

PART IV DAMAGE (CON'D)

A. OWN DAMAGE

1. DAMAGE TO AIRCRAFT DUE TO ENEMY ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

DATE	SQD	TYPE	BU. NO.	CAUSE	POSITION OF DAMAGE
12-10	VA 728	AD-4	123918	Bomb Blast	Fragments struck wheel well door, penetrated lower surface of stbd. flap & stbd. wing & stbd. side of oil scoop.
12-10	VF 713	F4U-4	97317	30 Cal.	Center windshield stopped by bullet proof glass. - Wing & ammo can.
12-11	VA 728	AD-2	122326	20mm/AP	Entered upper surface port stub.
12-11	VA 728	AD-4	123918	Small Arms	Entered top surface of stbd. flap & emerged lower surface.
12-11	VF 713	F4U-4	81546	30 Cal. 37mm 37mm	Center of fuselage out inter cooler Passed thru wing fabric - stbd. Passed thru wing fabric - port.
12-11	VF 713	F4U-4	81433	30 Cal.	Passed thru stbd. wing fabric.
12-11	VF 713	F4U-4	80939	30 Cal	Entered top, hit wing rib capatrie bulged bottem of rib.
12-13	VA 728	AD-2	122310	Small Arms	Penetrated stbd. side of fuselage port side.
12-13	VA 728	AD-2	122304	Bomb Blast	Fragments penetrated strut fairing & also made hole in speed ring.
12-13	VA 728	AD-4	123825	Bomb Blast	Penetrated lower leading edge of wing flap & emerged upper leading edge penetrating lower trailing edge of wing stub. Penetrated lower surface of port wing & emerged upper surface outboard of wing.
12-13	VC-35	AD-4NL	124732	40mm/A/W	Hit bottem of stbd. wing panel & exploded thru top of wing. Six (6) fragments hit stbd. engine cowling.
12-14	VF 837	F9F-2	125095	Bomb Debris	Stbd. wing leading edge dented & broken. Port wing leading edge dented.

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DATE	SQUAD.	TYPE	BU. NO.	CAUSE	POSITION OF DAMAGE
12-14	VA 728	AD-4	123949	Small Arms	Entered leading edge of right wing. Passed thru main spar destroying electrical wiring. Hole in stbd. wing.
12-15	VF 837	F9F-2	127156	AA	Stbd. wing - pierced on bottom stbd. side fuselage - hit engine port horiz. stabilizer, passed thru.
12-17	VF 713	F4U-4	8166A	20mm	Right oil cooler
12-18	VF 837	F9F-2	127147	Small Arms	Passed thru port horiz. stabilizer.
12-18	VF 713	F4U-4	81491	50 Cal.	Propeller Dome.
12-18	VF 831	F9F-2	127148	25 Cal. A	Right tip tank on lower side.
12-18	VF 831	F9F-2	123649	Bomb Blast	Lower lip leading edge root, right duct inlet. Upper lip leading edge root left duct inlet.
12-19	VF 837	F9F-2	127152	20mm/AA	Stbd. middle of nose, aft thru nose section.
12-19	VF 713	F4U-4	81631	Unknown	Aircraft hit in engine - abandoned
12-20	VA 728	AD-4	122815	Small Arms	Bullet entered outboard stub wing and emerged thru top of wing.
12-22	VA 728	AD-2	122310	Small Arms	Entered wing surface and emerged top doing no internal damage.
12-23	VF 831	F9F-2	127212	25 Cal. A	Projectile entered canopy skin frame.
12-23	VA 728	AD-4	123951	Small Arms	Entered stbd. side of fuselage and emerged thru top.
12-23	VA 728	AD-2	122248	Bomb Blast	Fragment glanced off port side of cowl ring and wrap cowl.

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A. OWN DAMAGE

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DATE	SQD	TYPE	EQ. NO.	CAUSE	POSITION OF DAMAGE
12-24	VA 728	AD-2	122333	Small Arms	Entered leading edge of stub outboard wing and emerged thru rib of split wing.
12-24	VA 728	AD-4L	123999	Small Arms	Bullet hole in trailing edge of stub flap.



