being used again. There have been several suggestions for improving the suit as follows:

(1) A better connection should be devised for making the "G" suit fitting watertight. The present method of connecting a rubber tube over the "G" suit hose and around the hole in the Mk-4 suit is awkward and hard on the fingers when installing it. Many pilots have stopped wearing "G" suits because of this. There have also been several incidents of the "G" suit hose, the hole in the innerliner, and the hole in the Mk-4 suit not lining up. The trouble seems to be that the hole in the innerliner is too far forward.

(2) The pockets appear to be very weak and tear easily. It is suggested that a better material be used and the stitching around the pockets be doubled or strengthened. There have been several comments on the advisability of using zippers instead of the present snaps to secure the pocket flaps.

(3) Provide larger ankle openings in the innerliner for pilots with a high instep.

(4) Elastic, cloth cuffs used at the wrists and ankles are not well secured to the innerliner, tearing loose easily. It is recommended that they be reinforced.

(5) The neck seals are stiff and have too steep a gradient. Mk-3 neck seals are preferred by the pilots. The Mk-4 seals chafe and irritate the neck and will not twist like the Mk-3 when the pilot turns his head from side to side. It is recommended that the neck seals be made longer and of softer rubber.

(6) The wrist seals split along the fiber cords in the rubber and should be made of soft pliable rubber as indicated for the neck seals.

(7) All fittings for Mk-4 suits should be conducted before leaving the U.S. and by experienced personnel. Over twenty neck seals had to be replaced due to improper cutting by inexperienced men.

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(8) The front of the neckline of the innerliner should be lowered about two inches. When a pilot sits down, the front of the innerliner moves up and causes the zipper to dig into his neck. The zipper should extend about three or four inches lower at the crotch of the innerliner.

(9) Boot straps should be provided at the back of each boot to facilitate pulling them on. A smooth, slick innerlining around the ankle of the boots would make for greater ease in slipping them on and off.

(10) The plastic strips on the chest roll would stay together longer if fused instead of glued.

2. Parachute Harness:

a. It is impossible to sit back in the parachute harness with a Mk-4 Anti-Exposure Suit on after a bailout. A pilot hanging in the harness cannot undo the leg straps until after hitting the ground or water. During this tour, some squadrons put cloth tabs approximately six inches long on each of the friction locks of the leg straps. These tabs are much easier to grasp and when pulled, release the locking action of the leg strap hardware. Because of the bulkiness of the winter flight clothing, if a form of quick release for the leg straps could be provided, it would be a great asset during cold weather operations.

b. There were five successful ditchings in this Air Group, two F9F, two F4U, and one AD. All of these pilots evacuated the aircraft with their parachutes strapped on tightly and experienced no difficulty in getting out of the airplanes.

3. ADSK-1 Droppable Survival Bomb: A separate switch was installed in the AD aircraft of this Air Group to prevent inadvertent dropping of the "Survival Bomb". Prior to installation of this switch, three kits were inadvertantly dropped during bombing runs. The contents of the ADSK-1 were packed into a cloth bag with two shoulder straps for greater ease in carrying. The calorie content of the food provided (est. 3,000 calories) was deemed inadequate for winter survival and was increased by 12,000 calories by using twelve cans of beef, pork, etc. from C rations.

4. PSK-1 Survival Kit: All pilots liked the PSK-1, but very few carried the whole kit in its plastic container. The majority of the pilots selected a minimum of the items they desired and distributed them throughout the various pockets of their Mk-4 suits.

5. PRC-17 and CRC-7 Portable Transceivers: In the five ditchings this Air Group experienced, only three radios were recovered; all were PRC-17's. Two of these contained sea water and were useless. The third had balloons

over both ends and was found to be dry and usable. Due to the constant disassembly of the radios to check the batteries, it is hard to keep them water-tight. It is recommended that all PRC-17 radios be sealed in a plastic bag or that the ends be covered by some form of easily detachable rubber balloons. A RUDM is in process.

