DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FIGHTER SQUADRON FOURTEEN
FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK 09501

1977

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CONFIDENTIAL (Unclassified upon removal of enclosure (2), (5), (6) and (8))

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Chief of Naval Operations (OP-05D2)

Subj: Command History; submission of OPNAV Report 5750-1

Ref: (a) OPNAVINST 5750.12B

Encl: (1) FITRON FOURTEEN History for Calendar Year 1977
(2) 1977 Chronology of Events
(3) FITRON FOURTEEN Officer and billets held 31 December 1977
(4) FITRON FOURTEEN Pilot/NFO flight time January thru December 1977
(5) 1977 Flight Statistics
(6) 1977 Weapons expended
(7) Admiral Joseph Clifton Award Nomination
(8) TOPHATTER 1977 Mediterranean Cruise Report
(9) Biography of Commander Francis J. Dougherty (Commanding Officer)
(10) Biography of Commander Timothy W. Wright (Executive Officer)

1. In accordance with reference (a), enclosures (1) through (10) are submitted.

T. W. Wright
T. W. WRIGHT

Copy to:
Director of Naval History (OP-09B9)

Classified by OPNAVINST 5750.12B
Declassify on 31 DEC 1984

FIGHTER SQUADRON FOURTEEN HISTORY FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1977

1. Basic History. Calendar Year 1977 was a year of significant challenge and ultimate success for the TOPHATTERS. Over eight months were spent at sea with Carrier Air Wing ONE; seven months embarked in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67) on an extensive Mediterranean deployment and six weeks aboard USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69) for her initial shakedown cruise in the Caribbean Sea. Specific statistics will be presented in detail in the text; however, it is significant to point out that during the course of 1977 over 3363 hours were flown by TOPHATTER aircrews with 1496 carrier arrested landings. Two major NATO exercises employed the talents of VF-14 and four separate MISSILEXES saw TOPHATTER crews launching 11 AIM-9 Sidewinder and 9 AIM-7 Sparrows at realistic target presentations. Command emphasis was placed on carrier proficiency and fighter readiness, culminating in an integrated program of shipboard operations dedicated largely to ACM (Air Combat Maneuvering) training and MAS (Maritime Air Superiority).

a. Command Organization.

(1) 1977 opened with a Change of Command ceremony on 7 January as CDR Carlton L. Lavinder, Jr. was relieved by CDR Francis J. Dougherty at ceremonies in Hangar 400 aboard NAS Oceana, Virginia. Commander Timothy W. Wright became the new Executive Officer of the TOPHATTERS as Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN prepared to go to sea.

(2) The basic mission of the squadron has not changed; however, the emphasis in training has been shifted somewhat. As stated in the VF-14 Watch and Information Sheet, the mission of Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN is to intercept and destroy enemy aircraft and anti-ship capable missiles in all weather conditions and to establish and maintain local air superiority. Historically, a Fighter Squadron is tasked with opposing enemy aircraft. However, with the very real threat of potent long range missiles in the enemy arsenal, the multi-track and ECM (Electronic Counter Measures) capabilities of the F-14A/AWG-9 Phoenix Weapons System have received added visibility. Consequently the MAS (Maritime Air Superiority) role of the TOMCAT and its crew has received added emphasis. During 1977 VF-14 has become a strong force in the introduction and improvement of sophisticated tactics which typify the MAS mission.

(3) Command organization has remained consistent during the calendar year. Enclosure (3) to the Basic History presents a graphic command structure as it existed throughout 1977 and lists the officers who held squadron billets at the close of the calendar year. Enclosures (9) and (10) provide a brief biography of the Commanding Officer and the Executive Officer.

(4) The squadron changed its location numerous times during 1977 to conform with ship movements and deployment schedules. These changes in geographic location and reporting commanders are in subparagraph (b) and are summarized below for convenience:

1-14 January:	Stationed at NAS Oceana, Virginia
14-28 January:	Embarked in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67)
28 January (6th Fleet INCHOP) - 21 July (6th Fleet OUTCHOP):	Embarked in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67), with COMCARGRU SIX onboard.
22 July (2nd Fleet) - 1 August:	Embarked on USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67), with COMCARGU TWELVE onboard.
2 August - 6 November:	Stationed at NAS Oceana, Virginia
7 November - 13 December:	Embarked in USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69), with COMCARGRU onboard.
14 December - 31 December:	Stationed at NAS Oceana, Virginia.

b. Summary of Operations. Squadron operations can be divided into five general periods of interest:

(1)	1 January - 14 January:	POM and Change of Command
(2)	15 January - 1 August:	Mediteranean deployment embarked in USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67)
(3)	2 August - 6 November:	Turnaround training at NAS Oceana, Virginia
(4)	7 November - 13 December:	Carribean Shakedown cruise aboard USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69)
(5)	14 December - 31 December:	Standdown and Christmas leave period

A more thorough description of the individual periods and specific events of interest are contained in enclosure (2).

c. Special Topics. A Command History would be incomplete without certain "vital" statistics which provide a composite picture of the year's operations and certain other command functions. Such statistics are presented in enclosures (4) and (5) and provides supplementary information which may be of additional interest.

1977 CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

01-15 JAN	Based ashore at NAS Oceana, Virginia
07 JAN	Change of Command CDR C. L. LAVINDER relieved by CDR F. J. DOUGHERTY
15-26 JAN	TRANSLANT
26-28 JAN	INCHOP Rota, Spain; turnover with CVW-8 aboard the USS NIMITZ (CVN-68)
29 JAN-11 FEB	Flight operations in the Atlantic, Western MED, and the Tyrrhenian Sea
31 JAN-09 FEB	Exercise Locked Gate
05 FEB	Soviet Bear surveillance flight
10 FEB	Strike on the USS FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
12-25 FEB	Inport Naples, Italy
26 FEB	Limited flight operations for Italian Day guest cruise
27 FEB	Inport Naples, Italy
28 FEB-06 MAR	Flight operations in both the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas
02 MAR	PASSEX with the French Navy
03-04 MAR	AIM-7 Sparrow Missle Exercise on the NAMFI Range, Crete
07-17 MAR	Inport Naples, Italy
17 MAR	Safetv Standdown
18-26 MAR	Flight operations in the Ionian Sea
19-25 MAR	National Week XXII
22 MAR	Training anchorage in Golfo de la Castelamare, Sicily