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2. AIRCRAFT DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR ABOARD SHIP

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>BUREAU NO.</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>
2/9/51	VA 728	AD-4	123836	AA damage - wheels up landing at K-18.
2/13/51	VC-35 DET "D"	AD-4NL	124732	AA damage - wheels up landing at K-18.
12/18/51	VF 831	F9F	123644	AA damage.

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3. AIRCRAFT LOST

DATE	SQUADRON	TYPE	BUREAU NUMBER	CAUSE
2/6/51	VA 728	AD-4	124002	Unable to remain airborne after deck take-off. Ditched.
2/13/51	VC-3 DET "D"	F4U5NL	124533	Engine failure - Ditched.
2/14/51	VA 728	AD-4	123825	AA damage - Ditched
12/18/51	VF 713	F4U-4	81491	AA damage - Pilot bailed out.
2/19/51	VF 713	F4U-4	81631	AA damage - Pilot bailed out.
2/22/51	VA 728	AD-4	123812	AA damage - Pilot bailed out.

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B DAMAGE TO ENEMY

TARGETS	OCT 15 - NOV 14, '51		NOV 26, 1951		DEC 31, 1951		TOTAL	
	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed	Damaged	Destroyed
TANKS	1		6	6	7	6		
TRUCKS	26	47	60	49	86	96		
CARS	1				1			
LOCOS	6	3	7	14	13	17		
EXCARTS	16	24	34	189	50	213		
HIWAY BRIDGES	4				4			
SUPPLY DUMPS	12	14		4	12	18		
MMO DUMPS	1	1			1	1		
FACTORIES	3	5	1	2	4	7		
WAREHOUSES	32	28	32	35	64	63		
BARRACKS & BUILDINGS	82	78		102	81	180		
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	33	26	2	20	35	46		
LUMBER PILES	6				6			
OXEN		25		120		145		
VILLAGES	7	2			7	2		
BOATS	2	5	34	60	36	65		
BUNKERS	6	3			6	3		
RR TRACKS	350	Cuts	954	Cuts	1304	Cuts		
RR TUNNELS	3				3			
RR CARS	92	61	108	70	200	131		
RR BRIDGES	13	7	10	15	23	22		
TROOPS KILLED		246		303		549		
RR BYPASS	5		3	5	8	5		
HIWAY BYPASS	3		6	2	9	2		
FUEL DUMP		1				1		
HIWAY	3				3			
OBS. POST	2			1	2	1		
AIRFIELDS		1				1		
GRADER		1				1		
HUNGARS	3				3			
TELEPHONE EXCHANGE				1		1		
BOAT HOUSES			1	1	1	1		

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PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. Personnel performance and morale of all personnel has been outstanding during this period. The hardship and extra burden imposed on Maintenance and Ordnance personnel made work on the flight deck particularly difficult. The ability of these men to willingly assume these added burdens was particularly gratifying.

2. During this operating period, one aviator was returned to his parent VC squadron for disposition because he wished to discontinue night flying with his attack detachment. One aviator returned to the air group after being hospitalized at the U. S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan for back difficulties, and was subsequently found to be physically qualified only for Service Group II and has been transferred from this command. One aviator will be transferred to the hospital for evaluation of intestinal and joint complaints.

3. During this operating period, three Corsair, one night attack, and one F9F pilot have reported aboard as replacement pilots. One of the Corsair replacement pilots, only with his squadron 16 days, was forced to bail out over water after being hit by anti-aircraft fire while flying a combat mission, sank with his parachute and is presumed dead.

4. Three of four aviators who were suspended from flying during the first operating period are still undergoing FCLP at NAS, ATSUGI, JAPAN; the fourth, has been transferred from this command. Refresher FCLP training at NAS ATSUGI during the first In Port period for pilots who were weak or rough during the first action period proved highly successful as carrier operations were uniformly good to excellent during this action period.