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PART VII

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL SUMMARY

MAINTENANCE:

1. Aircraft moving and spotting requirements for maintenance:

a. During flight operations in the early stages of deployment, adverse effects on aircraft availability were apparent because of the lack of a satisfactory integrated system of immediate aircraft status reporting to a central control point. Much time was lost in moving and spotting downed aircraft, particularly jets, for maintenance work and test turn-ups. Through experimentation a most effective system was devised and implemented and aircraft availability progressively improved. This system of constantly gathering, displaying, evaluating, and disseminating aircraft status information to responsible maintenance and handling personnel consisted of:

(1) The installation of a 6' X 8' plexi-glass master aircraft status board in hangar bay two, manned by a talker on the 2JG circuit.

(2) The installation of a 4' X 5' aircraft status board and 12" X 16" individual squadron aircraft movement boards in flight deck control, manned by a 2JG talker (CPO-ADC).

(3) Only responsible, specifically designated squadron trouble-shooters were authorized to transmit aircraft change of status information to the personnel tending the master aircraft status board in hangar bay two and the movement and up-down boards in flight deck control.

(4) All aircraft discrepancies, movements from the flight deck to the hangar deck for maintenance work, etc. were entered in a permanent log by the master aircraft status board talker.

b. During in-port periods, ship maintenance requirements such as elevator servicing, flight deck repairs, etc. inhibited the expeditious completion of aircraft maintenance work. A coordinated system of planning and scheduling in-port squadron maintenance greatly alleviated the foregoing problem. All in-port maintenance was carefully planned and schedules of proposed work were prepared every three days. The first squadron work schedules were submitted to the Air Group Maintenance Officer by 1600 on the day prior to entering port. Schedules showed the relative order in which various jobs were to be performed and noted requirements for the moving of aircraft by side numbers. Similar work lists were submitted prior to 1600 each third day, and all squadron work lists were compiled by the Air Group Maintenance Officer into one master work schedule and delivered every three days to the Air Officer, with copies to the aircraft

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Handling Officer. On this work schedule basis, coordination through personal contact and liaison between the squadron maintenance officers and the ship's air department was carried out by the Air Group Maintenance Officer throughout the entire in-port period. The plexiglass master board in hangar bay two, and the individual squadron movement boards in flight deck control were adjusted to reflect aircraft status changes.

2. Engine Changes:

	NUMBER	AVERAGE TIME
a. J48-P-6A		
High time	3	300
Cracks in combustion chamber supports	6	270
Cracked and nicked cooling impeller blades	2	234
Sheared compressor stress bolt	1	87
TOTAL	12	
b. J34-WE-34		
Fire inside of engine on shut down during flight	1	33
c. R2800-18W		
Stuck in blower	3	267
Metal particles in strainer	1	415
TOTAL	4	
d. R3350-26WA		
5 Cracked cylinders and poor engine condition general	1	294
Metal in oil strainers	7	213
Damaged impeller	1	169
Oil leak in impeller section	3	409
Excessive oil consumption	1	648
TOTAL	13	

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3. Squadron work benches, tool kit stowages, and tool rooms: In order to facilitate aircraft maintenance work and elimimte hazards from tool kits and loose gear adrift, the following facilities, in the proximity of aircraft concerned, were erected and/or provided and utilized:

a. A metal work bench with a vise was erected on the port side between frames 135-138 adjacent to number three elevator. This bench was used by all squadrons.

b. A tool box rack was constructed on the port side between the stanchions of elevator three. This rack was used by propeller squadrons and detachments.

c. The small cage located forward on the port side of hangar bay one, adjacent to number one elevator, was utilized as a jet squadron tool box stowage. The space afforded therein was not adequate, however.

d. The large cage, B-0102-LE, divided into three sections, was utilized for tool box stowage, maintenance literature, and miscellaneous maintenance gear by three squadrons. The space thus afforded was also inadequate.