Enclosure (2)

26 MAR	Training Anchorage 0800-1600 Augusta Bay, Sicily
27 MAR	Transit of the Ionian and Adriatic
28 MAR-01 APR	Inport Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia
02-04 APR	Flight operations in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas
05-18 APR	Inport Naples, Italy
19-22 APR	Flight operations in the Ionian Sea
23-24 APR	Training Anchorage, Crete
25-28 APR	Exercise SHAHBAZ 77, OPS in Eastern MED
29-30 APR	Operations in the Central MED
01 MAY	Eastern MED operations
02-05 MAY	Inport Alexandria, Egypt
06-07 MAY	Eastern MED/Ionian flight operations
08 MAY	Augusta Bay, Sicily Training Anchorage
09 MAY	Ionian Sea flight operations
10 MAY	Augusta Bay, Sicily Training Anchorage
10-16 MAY	Ionian/Tyrrhenian flight operations with Exercise Dawn Patrol
17-31 MAY	Inport Naples, Italy
01-05 JUN	Tyrrhenian/Western MED operations
01 JUN	CQ (Carrier Qualifications)
04 JUN	PASSEX with HMS MELBORNE
06-13 JUN	Inport Barcelona, Spain
14 JUN	Western MED flight operations and CQ

15-20 JUN	Tyrrehnian flight operations
17 JUN	AIM-9 Sidewinder MISSILEX at the Salto de Quirra Range, Sardenia
21-22 JUN	Western MED flight operations with 36 hour flexdeck (continuous flight operations)
23-04 JUL	Inport Palma, Spain
25-26 JUN	RAF Greenham Common Air Show
05-12 JUL	Western MED flight operations
05 JUL	CQ
06-09 JUL	PHIBLEX 7-77
07-09 JUL	65 hour Flexdeck
13-18 JUL	Inport Malaga, Spain
19 JUL	Transit to Rota, Spain
19-21 JUL	Inport Rota, Spain, turnover with CVW-3 and the USS SARATOGA (CV-60)
22 JUL-01 AUG	TRANSLANT
22 JUL	OUTCHOP from Sixth Fleet
28 JUL	Soviet Bear Surveillance Flight
30 JUL	Airwing Fly-off
01 AUG	Arrived at Pier 12 Naval Station, Norfolk, VA
02-05 AUG	Move ashore to NAS Oceana, Virginia
06 AUG-06 SEP	Post-deployment standdown, limited flying
07-11 SEP	Routine flight operations
12 SEP-02 OCT	Integrated Weapons Systems Review
22 SEP	First ITAOC Sortie (Marine Data Link)

16 OCT	Routine flight operations
17 OCT-02 NOV	Fleet Fighter ACM Readiness Program
03-06 NOV	CQ and move aboard the USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN-69)
07 NOV-13 DEC	EISENHOWER workups and "shakedown" cruise to the Caribbean
09 NOV	Bear intercept
06-08 DEC	Roosevelt Roads MISSILEX
10-11 NOV 26-28 NOV	Inport Guantanamo
14-18 DEC	Return to Oceana and standdown
19-31 DEC	Holiday leave period; limited operations
31 DEC	Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN reached 11,933.00 accident free hours

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VF-14 OFFICERS AND BILLETS HELD 31 DECEMBER 1977

NAME	BILLET
CDR F. J. DOUGHERTY	COMMANDING OFFICER
CDR T. W. WRIGHT	EXECUTIVE OFFICER/LEADERSHIP
LCDR [redacted]	SAFETY OFFICER
LCDR [redacted]	PERSONNEL OFFICER
LCDR [redacted]	MAINTENANCE OFFICER
LCDR [redacted]	OPERATIONS OFFICER
LCDR [redacted]	ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER
LT [redacted]	ASSISTANT MAINTENANCE OFFICER
LT [redacted]	AIRCRAFT DIVISION OFFICER
LT [redacted]	ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER/ TRAINING OFFICER
LT [redacted]	MAINTENANCE CONTROL OFFICER
LT [redacted]	AV/ARM DIVISION OFFICER
LT [redacted]	NATOPS/PILOT/ ACM TRAINING OFFICER
LT [redacted]	OUALITY ASSURANCE OFFICER
LT [redacted]	LINE DIVISION OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	AIR FRAMES OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	FLIGHT OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	ELECTRICAL INSTRUMENT BRANCH OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	NFO TRAINING OFFICER/COMM
LTJG [redacted]	CORROSION CONTROL DIVISION OFFICER

Enclosure (3)

LTJG [redacted]	EDUCATIONAL SERVICES OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	ASSISTANT PERSONNEL OFFICER/ HUMAN RESOURCES/DRUG OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	NATOPS/EW TRAINING OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	MATERIAL CONTROL OFFICER
LTJG [redacted]	FIRST LIEUTENANT
LTJG [redacted]	POWER PLANTS BRANCH OFFICER
ENS [redacted]	ASSISTANT MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL CONTROL OFFICER/CMS
ENS [redacted]	AIR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER/LEGAL OFFICER
CWO3 [redacted]	ARMAMENT BRANCH OFFICER/HERO