5. During this operating period, 35 different pilots were grounded for short periods of time primarily for upper respiratory diseases, and for observation following accidents. The total number of pilots temporarily grounded at any one time was eight (8) for the whole Air Group. A maximum of four (4) in one Squadron (Jet) were grounded at one time. Due to the heavy jet operating schedule a pilot ratio 1.5 pilots per aircraft especially during winter months is recommended in Jet Squadrons to provide for more frequent grounding for common colds. This Air Group actually deployed with 1.5 pilots per plane in the Jet Squadrons instead of the normal 1.3. Therefore operations have continued satisfactorily, but only just within what is considered a normal pilot work load of 4 flights every 8 days. Only 6 pilots were grounded on more than one occasion. Two of 22 combat air crewmen have been grounded for short periods of time for upper respiratory diseases.

6. Since leaving Japan for this operating period, the Air Group has had ten (10) cases of venereal diseases: 9 gonococcal urethritis, 1 primary syphilis, but no chancroid. This is compared with two cases of venereal disease diagnosed during the first operating period.

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PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE (CON'D)

B. CASUALTIES.

1. LT G. C. YOUNG, 315272/1315 USNR

On 3 December 1951, LT YOUNG engaged #20 wire in landing his F9F-2P aircraft, and the nose and nose gear engaged the Davis barrier, the nylon straps of the barrier were broken and some were thrown into the cockpit hitting him in the face and producing a mild confusion of the right eye. LT YOUNG was returned to flying status on 4 December 1951.

2. ENS W. T. BIRD, Jr. 538655/1325 USNR

On 6 December 1951, ENS BIRD crashed into the sea immediately after take off with a full load of bombs on his AD-4L aircraft. He sustained a mild degree of shock from the immersion of 1 1/2 minutes and minor cervical muscle strains. ENS BIRD returned to flying status on 8 December 1951.

3. LCDR S. T. BITTING, 112752/13135 USNR.

On 9 December 1951, LCDR BITTING was hit by anti-aircraft fire while flying on a strike and crashed landed his AD-4 aircraft at K-18 without injury. LCDR BITTING returned to the ship on 14 December 1951 and resumed flying immediately.

4. LTJG W. K. DONAHOE, 456794/1315 USNR
AT3 J. A. BEECHER, 7994387 USN
AM3 R. A. NOBLE, 7988211 USN

On 13 December 1951, LTJG DONAHOE and his crewmen, while flying on a pre-dawn heckler mission, were hit by anti-aircraft fire and were forced to crash land their AD-4NL aircraft at K-18. No injuries were sustained by any of the personnel. LTJG DONAHOE and his crewmen returned to the ship on 15 December 1951 and returned to flying status immediately.

5. LT C. H. SCHINDLER, 466112/1310 USN

On 13 December 1951, LT SCHINDLER had engine failure with his F4U-5NL aircraft approximately 15 miles from the force while flying an ASP escort mission. He ditched at sea and was rescued by a helicopter after being in the water 20 minutes. He suffered a mild degree of shock from exposure and mild cervical muscle strains. LT SCHINDLER returned to flying status on 17 December 1951.

6. ENS R. A. COURTNEY 538315/1325 USNR

On 14 December 1951, ENS COURTNEY ditched his AD-4 aircraft after being hit by anti-aircraft fire while on a combat strike and survived on a raft for 2 hours and 20 minutes in the open sea. He sustained a moderate degree of shock, and exposure of the hands, feet, and legs. ENS COURTNEY was rescued

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B. CASUALTIES (Con'd)

by a destroyer, treated, and returned to this ship on 19 December 1951. He returned to flying status on 22 December 1951.

7. LT D. E. WILSON, 437657/1315 USNR

On 18 December 1951, LT WILSON was forced to bail out over water after his F4U-4 aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire while on a combat strike. He sustained a mild degree of shock from being in the water and on a raft for 17 minutes prior to being rescued by a destroyer. LT WILSON returned to this ship on 19 December 1951 and returned to flying status on 23 December 1951.