4. Aviation Electronics:

a. The personnel allowance for electronic technicians was barely adequate for the type of operations experienced. Satisfactory maintenance was achieved only through the excellent cooperation of the Air Group technicians working as a team instead of separate units. At the start of the cruise, a night and day maintenance crew was organized to maintain the common electronics equipments of the entire Air Group. The men thus assigned were the most experienced on the equipments involved. Spare equipments were borrowed from supply so that bench-tested replacement units were always immediately available. As a result, the only aircraft out of commission for radio discrepancies were down because of antenna, cable, and corrosion difficulties. The number of such downed aircraft did not exceed eight or ten for the period of this report. Planning should include two experienced technicians in each squadron for maintenance of APG-30. The personnel allowance for electricians was found to be adequate.

b. Winterization of all aircraft was necessary during this period. However, no repeated discrepancies were noted with either electrical or electronic equipment due to cold weather operations.

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APG-30 :

c. The APG-30 required more maintenance hours than all other electronics equipments combined. The primary problem was the instability and drifting of calibration. In some cases a normal carrier landing would disrupt the calibration. Calibration would also vary greatly after the aircraft had been idle during in-port periods. It was further observed that the APG-30 was very sensitive to noise pulses, with the unit locking on the noise voltage rather than on the target. The new modifications recently published have not been incorporated yet due to the lack of available parts.

APX-6:

d. APX-6 test equipment, UPM-8, became inoperative after the first three months' operations and after having been on requisition for four months, it is still unavailable. To check out APX-6 in the planes on the hangar deck, an antenna was hung just below the hangar overhead and connected by coax to an operating set in the ship. The APX-6 has given little trouble.

e. During flight operations it was not unusual to find the APX-6 antenna filled with gasoline, water, and trash, causing corrosion. In a few cases acceptable antenna operation was regained by cleaning. It was further observed that the three ampere fuse for the APX-6 antenna, under operating conditions, was not adequate. The use of a five ampere fuse eliminated such failures.

ARC-1:

f. Corroding and shorting of AN/ARC-1 cable plugs was experienced late in the cruise. The cause is believed to be due to salt water spray entering the forward wheel compartment and draining down the ARC-1 cables.

g. In many cases the tail cap antenna shunting strap became partially insulated by corrosion. This condition was remedied by sanding and cleaning.

h. Breakages of nine UG83-U's were experienced. Replacements are not handled through regular supply channels (no stock number assigned). It is suggested that Air Groups provision with spare adapters prior to deployment.

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ARP-9:

i. When bench testing the ARR-9 with the PP-336 400-800 cycle switch in the 800 cycle position, the tuner unit selsyn burned out when the power was applied, if the ID-226 selsyn was burned out. The testing technique was corrected to provide for checking the ID-226 selsyn prior to trouble shooting.

APS-31B:

j. Some difficulty was experienced with the mixer-duplexer bushing which insulates the Klystron probe from the wave guide of the APS-31B. The bushing deteriorated and arcing resulted, which burned the 330 ohm resistor that supplies B plus voltage to the shell of the Klystron. Frequent checking of the bushing reduced such failures.

k. Radomes for both APS-31 and APS-20 were not carried by supply nor were they available in WestPac. Considering the time necessary to obtain one from the U.S., consideration should be given to carrying one of each type on board deploying carriers.

TUBES:

l. New 6AK5 tubes were extremely defective. Approximately 50% of the tubes had hot shorts when received. Of the remainder, practically all shorted after the first carrier landing. However, the last order of tubes received was marked as being screened in 1952. These tubes have been exceptionally good with none showing hot shorts.

MATERIAL:

5. The supply of aviation material has been satisfactory throughout the WestPac deployment period. Following is a summary of aviation electronics items in short supply and ACOG's:

a. The availability of Section "R" allowance items such as fuses, small resistors and condensers, relays, switches and cannon plugs was inadequate. This was particularly true of items peculiar to individual equipments.

b. Replacements for components of G-2 compasses, fluxgate compasses, and AD wing tank fuel gages were not readily available in supply channels.

c. There was a shortage of Section "G" allowance items carried in supply as replacements for the Electronics "A" Kits. The "A" Kits were complete at the time of deployment to the forward area, but were depleted about twenty-five percent due to breakage and normal losses.