bruary 1977

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for January 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time January	Monthly Night Time January	Monthly Act Inst January	Arrested Landings Day/Night/Total
CDR WRIGHT	3681.7	100.3	12.3	3.7	1.6	5/3/8
LCDR [redacted]	2030.4	208.2	7.1	1.2	.7	4/3/7
LCDR [redacted]	2470.6	120.8	14.1	6.4	.5	4/2/6
LCDR [redacted]	2329.6	757.5	5.2	1.8	1.0	4/2/6
LCDR [redacted]	1956.7	518.5	11.2	3.5	1.5	5/3/8
LT [redacted]	1672.0	552.4	10.1	3.3	.8	4/3/7
LT [redacted]	1839.3	517.1	12.9	6.9	4.5	4/4/8
LT [redacted]	1818.6	543.2	3.8	1.1	1.0	3/2/5
LT [redacted]	1427.0	231.5	9.4	3.2	1.2	4/3/7
LT [redacted]	787.5	450.1	11.3	3.8	2.7	4/3/7
LTJG [redacted]	529.8	224.9	9.6	1.9	2.5	6/1/7
LTJG [redacted]	544.3	145.4	9.6	6.0	1.8	4/4/8
LTJG [redacted]	479.5	147.4	11.5	6.2	1.0	4/4/8
LTJG [redacted]	528.3	226.7	12.1	3.6	4.6	6/3/9
CDR [redacted]			5.0	2.4	.9	3/3/6
AVG:		338.9	10.4	3.9	1.8	4.3/2.9/7.1
NFO						
CDR DOUGHERTY	2215.5	269.4	11.4	3.9	1.3	5/4/9
LT [redacted]	2265.4	546.4	13.2	6.7	5.9	6/4/10
LT [redacted]	1471.3	118.6	3.2	0.0	0.0	2/0/2
LT [redacted]	893.6	77.0	11.8	4.0	3.4	8/3/11
LT [redacted]	934.4	694.1	13.5	3.5	2.8	6/3/9
LT [redacted]	648.4	541.5	10.8	3.7	.9	5/3/8
LT [redacted]	687.7	565.3	12.2	4.6	1.8	4/4/8
LTJG [redacted]	450.8	266.3	13.6	7.1	.8	5/4/9
LTJG [redacted]	300.7	199.5	12.2	5.0	1.7	4/4/8
LTJG [redacted]	252.6	147.0	7.4	1.0	1.3	4/2/6
LTJG [redacted]	246.6	119.1	11.2	3.1	.4	7/3/10
LTJG [redacted]	276.9	163.3	12.2	6.1	2.3	4/4/8
[redacted] ROGERS	302.8	187.0	12.5	6.3	3.0	4/5/9
AVG:		299.6	11.2	4.2	2.0	4.9/3.3/8.2

[redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

2 March 1977

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for February 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time February	Monthly Night Time February	Monthly Act Inst February	Arrested Landings Day/Night/Total/Cruise
CDR WRIGHT	3702.4	121.0	20.7	9.5	6.9	4/7/11/19
LCDR [redacted]	2054.8	232.6	24.4	7.1	1.0	7/5/12/19
LCDR [redacted]	2497.3	147.5	26.7	10.2	2.6	8/5/13/19
LCDR [redacted]	2352.3	780.2	22.7	15.2	9.6	3/9/12/18
LCDR [redacted]	1983.1	544.9	26.4	5.7	2.2	9/4/13/21
LT [redacted]	1695.4	575.8	23.4	6.5	3.2	6/6/12/19
LT [redacted]	1861.2	539.0	21.9	8.7	6.8	6/5/11/19
LT [redacted]	1850.3	574.9	31.7	9.9	3.9	11/5/16/21
LT [redacted]	1446.9	251.4	19.9	5.1	1.0	6/4/10/17
LT [redacted]	812.0	474.6	24.5	6.1	1.1	8/4/12/19
LTJG [redacted]	546.9	242.0	17.1	5.5	5.5	6/3/9/16
LTJG [redacted]	568.2	169.3	23.9	10.0	2.3	6/5/11/19
LTJG [redacted]	502.5	170.4	23.0	14.4	5.1	4/7/11/19
LTJG [redacted]	546.5	244.9	18.2	8.5	8.7	4/6/10/19
CDR [redacted]			4.3	0.8	0.1	1/1/2/8
AVG:		362.0	23.5	8.8	4.3	6.6/5.2/11.8/19.4
NFO						
CDR DOUGHERTY	2241.9	295.8	26.4	5.7	2.2	9/4/13/22
LCDR [redacted]	2289.3	570.3	23.9	7.8	4.9	6/6/12/22
LT [redacted]	1475.4	122.7	4.1	0.0	0.1	2/0/2/4
LT [redacted]	911.7	95.1	18.1	6.7	5.8	5/4/9/20
LT [redacted]	9693	729.0	34.9	12.6	10.4	11/8/19/28
LT [redacted]	677.3	570.4	28.9	12.7	8.3	5/9/14/22
LT [redacted]	716.7	594.3	29.0	14.4	5.1	7/7/14/22
LTJG [redacted]	474.9	290.4	24.1	9.7	2.8	7/5/12/21
LTJG [redacted]	327.4	226.2	26.7	6.5	1.1	8/5/13/21
LTJG [redacted]	287.6	182.0	35.0	15.4	8.0	10/8/18/24
LTJG [redacted]	268.9	141.4	22.3	9.0	3.0	6/5/11/21
LTJG [redacted]	306.8	193.2	29.9	13.9	5.2	8/6/14/22
LTJG [redacted]	328.1	212.3	25.3	8.8	2.6	6/7/13/22
LCDR [redacted]			2.3	0.0	0.0	1/0/1/1
AVG:		324.7	25.3	9.5	4.6	7.1/5.6/12.7/20.9

[redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

29 March 1977

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for March 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time March	Monthly Night Time March	Monthly Act Inst March	Arrested Landings D/N/Total/Cruise
CDR WRIGHT	3736.4	155.0	34.0	9.2	6.1	11/6/17/36
LCDR [redacted]	2084.0	261.8	29.2	7.5	2.0	12/4/16/35
LCDR [redacted]	2526.8	177.0	29.5	7.4	2.1	10/6/16/35
LCDR [redacted]	2017.2	579.0	34.1	8.3	5.0	13/5/18/39
LT [redacted]	1724.7	605.1	29.3	4.3	4.3	12/ 4/16/35
LT [redacted]	1896.6	574.4	35.4	9.5	9.8	13/5/18/37
LT [redacted]	1876.5	601.1	26.2	5.5	.5	10/4/14/35
LT [redacted]	1475.3	279.8	28.4	12.9	6.6	8/8/16/33
LT [redacted]	845.5	508.1	33.5	8.2	4.0	12/5/17/36
LTJG [redacted]	586.9	277.8	35.8	9.4	9.0	12/7/19/35
LTJG [redacted]	602.5	203.6	34.3	8.4	1.6	13/4/17/36
LTJG [redacted]	531.9	199.8	29.4	6.2	3.0	12/4/16/35
LTJG [redacted]	579.2	277.6	32.7	11.1	9.3	10/6/16/35
CDR [redacted]			5.9	0.0	0.0	3/0/3/11
AVG:		361.5	32.1	8.3	4.8	11.4/5.2/16.6/35.5
NFO						
CDR DOUGHERTY	2274.1	328.0	32.2	8.3	5.0	12/5/17/39
LCDR [redacted]	2320.6	601.6	31.3	7.7	7.8	12/4/16/38
LT [redacted]	1514.4	161.7	39.0	10.7	7.6	14/8/22/26
LT [redacted]	941.7	125.1	30.0	7.5	6.2	11/5/16/36
LT [redacted]	979.8	739.5	10.5	2.3	2.3	4/1/5/33
LT [redacted]	709.8	605.0	34.6	10.1	5.4	11/6/17/39
LT [redacted]	743.0	620.6	26.3	8.0	3.7	10/4/14/36
LTJG [redacted]	507.1	322.6	32.2	12.0	5.6	9/8/17/38
LTJG [redacted]	365.0	263.8	37.6	7.8	3.6	14/5/19/40
LTJG [redacted]	325.8	214.2	32.2	5.8	4.1	12/5/17/41
LTJG [redacted]	304.5	177.0	35.6	11.4	2.9	13/6/19/40
LTJG [redacted]	339.7	226.1	32.9	4.2	1.5	15/2/17/39
LTJG [redacted]	189.9	51.5	5.8	1.6	0.0	2/1/3/3
LTJG [redacted]	357.2	241.4	29.1	10.3	6.1	9/7/16/38
LCDR [redacted]			4.2	0.2	0.2	1/1/2/3
LCDR [redacted]			2.0	0.0	0.0	1/0/1/1
LT [redacted]			2.2	0.0	0.0	1/0/1/1
AVG:		303.0	32.1	8.3	4.8	11.4/5.2/16.5/37.4

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LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

7 May 1977

MEMORANDUM

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

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Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for April 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time April	Monthly Night Time April	Monthly Act Inst April	Arrested Landings D/N/Total/Cruise
CDR WRIGHT	3767.0	185.6	30.6	8.6	6.9	12/5/17/53
LCDR [redacted]	2117.2	295.0	33.2	12.7	5.0	12/7/19/54
LCDR [redacted]	2556.2	206.4	29.4	7.6	2.6	12/4/16/52
LCDR [redacted]	3057.8	89.6	3.8	0.0	0.0	2/0/2/2
LCDR [redacted]	2048.5	610.3	31.3	6.1	4.3	13/3/16/55
LT [redacted]	1758.7	639.1	34.0	7.5	6.6	12/6/18/53
LT [redacted]	1896.6	576.1	1.7	0.0	0.7	1/0/1/38
LT [redacted]	1898.2	622.8	21.7	4.2	3.0	11/3/14/49
LT [redacted]	1509.1	313.6	33.8	5.1	3.6	13/4/17/50
LT [redacted]	875.1	537.7	29.6	13.9	3.8	8/8/16/52
LTJG [redacted]	618.6	309.5	31.7	8.4	7.7	10/6/16/51
LTJG [redacted]	630.9	232.0	28.4	10.5	4.4	10/6/16/52
LTJG [redacted]	565.3	233.2	33.4	8.5	5.3	13/6/19/54
LTJG [redacted]	609.5	307.6	30.3	4.9	8.8	11/4/15/50
CAPT PRESLEY			9.9	2.1	2.3	4/1/5/16
AVG:		368.5	30.6	8.2	5.2	11.4/5.2/16.6/52.1
NFO						
CDR DOUGHERTY	2305.0	358.9	30.9	4.1	2.0	14/2/16/55
LCDR [redacted]	2335.7	616.7	15.1	2.4	1.4	6/2/8/46
LT [redacted]	1548.0	195.3	33.6	7.6	6.5	12/6/18/44
LT [redacted]	970.2	153.6	28.5	5.7	8.9	10/4/14/50
LT [redacted]	740.3	635.5	30.5	8.6	5.4	12/5/17/56
LT [redacted]	779.8	657.4	36.8	10.0	6.6	15/6/21/57
LTJG [redacted]	533.6	349.1	26.5	8.7	2.6	10/5/15/53
LTJG [redacted]	393.5	292.3	28.5	11.0	4.2	9/6/15/55
LTJG [redacted]	333.6	206.1	29.1	10.6	5.2	10/6/16/56
LTJG [redacted]	353.8	241.7	27.5	8.4	6.4	8/6/14/55
LTJG [redacted]	226.8	74.8	23.3	6.2	3.8	11/4/15/18
LTJG [redacted]	367.4	253.8	27.7	8.8	4.4	10/5/15/54
LTJG [redacted]	394.0	278.3	36.9	4.5	4.5	15/4/19/57
LCDR [redacted]			5.9	3.5	3.1	1/2/3/6
LCDR [redacted]			2.0	0.0	0.0	1/0/1/2
AVG:		331.8	30.0	7.9	5.0	11.3/4.9/16.3/53.7

[redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

18 May 1977

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for May 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time May	Monthly Night Time May	Monthly Act Inst May	Arrested Landings D/N/Total/Cruise
CDR WRIGHT	3787.1	205.7	20.1	2.8	2.4	9/ 2/11/64
LCDR [redacted]	2132.7	310.5	15.5	1.6	0.5	8/1/9/63
LCDR [redacted]	2579.0	229.2	22.8	2.1	1.0	11/1/12/63
LCDR [redacted]	3081.0	112.8	23.2	2.8	2.3	10/3/13/15
LCDR [redacted]	2060.4	622.2	11.9	1.0	1.4	6/1/7/62
LT [redacted]	1772.4	652.8	13.7	2.2	2.2	6/2/8/61
LT [redacted]	1916.7	641.3	18.5	3.6	0.0	7/4/11/60
LT [redacted]	1533.1	337.6	24.0	8.8	4.6	6/7/13/63
LT [redacted]	894.3	557.9	20.2	3.4	0.3	9/ 2/11/63
LTJG [redacted]	642.2	333.1	23.6	3.1	3.0	10/3/13/64
LTJG [redacted]	653.7	254.8	22.8	6.4	5.1	8/3/11/63
LTJG [redacted]	582.0	249.7	16.5	1.0	1.0	8/1/9/63
LTJG [redacted]	631.2	329.3	21.7	2.1	2.7	11/1/12/62
CAPT PRESLEY			3.5	0.0	0.0	2/0/2/18
AVG:		372.1	19.6	3.1	2.0	8.4/2.4/10.8/60.3
NFO						
CDR DOUGHERTY	2324.3	378.2	19.3	3.2	1.3	8/ 3/11/66
LT [redacted]	1569.7	217.0	21.7	5.6	4.9	7/5/12/56
LT [redacted]	995.7	179.1	25.5	4.4	4.5	11/3/14/64
LT [redacted]	761.8	657.0	21.5	2.0	1.9	11/1/12/68
LT [redacted]	799.2	676.2	19.2	0.0	0.0	10/0/10/67
LTJG [redacted]	557.0	372.5	23.4	3.8	2.2	11/3/14/67
LTJG [redacted]	413.2	312.0	19.7	1.4	0.0	10/1/11/66
LTJG [redacted]	351.2	223.7	17.6	1.6	0.7	9/1/10/66
LTJG [redacted]	372.1	260.5	18.8	3.3	3.4	8/3/11/66
LTJG [redacted]	249.4	97.4	22.6	3.6	0.0	9/4/13/31
LTJG [redacted]	394.9	281.3	27.5	6.7	5.6	10/3/13/67
LTJG [redacted]	413.1	297.4	19.1	5.3	2.0	6/4/10/67
CDR [redacted]			2.1	0.0	0.0	1/0/1/1
AVG:		329.4	21.3	3.4	2.2	9.2/2.6/11.8/62.6

[redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

30 June 1977

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for June 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time June	Monthly Night Time June	Monthly Act Inst June	Arrested Landings D/N/Total/Cruise
CDR WRIGHT	3826.3	244.9	39.2	7.3	4.2	15/5/20/84
LCDR [redacted]	2171.2	349.0	38.5	2.7	1.5	16/4/20/83
LCDR [redacted]	2614.0	264.8	35.6	11.0	6.4	13/7/20/83
LCDR [redacted]	3113.0	144.8	32.0	6.1	3.7	16/5/21/36
LCDR [redacted]	2135.2	92.7	7.5	2.8	1.0	2/3/5/5
LCDR [redacted]	2096.1	657.9	35.7	5.2	4.6	19/4/23/85
LT [redacted]	1788.2	668.6	15.8	1.3	1.2	6/2/8/69
LT [redacted]	1953.0	677.6	36.3	3.1	3.5	19/3/22/82
LT [redacted]	1567.2	371.7	34.1	5.9	3.6	17/5/22/85
LT [redacted]	925.9	588.5	30.6	8.2	4.8	13/7/20/83
LTJG [redacted]	669.8	360.7	27.6	5.1	3.4	16/4/20/84
LTJG [redacted]	690.0	291.1	36.3	7.3	4.1	17/5/22/85
LTJG [redacted]	616.8	284.5	34.8	8.7	7.7	16/6/22/85
LTJG [redacted]	662.3	360.4	31.1	4.9	5.4	19/3/22/84
CAPT PRESLEY			9.1	1.3	.9	4/1/5/23
AVG:		382.7	31.7	5.8	3.9	17.1/5.1/22.2/79.1
NFO						
CDR DOUGHERTY	2360.9	414.8	36.6	4.5	3.8	19/5/24/90
LCDR [redacted]	2161.7	507.3	32.9	4.2	4.7	19/2/21/21
LT [redacted]	1605.2	252.5	35.5	5.6	4.1	17/4/21/77
LT [redacted]	1028.2	211.6	32.5	4.4	2.5	19/3/22/86
LT [redacted]	1397.6	425.5	23.3	4.7	1.0	8/4/12/12
LT [redacted]	825.5	702.5	26.3	9.7	8.1	10/6/16/83
LTJG [redacted]	590.3	405.8	33.3	7.2	4.4	14/5/19/86
LTJG [redacted]	448.7	347.5	35.5	6.8	5.2	17/5/22/88
LTJG [redacted]	384.2	256.7	33.0	2.9	3.4	16/2/18/84
LTJG [redacted]	400.4	288.8	28.3	4.4	3.6	16/4/20/86
LTJG [redacted]	279.0	127.0	29.6	2.2	3.4	17/2/19/50
LTJG [redacted]	428.9	315.3	34.0	10.9	4.4	11/9/20/87
LTJG [redacted]	444.5	328.8	31.4	7.3	4.2	13/6/19/86
LTJG [redacted]	235.3	127.9	30.0	6.0	3.2	12/6/18/18
LTJG [redacted]	2.0	2.0	2.0	.1	0.0	0/1/1/1
AVG:		336.6	31.7	5.8	3.9	

[redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

17 August 1977

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for July 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time July	Monthly Night Time July	Monthly Act Inst July	Arrested Landings D/N/Total/Cruise
CDR WRIGHT	3852.7	271.3	26.4	3.9	3.6	13/3/16/100
LCDR [redacted]	2195.9	373.7	24.7	4.1	2.1	13/4/17/100
LCDR [redacted]	2637.6	287.9	23.1	1.8	3.1	13/1/14/97
LCDR [redacted]	3131.6	163.4	18.6	6.3	4.5	6/3/9/45
LCDR [redacted]	2152.9	110.4	17.7	2.1	1.8	8/1/9/14
LCDR [redacted]	2120.6	682.4	24.5	4.4	4.8	11/4/15/100
LT [redacted]	1979.9	704.5	26.9	3.4	2.4	10/2/12/94
LT [redacted]	1587.7	392.2	20.5	3.1	2.5	14/1/15/100
LT [redacted]	955.1	617.7	29.2	3.2	3.7	14/3/17/100
LTJG [redacted]	691.3	382.2	21.5	2.9	3.3	14/2/16/100
LTJG [redacted]	712.6	313.3	22.2	2.6	3.0	13/2/15/100
LTJG [redacted]	640.7	307.1	22.6	4.8	4.2	14/2/16/101
LTJG [redacted]	687.5	385.6	25.2	4.3	5.5	11/5/16/100
CAPT PRESLEY			3.9	0.3	0.5	4/1/5/23
AVG:		384.0	23.7	3.6	3.4	11.9/2.6/14.5/88.
NFO						
CDR DOUGHERTY	2379.6	433.6	18.8	0.9	1.5	9/3/12/102
LCDR [redacted]	2181.1	523.7	16.4	0.0	2.2	11/0/11/32
LT [redacted]	1655.9	273.1	20.6	4.4	4.7	9/3/12/89
LT [redacted]	1054.6	238.0	26.4	2.6	2.9	13/2/15/101
LT [redacted]	1418.7	446.6	21.1	2.8	2.6	9/2/11/23
LT [redacted]	850.5	727.1	24.6	5.8	4.7	12/5/17/100
LTJG [redacted]	609.1	424.6	18.8	2.5	2.2	13/1/14/100
LTJG [redacted]	469.0	367.8	20.3	3.1	2.3	10/3/13/101
LTJG [redacted]	411.1	283.6	26.9	6.0	4.9	13/4/7/101
LTJG [redacted]	429.1	317.5	28.7	1.5	3.4	14/1/15/101
LTJG [redacted]	302.1	150.1	23.1	2.4	1.9	10/2/12/62
LTJG [redacted]	451.0	337.4	22.1	4.3	3.0	11/3/14/101
LTJG [redacted]	463.5	347.8	19.0	4.4	3.0	12/2/14/100
LTJG [redacted]	252.5	143.1	15.2	4.5	4.5	8/2/10/28
LCDR [redacted]			4.0	2.0	1.7	1/1/2/8
AVG:		358.1	22.0	3.4	3.2	11.1/2.4/13.5/81.

[redacted]
for LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

UNCLASSIFIED

1 September 1977

MEMORANDUM

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for August 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time August	Monthly Night Time August	Monthly Act Inst August
CDR WRIGHT	3852.7	271.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
LCDR [redacted]	2207.1	384.9	11.2	0.0	1.0
LCDR [redacted]	2643.2	293.5	5.6	0.0	0.1
LCDR [redacted]	3134.8	166.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
LCDR [redacted]	2167.9	125.4	15.0	0.0	3.4
LCDR [redacted]	2124.5	686.3	3.9	0.6	0.0
LT [redacted]	1599.7	404.2	12.0	0.0	2.2
LT [redacted]	959.9	622.5	4.8	0.0	0.3
LTJG [redacted]	691.3	382.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
LTJG [redacted]	731.0	321.7	18.4	0.0	4.1
LTJG [redacted]	653.9	320.3	13.2	1.1	1.1
LTJG [redacted]	687.5	385.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
			1.7	0.0	0.3
CAPT TUTTLE			12.4	0.0	3.5
LCDR [redacted]			1.5	0.6	0.0
LCDR [redacted]					
AVG:		365.9	7.9	0.2	0.9
NFO					
CDR DOUGHERTY	2383.7	437.7	4.1	0.0	0.3
LCDR [redacted]	2186.3	528.9	5.2	0.0	0.5
LT [redacted]	1659.0	276.2	3.1	1.1	1.4
LT [redacted]	1059.0	242.6	4.4	0.0	0.0
LT [redacted]	1422.6	450.5	3.9	0.0	0.3
LT [redacted]	863.7	740.3	13.2	0.6	2.5
LTJG [redacted]	613.8	429.3	4.7	0.6	0.3
LTJG [redacted]	482.5	381.3	13.5	0.0	1.9
LTJG [redacted]	412.7	285.2	1.6	0.0	0.0
LTJG [redacted]	434.6	323.0	5.5	0.0	0.0
LTJG [redacted]	314.1	162.1	12.0	0.0	2.4
LTJG [redacted]	457.3	343.7	6.3	0.0	0.0
LTJG [redacted]	465.9	350.2	2.4	0.0	0.0
LTJG [redacted]	276.2	166.8	23.7	0.0	5.9
AVG:		365.5	7.2	0.2	0.8

[redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

1 October 1977

MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for September 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time September	Monthly Night Time September	Monthly Act Inst September
CDR WRIGHT	3874.3	292.9	21.6	5.2	5.2
LCDR [redacted]	2226.2	404.0	19.1	0.0	1.2
LCDR [redacted]	2670.3	320.6	27.1	6.1	4.6
LCDR [redacted]	3168.4	200.2	33.6	4.9	10.2
LCDR [redacted]	2194.2	151.7	26.3	2.0	4.8
LT [redacted]	1635.9	440.4	36.2	4.7	6.4
LT [redacted]	985.5	648.1	25.6	7.1	4.2
LTJG [redacted]	726.4	417.3	35.1	3.2	2.9
LTJG [redacted]	759.1	349.8	28.1	7.1	2.9
LTJG [redacted]	694.0	360.4	40.1	2.1	5.1
LTJG [redacted]	718.5	416.6	31.0	2.6	8.9
LTJG [redacted]	383.2	106.1	-	-	-
CDR [redacted]			4.4	0.0	0.0
LCDR [redacted]			5.7	0.0	2.0
LCDR [redacted]			1.5	1.5	0.0
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		395.1	29.4	4.1	5.1

NFO

CDR DOUGHERTY	2398.1	452.1	14.4	0.0	1.2
LCDR [redacted]	2209.9	552.5	23.6	2.6	4.8
LT [redacted]	1674.8	292.0	15.8	0.0	0.0
LT [redacted]	1094.3	277.9	35.3	2.0	3.7
LT [redacted]	1446.6	474.2	23.7	2.0	4.2
LTJG [redacted]	627.8	443.3	14.7	0.0	0.0
LTJG [redacted]	522.0	420.8	39.5	10.0	6.5
LTJG [redacted]	448.3	320.8	35.6	0.0	3.6
LTJG [redacted]	463.4	351.8	28.8	8.5	10.5
LTJG [redacted]	337.1	185.1	23.0	2.6	6.5
LTJG [redacted]	478.9	365.2	21.5	2.6	3.7
LTJG [redacted]	496.6	380.9	30.7	6.9	8.4
LTJG [redacted]	310.9	201.5	34.7	7.8	7.3
LCDR [redacted]			5.7		2.0
LCDR [redacted]			1.5	1.5	
LCDR [redacted]			1.6		
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		362.9	26.3	3.5	4.6