8. ENS G. A. RILEY, 377115/1325 USNR

On 19 December 1951, ENS RILEY was forced to bail out of his F4U-4 aircraft over water after being hit by anti-aircraft fire while on a combat strike. He was observed to have parachuted safely but was seen to be dragged thru the water by his parachute, and when it capsized, it is believed that he sank with it, as he was not seen after the parachute sank. An extensive search by his flight, a helicopter, and by a destroyer whale boat all reported negative results for ENS RILEY or for floating equipment.

9. LT S. (n) MARSHALL, 306039/1315 USNR

On 22 December 1951, LT MARSHALL was forced to bail out of his flaming AD-4 aircraft over enemy territory after being hit by anti-aircraft fire while on a combat strike. He landed safely on a ridge sustaining only generalized contusions and was rescued by a helicopter returning him to Yodo Island. LT MARSHALL returned to this ship on 23 December 1951 and will return to flying status the next operating period.

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A. OPERATIONS

1. Operations during the second combat tour were characterized by a general smoothing out. This was reflected in the airmanship displayed around the Task Force, greater accuracy in the use of weapons, and considerable reduction in operational accidents.

2. Operations were almost entirely of an interdiction nature. Enemy activity in the interdiction zone showed an increase during this period which was reflected in the number of trains and tanks sighted and destroyed.

3. The low temperature of the water in the combat area (below 40°) made rescue operations critical. Cooperation of rescue agencies proved excellent and kescap procedures were effectively carried out. Of the five personnel that ditched, four were recovered with no harmful effects. The fifth pilot was observed to be dragged by his parachute after hitting the water and made no apparent attempt to extricate himself from the parachute. It is considered possible that he had been injured by anti-aircraft fire or by collision with the aircraft during bailout.

4. Examination of kescap procedures, however, indicates that much improvement could be made. The following kescap comments and recommendations have been adopted by this group and are submitted. They are covered specifically for a strike group but

(a) kescap plans must be thoroughly covered during the pre-flight briefing taking into consideration target location and other variables such as location of rescue facilities.

(b) It is considered desirable to join up (by section) after each dive bombing run since a pilot may have been hit and lost his radio and, therefore, may be unable to advise his wingman of his difficulty. The wingman can also usually assess the damage. The last plane of the attack calls "Attack completed, all aboard".

(c) The damaged aircraft and/or his wingman should notify the flight leader immediately of his difficulties and both proceed toward the water or the nearest ASR facility.

(d) The strike leader should dispatch a section of aircraft to proceed towards the ASR facility:

(1) To act as a communication relay.

(2) To lead the rescue unit (helicopter or ship) towards the location of the downed aircraft.

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- e. The flight leader should immediately climb to altitude over the stricken aircraft and make his Mayday transmission, which should include location, condition of pilot, and length of time he can remain in the area. In event the ASK units are beyond 40 miles, the detached section can act as a relay.
- f. The wingman of the damaged aircraft should call out a check list to the pilot in trouble, assist him in determining whether to bail out or not and assure that he has taken necessary steps; jettisoning ordnance, shoulder straps, seat belt, and flaps down before landing.
- g. In event the pilot of the downed aircraft is subjected to enemy fire the Flight Leader should detach additional aircraft to strafe the area.
- h. The major problem is to keep voice transmissions to a minimum so that essential traffic can be transmitted. No transmissions by persons other than those authorized above in the flight should be tolerated. This is the reason such adequate preflight briefing is required.

5. Damage to aircraft resulting from flak and small arms increased considerably during this period. This is attributed to the following: increase in enemy guns in the target area, over-confidence of pilots, zealously of pilots in making runs to lower altitude, with resultant low pullouts. This is reflected in the increased incidence of bomb damage and small arms fire. In many cases, no ground fire was witnessed and the pilot had no knowledge that he was hit. This tends to lull the pilot into a "false sense of security."

6. Action has been taken to reemphasize glide bombing safety precautions and to insist that all aircraft jinx continuously while over enemy territory. In addition, flak area photo coverage is providing better gun location information. During the next tour charts will be prepared showing the enemy damage sustained by each pilot in an attempt to highlight this problem.