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d. ACOG's:

TYPE A/C	PART DESCRIPTION	PART NO.	NO. CASES	NO. DAYS
F9F-5	Door Assembly	R82GR143220-2L	1	3
F9F-5	Nose Section	132001	2	4
F9F-5	Hook, Tail	GR-140705-1	1	6
F9F-5	Fuel Control	R85HO-A7008A	1	1
F9F-5	Emergency Air Bottle Elbow	R-45E266-60	2	4
F9F-5	Valve	R83BTP-MLV4-01	1	13
F9F-5	High Pressure Regulator	PN/311781	2	4
F9F-5	Seal	R82GR131958	1	13
F4U-4	Wing Assembly	R82CVVS37013-2	1	13
F4U-4	Voltage Regulator	NAF-1204-3	1	2
F4U-4	Switch	R17-S-25109-166	1	6
F4U-4	Wing Assembly	R82CVVS37013-2	1	11
F4U-4	Panel Assembly	R82CVVS40624R	1	3
F4U-4	Panel Assembly	R82CVVS40626R	1	3
F4U-4	Key Assembly	R82CVVS46208-R	1	3
F4U-4	Wing Assembly	R82CVVS37013	1	6
F4U-4	Enclosure Assembly	R82CVVS40296	1	4
F4U-4	Control Assembly	R82CVVS48660	1	7
F4U-4	Strut Assembly	R82CVVS13853	1	8
F4U-4	Control Box	R86EC1002-5A	1	8
F4U-4	Elevator	R82CVVS33109	1	4
F4U-4	Horn	R82CVVS12188	1	2

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TYPE A/C	PART DESCRIPTION	PART NO	NO. CASES	NO. DAYS
F4U-4	Link	R82CVVS16848	1	2
F4U-4	Bolt	R82CVVS18221-2	1	2
F4U-4	Stabilizer	R82CVVS40103	1	5
F4U-4	Elevator	R82CVVS33109	1	12
AD-3	Control	R86STC100620	1	1
AD-3	Nose Assembly	R82-GR14200-1	1	21
AD-3	Section Assembly	R82-GSR403-4	2	21
AD-3	Propeller	R87HSP100005	1	2
AD-3	Cylinder	R85PW144319	1	2
AD-3	Cylinder	R83DG-5255155-10	1	8
AD-4W	Wing Fold Crank Assembly	526279-6	1	2
AD-4W	Unit	R88U1058-25	1	2
AD-4W	Fuel Quantity Gauge	R88-I-2003-25	1	1
F4U-5N	Valve	R83AP13802	1	14
F4U-5N	Support	R82CVVS53682	1	7
F4U-5N	Manifold	R83CVVS14290R	1	31
F2H-2P	Nose Landing Gear Emergency Extention Cylinder-End Assembly	15-45167	1	12
			43	273

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6. Statistics:

a. Maintenance:

	F9F-5	F2H-2P	F4U-4	F4U-5N	AD-3	AD-4	AD-4N	AD-4W	TOTAL
Aircraft repaired on board	112	4	40	7	14	22	15	7	221
Aircraft not repairable on board	16	0	6	3	1	2	2	2	32
Engines Changed	12	1	4	0	10	3	0	0	30

b. Average Availability:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT ONBOARD EXCLUSIVE OF "DUD" AIRCRAFT	AVERAGE AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE	PERCENTAGE AVAILABLE
VF-121	F9F-5	13.8	12.1	87%
VF-122	F9F-5	13.7	11.6	85%
VF-124	F4U-4	12.9	11.9	92%
VA-125	AD-3,4	14.7	13.0	88%
VC-3	F4U-5N	3.8	3.2	84%
VC-11	AD-4W	2.9	2.4	82%
VC-35	AD-4N	3.8	3.3	87%
VC-61	F2H-2P	3.2	2.7	84%
AIR GROUP		68.8	60.2	86%

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