7. The treachery of icy decks has been apparent during this tour. Dangers to personnel are greatly increased and several minor accidents occurred when chocks slipped and aircraft slid forward. Jet aircraft have proved to be excellent snow and ice "removers", both from the flight deck and from the other aircraft on "hot air operation pinwheel".

8. A K-25 camera was carried on each strike by the AD aircraft. The resultant film provided excellent damage assessment. In order to get good shots, however, the "pilots plane" had to make down runs (below 500) and is particularly vulnerable to enemy fire. It is recommended that a camera with a longer focal length be provided to reduce this hazard.

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9. Jet operations increased greatly during this operating period. The two jet squadrons flew more sorties than the prop squadrons (less VC units). Availability actually increased with the higher utilization.

a. During this period activities were principally directed at railroad interdiction flights over Korea and combat air patrol flights over the task force. Several sweeps were also made over enemy held airfields to insure that the enemy was not using or preparing for use any of these fields. An average of forty flights were flown each day.

b. The primary target of all the interdiction flights was changed from the reconnaissance routes to rail cuts with the recco route being secondary. The ordnance load was also changed from rockets to 4 - 250# bombs exclusively. The total rail cuts increased with the use of the 250# bombs. The 250# bomb is considered the best loading for the F9F. Bombs are dropped on the rail route and the flight then proceeds on their assigned recco route. The point of return is determined by the time factor or the fuel factor. These flights for this period have been made up of a four plane division, which differs from the first period, that consisted of the three plane division. It is considered desirable that the recco flights in the future consist of four planes. With this arrangement in the case of a downed plane the flight can revert back to the basic three plane division, and no standby plane would be required.

c. Short sections of approximately 15 miles of railroad were assigned to each flight of four F9F's. When these track sections were in open country with relatively meager concentration of ground fire, the attacks were made at low angles along straight sections of track, and pressed to an altitude between 500 and 1000 feet above the terrain. This greatly improved the accuracy of the bombing on a target that is extremely difficult to hit.

d. TARCAPS were conducted in conjunction with Armed recco flights. The flight was assigned a recco route after which it proceeded to an assigned area. Enroute from the recco route the flight climbed to an altitude ranging from 20,000 feet to 25,000 feet. Upon reaching the assigned area the division would be split into two sections, each taking an advantageous position on either side of the area. Abeam of each other, the sections would begin weaving on a predetermined course, reversals being made at the discretion of the flight leader. The purpose of the TARCAP is to provide high jet fighter coverage for the prop planes on their rail interdiction program, in case enemy jet or prop fighters should appear. The main purpose of this type flight is defeated by launching time of both jets and props being the same. With the speed of the jets, it is impractical for jets and props on the same event to be used together. In most cases the jet flights have covered their recco route and

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and have proceeded over their assigned TARCAP area until the point of return has been reached, before the prop flights have reached the area. Only in rare cases has the TARCAP been able to provide coverage for any length of time. It is recommended that future TARCAPS be launched 45 to 60 minutes after the aircraft they are to fly cover for, so as to utilize the jet coverage for the maximum length of time.

e. It is recommended that the Fighter Director controlling all CAPS make a radio check at least each five minute period, including in his check "pigeons and distance to base". This point cannot be overstressed, especially when the CAP is operating over an overcast.

10. Compron Teams

- a. The efficiency and performance of Compron personnel has been highly gratifying.
- b. The night attack unit has had very little success with flares as a means of spotting targets. It is recommended that additional training be provided future teams in this type of work.
- c. The VO-3 pilot personnel are being relieved after the completion of a two-month combat tour. It is considered that the same operational problems apply to all night Compron pilots. In the interest of uniformity, fairness to all personnel of similar status, and morale considerations, it is recommended that combat tour length be standardized for all composite team personnel.

11. This group has developed a comprehensive system of LSO records, which have provided much useful information. The details of each "pass" are recorded in a small notebook normally used by LSO's. This information is used for pilot briefing in the Ready Rooms after each recovery. The information from the notebook is then transcribed to individual pilot sheets which then provide a permanent record of all carrier landings made by each individual pilot. Repetition of errors is readily noted and much valuable information has been provided the pilots through this system. Surprisingly, the pilots frequently examine their landing sheets which indicate excellent pilot interest and the overall effect has been a noticeable improvement in carrier landing operations. This procedure is recommended for all Landing Signal Officers.

12. This group has two jet squadrons aboard using the same type aircraft and the same ready room. Due to flight and hanger deck problems aircraft of each squadron must be used interchangeably. It is believed that much administrative "overhead" could be removed if both squadrons were combined. It is recommended that when two identical squadrons are to be deployed in an air group, they be combined early during the training period. There would be virtually no increase in administrative personnel needed for a combined squadron over a normal squadron. The reduction in personnel would relieve the shipboard congestion problem.

B. INTELLIGENCE

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1. All phases of intelligence have functioned very smoothly with the exception of reports. The vulnerability Report is required to be accompany the air attack report, but frequently this is impossible due to the fact that maintenance is overworked and cannot estimate the extent of damage inflicted on an aircraft until it is carefully studied. The vulnerability report often is not turned in to the Air Group Intelligence Officer within a week after damage because of the high number of aircraft hit by enemy flak or damaged by bomb blast. This results in a backlog of reports. The Aircraft Availability Report is entirely unrealistic and does not show true availability for operations. It does show the capabilities of the maintenance personnel by reporting an aircraft if it is available at any time during a 24 hour period. To show operating availability this report should show the average percentage of aircraft available during each launch of that type aircraft.

2. The photographic phase of intelligence has worked out much better this operating period. Photographic flak studies of targets were prepared which enabled much more accurate briefing. Jet photo aircraft should be equipped with a larger focal length camera in order to obtain as accurate information as possible on AA positions. 1:5000 prints are necessary for proper interpretation. 7500 to 10,000 feet of altitude is the minimum safe photo recon flight altitude with present AA. The use of the K-25 camera on each strike has provided much more accurate damage assessment, and prints have been used to locate additional targets.

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C- MAINTENANCE

1. During this action period a heavy load was placed on the squadron maintenance personnel due to the increase in the number of sorties scheduled daily, the incidence of good flying weather, and the marked increase in the number of aircraft damaged by ground fire. The latter reason placed a particularly heavy burden on the squadron structural mechanics. It is suggested that consideration be given to increasing the squadron complements of structural mechanics.

2. Squadron aircraft availability was excellent throughout this period. The operational availability of VF-713 was particularly outstanding considering the age and condition of the aircraft operated. This squadron completed more than 100 % of scheduled flights for each of eight successive days.

3. The jet aircraft squadrons experienced numerous cases of engine surge at altitude and two engine flameouts. Investigation revealed the cause to be the seizing of the aneroid shift of the turbo jet control. Twelve control units were changed and at the present time no replacement units are available. These difficulties are covered in VF-837 RUM No. 13-51. A lubricating oil proportioner system is operative only on the hangar deck and regular fueling with required percentage of oil was not possible. Installation of this system has been requested during the succeeding In Port period.

4. An interesting demonstration of the endurance and ruggedness of the J-42 engine was provided when an F9F aircraft took a battle hit in the forward combustion chamber casting. The slug, together with a 2 inch square piece of chamber casting, went through the combustion chamber, the nozzle guide vanes and out through the turbine blades. The trailing edges of all of the nozzle guide vanes were severely notched at the top. All turbine blades were curled into a "U" shape at their tips. The pilot continued on his mission operating his engine for over 3/4 of an hour at all power settings with no sign of malfunctioning. Even the final carrier approach and landing were made without any apparent engine difficulty. It is a steady thought to pilot and maintenance people alike that the engine can take this kind of unexpected operation.

5. During this period a total of eight engine changes were completed, which included one J-42, four R-3350 and three R-2800 engines. This required the return of some of the engine build-up personnel which the V-2 division had loaned on an informal basis to the squadrons during the first action period, when few engine changes were accomplished.

6. As a result of increased experience and continuing education, aircraft handling accidents this period were reduced by 29% over last period. However, this type of accident continues to cause unnecessary maintenance difficulties and all possible effort is being expended to lower their incidence.

7. Material support was satisfactory. However, critical shortages continue to appear and cause grounding of aircraft. The AD-2 replacement aircraft from FASRON 11 caused particular trouble in that spares for AD-4 aircraft only were aboard. Two planes were AOG for parts for the last ten days of the period.

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D. ELECTRONICS

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1. Operation of electronics equipments for this period were highly satisfactory. In general, difficulties were minor and maintenance was routine. All discrepancies during this period were noted and logged. In this manner, a breakdown, percentage-wise, of difficulties per equipment was arrived at.

2. In the two F9F-2 squadrons discrepancies in equipments were nearly equal. AN/ARC-1 caused approximately 35%, AN/ARR-2, 25%, AN/ARN-6, 16%, AN/APX-6, 12% and AN/APN-1, 3%. However, many of the flexible cables to the AN/ARN-6 sense antenna have been discovered broken or cut. Close observation of this problem is now underway to determine the cause. AN/LPG-30 is being maintained at all times should the occasion arise where its use would be necessary.

3. In the FAU and AD squadrons it was found that there was a high correlation between discrepancies noted in each squadron. The AN/ARC-1 accounted for approximately 55%, AN/ARR-2, 30%, AN/ARC-5, 10% and AN/APX-1, 5%. Attrition rates on Altimeter, IFF and AN/ARC-5 antennas was rather high, especially on the Corsairs.

4. MK III, Mod III equipments are going to be calibrated during this in-port period. It is felt that this will, at least, provide an opportunity for some use of the equipment. As some aircraft are configured with AN/ASG-10A this is being thoroughly checked for use.

5. All test equipment in the shops has performed in a very satisfactory manner. It is recommended that the AN/ARR-2 be relocated to facilitate in the F9F-2 to facilitate removal.

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E. SURVIVAL

1. Deficiencies of Survival and Aviation Supply equipment at conclusion of operation period 27 November - 31 December 1951.

(a) Inadequate supply of:

- (1) Life raft type rations.
- (2) Sewing thread and card supplies.
- (3) Dye markers
- (4) Life Vest lights
- (5) Oxygen bottles
- (6) Shoulder harness for F9F type aircraft
- (7) Type 8 parachute webbing for harness and cargo chute assemblies
- (8) Linoleum Wax

These items have been ordered and should be available next period.

2. Droppable Survival Bomb (kit)

A new compartment type droppable arctic survival bomb (kit) was developed this period which in many ways appears superior to the ones used the first period of operation.

3. Survival Bombs, loss of

Six (6) survival bombs were lost this period. Three (3) were dropped accidentally while trying to jettison a bomb load and one (1) was dropped to a pilot downed in the water. The bomb landed too far from the pilot for him to reach it as the water was so cold that hand paddling was attempted but abandoned. The bomb eventually sank. Two (2) were damaged beyond repair on experimental drop tests at NAS Atsugi, Japan.

4. Ditching in Water.

Three aircraft were ditched in water with a total of three (3) pilots and two (2) aircrewmembers being rescued from the water.

5. Bailouts.

Three (3) pilots bailed out during this operating period. Two (2) came down in the water. One of these pilots made no apparent attempt to extricate himself from the harness and was lost. The other was rescued safely. The third pilot landed on enemy territory and was rescued.

6. Crash Landing

There was one crash landing at K-18 in Korea with pilot and two (2) aircrewmembers aboard. No major injuries reported.

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7. It is recommended that a pair of waterproof gloves will be placed in the PK-2 life raft assembly for cold water emergency purposes. Hand paddles should be returned to this raft for cold water paddling.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (a) That a standard droppable survival kit for fighter type aircraft be developed and issued to Carrier Air Groups prior to deployment.
- (b) That ditching drills, bailout procedure and survival technique be reviewed and demonstrated frequently.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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