[redacted]
LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

DECLASSIFIED
2 November 1977

MEMORANDUM

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To; Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for October 1977

Pilot	Total Time	F-14 Time	Monthly F-14 Time October	Monthly Night Time October	Monthly Act Inst October
CDR WRIGHT	3885.7	304.3	11.4	3.4	Ø.Ø
LCDR [redacted]	2242.4	412.8	8.8	1.5	Ø.Ø
LCDR [redacted]	2682.3	330.9	10.3	3.8	3.0
LCDR [redacted]	3174.9	207.7	10.3	1.0	0.8
LCDR [redacted]	2211.2	168.7	14.2	3.0	6.4
LT [redacted]	1644.5	447.1	6.7	1.3	Ø.Ø
LT [redacted]	991.9	654.5	6.4	Ø.Ø	1.0
LTJG [redacted]	754.5	445.4	30.4	5.1	5.2
LTJG [redacted]	766.9	357.6	7.8	1.0	Ø.Ø
LTJG [redacted]	706.5	372.9	11.9	1.8	3.4
LTJG [redacted]	731.3	429.3	11.4	3.1	3.8
LTJG [redacted]	394.3	117.2	11.1	2.9	0.8
CDR [redacted]			2.9	Ø.Ø	0.1
LCDR [redacted]			3.1	Ø.Ø	1.8
CAPT [redacted]			5.9	1.5	Ø.Ø
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		354.0	10.9	2.3	2.0

NFO

CDR DOUGHERTY	2404.5	458.4	6.3	1.5	Ø.Ø
LCDR [redacted]	2225.9	568.5	16.0	3.1	8.2
LT [redacted]	1688.9	306.1	13.1	3.8	3.1
LT [redacted]	1104.2	287.8	9.9	1.3	0.8
LT [redacted]	1456.4	484.3	10.1	2.9	0.8
LTJG [redacted]	646.6	450.2	4.0	2.2	Ø.Ø
LTJG [redacted]	539.5	438.3	17.5	3.7	0.4
LTJG [redacted]	478.4	350.9	30.4	5.1	5.2
LTJG [redacted]	471.8	360.2	8.4	3.0	0.9
LTJG [redacted]	344.9	192.9	7.8	1.8	1.1
LTJG [redacted]	489.4	374.7	9.5	1.0	1.9
LTJG [redacted]	506.1	390.4	9.5	Ø.Ø	2.0
LTJG [redacted]	316.9	207.5	6.0	Ø.Ø	0.1
LCDR [redacted]			3.1	Ø.Ø	1.8
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		374.6	11.4	4.5	1.9

[redacted] [redacted]
LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

DECLASSIFIED

M E M O R A N D U M

1 DECEMBER 1977

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for November 1977

PILOT	TOTAL TIME	F-14 TIME	MONTHLY F-14 TIME NOVEMBER	MONTHLY NIGHT TIME NOVEMBER	MONTHLY ACT INST NOVEMBER	CVN-69 ARRESTED LDGS. D/N/TOTAL
CDR WRIGHT	3902.6	321.2	16.9	6.7	5.4	8/4/12
LCDR [redacted]	2262.9	433.3	20.5	4.5	2.9	10/2/12
LCDR [redacted]	2696.6	345.2	14.3	6.5	6.3	6/4/10
LCDR [redacted]	3193.9	226.7	19.0	3.5	0.5	8/2/10
LCDR [redacted]	2224.8	182.3	13.6	4.6	2.6	8/2/10
LT [redacted]	1666.2	467.8	20.7	4.3	3.2	10/2/12
LT [redacted]	1009.6	672.2	17.7	1.5	1.1	7/0/7
LTJG [redacted]	773.2	464.1	18.7	4.7	1.5	6/3/9
LTJG [redacted]	776.8	367.5	9.9	1.3	0.8	6/0/6
LTJG [redacted]	719.2	385.6	12.7	3.3	3.5	6/1/7
LTJG [redacted]	745.9	443.9	14.6	0.3	0.8	7/1/8
LTJG [redacted]	409.0	131.9	14.7	4.8	0.7	7/2/9
CDR [redacted]			9.2	4.3	3.9	4/2/6
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		370.1	16.1	3.8	2.8	7/2/9

NFO

CDR DOUGHERTY	2422.2	476.1	17.7	4.5	2.9	10/2/12
LCDR [redacted]	2239.2	581.6	13.1	0.3	0.3	6/1/7
LT [redacted]	1704.6	321.8	15.7	6.5	6.3	7/4/11
LT [redacted]	1121.4	306.7	18.9	5.8	4.4	10/3/13
LT [redacted]	1472.0	499.9	15.6	3.7	0.7	8/2/10
LTJG [redacted]	652.6	456.2	6.0	1.1	0.5	5/0/5
LTJG [redacted]	547.9	446.7	8.4	1.3	0.5	5/0/5
LTJG [redacted]	497.1	369.6	18.7	4.7	1.5	6/3/9
LTJG [redacted]	485.0	373.4	13.2	4.6	3.1	8/2/10
LTJG [redacted]	366.8	214.8	21.9	3.8	4.2	7/2/9
LTJG [redacted]	512.4	397.7	23.0	4.5	0.9	8/1/9
LTJG [redacted]	517.6	401.9	11.5	5.3	4.4	5/3/8
LTJG [redacted]	334.7	225.3	17.8	3.2	3.0	8/2/10
DOC [redacted]			1.0	1.0	0.5	0/0/0
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		391.3	16.7	3.8	2.5	7/2/9

[redacted]

LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

DECLASSIFIED

11 January 1978

M E M O R A N D U M

From: Operations Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN

Subj: VF-14 Pilot/NFO Flight time for December 1977

PILOT	TOTAL TIME	F-14 TIME	MONTHLY F-14 TIME	MONTHLY NIGHT TIME	MONTHLY ACT INST	CVN-69 ARRESTED LDGS. D/N/TOTAL
CDR WRIGHT	3917.6	336.0	15.0	1.9	1.0	13/5/18
LCDR [redacted]	2275.4	449.5	16.2	3.6	1.9	14/4/18
LCDR [redacted]	2709.7	358.3	13.1	5.1	2.0	9/6/15
LCDR [redacted]	3209.6	242.4	15.7	5.0	1.5	11/5/16
LCDR [redacted]	2243.5	194.9	12.6	4.0	2.0	12/4/16
LT [redacted]	1687.9	489.5	21.7	1.6	1.5	14/2/16
LT [redacted]	1024.7	687.3	15.1	3.4	2.8	14/2/16
LT [redacted]	788.9	479.8	15.7	2.9	1.6	8/7/15
LT [redacted]	798.2	388.9	21.4	7.2	6.0	14/3/17
LTJG [redacted]	726.4	390.8	5.2	1.2	4.5	6/1/7
LTJG [redacted]	766.8	466.2	20.9	8.0	7.8	11/5/16
LTJG [redacted]	427.5	150.7	18.8	5.0	0.2	13/3/16
CDR [redacted]			9.5	0.0	1.7	6/2/8
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		386.2	16.0	4.1	2.7	12/4/16

NFO

CDR DOUGHERTY	2435.5	489.4	13.3	3.9	2.6	13/5/18
LCDR [redacted]	2244.6	587.2	5.6	1.9	4.1	6/1/7
LT [redacted]	1718.1	335.3	13.5	3.1	2.0	11/5/16
LT [redacted]	1131.2	316.5	9.8	0.1	1.2	12/4/16
LT [redacted]	1490.8	518.7	18.8	6.8	1.0	13/3/16
LTJG [redacted]	671.9	475.5	19.3	5.4	5.2	9/3/12
LTJG [redacted]	566.5	465.3	18.6	2.3	3.0	12/1/13
LTJG [redacted]	501.3	373.8	4.2	0.5	0.5	6/5/11
LTJG [redacted]	500.7	389.1	15.7	4.0	2.0	12/4/16
LTJG [redacted]	380.1	228.1	13.3	5.0	3.9	11/4/15
LTJG [redacted]	528.7	414.0	16.3	6.4	2.0	11/6/17
LTJG [redacted]	535.3	419.6	17.7	3.6	1.8	10/5/15
LTJG [redacted]	347.7	238.3	13.0	2.8	2.7	13/3/16
DOC [redacted]			1.5	1.5	0.3	0/0/0
LCDR [redacted]			4.5			2/0/2
ENS [redacted]			3.1		1.7	
LT [redacted]			10.2	1.6	0.5	
[redacted]			2.5			
VF-14 AIRCREW AVG:		405.1	13.8	3.5	2.5	11/4/15

[redacted]
LCDR USN

ENCLOSURE (4)

[redacted]

1977 FLIGHT STATISTICS

Flight Hours*

	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
Embarked	-2096.8	-605.6	-2702.4
Ashore	- 533.9	-127.0	- 660.9
Total	-2630.7	-732.6	-3363.3

Carrier Landings*

	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
Embarked	-1073	-423	-1496

Sortie Completion Rate

	EMBARKED	ASHORE	TOTAL
Sorties Scheduled	-1521	-585	-2106
Sorties Flown	-1402	-398	-1800

Sortie Efficiency Rate -86%

* Individual flight statistics for assigned aircrew members are presented in Enclosure (4).

[redacted]

1977 WEAPONS EXPENDED

AIM-54 Phoenix	-0
AIM-7E4 Sparrow	-7
AIM-7F Sparrow	-2
AIM-9 Sidewinder	-11
20MM Rounds	-18,624

1977 SAFETY RECORD

The TOPHATTERS completed Calendar Year 1977 with 57 consecutive months of accident-free flight operations. This included 2647.3 hours of accident free time while flying the F-4 PHANTOM II aircraft and 9, 285.7 hours since transitioning to the sophisticated F-14 TOMCAT.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
FIGHTER SQUADRON FOURTEEN
FLEET POST OFFICE
NEW YORK 09501

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Ser: C7/042
11 October 1977

[redacted]L

From: Commanding Officer, Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN
To: Commander Carrier Air Wing ONE

Subj: TOPHATTER 1977 Mediterranean Cruise Report

1. The attached report is submitted to provide information concerning the recent 15 January - 1 August 1977 deployment aboard USS John F. KENNEDY. The 6½ month cruise was filled with challenges and achievements, problems and solutions. This report relates the events and statistics of the cruise and addresses the problems and programs which occurred during the deployment.

F. J. DOUGHERTY

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See next page

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ENCLOSURE (8)

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COMMANDER, JTF ACEVAL/AIMVAL JTSE NELLIS AFB
CO NATC, PATUXENT RIVER (STRIKE/FIGHTER BR)
CO, USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (CV-67)
CO, NAS OCEANA (AIMD)
CO, AIRTEVRON FOUR
COMCARAIRWING SIX
COMCARAIRWING EIGHT
COMCARAIRWING NINE
COMCARAIRWING ELEVEN
COMCARAIRWING FOURTEEN
CO, FITRON ONE
CO, FITRON TWO
CO, FITRON TWENTY FOUR
CO, FITRON THIRTY TWO
CO, FITRON FORTY ONE
CO, FITRON EIGHTY FOUR
CO, FITRON ONE HUNDRED ONE
CO, FITRON ONE HUNDRED FOURTEEN
CO, FITRON ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FOUR
CO, FITRON ONE HUNDRED FORTY TWO
CO, FITRON ONE HUNDRED FORTY THREE
CO, FITRON TWO HUNDRED ELEVEN
CO, FITRON TWO HUNDRED THIRTEEN

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OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

[redacted]

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3. AIC

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7. "Z" Exercises

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2. FLEX DECK

3. Phoenix Captive Carry

[redacted]

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ENCLOSURE (8)

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I. General Comments

a. The 1977 deployment of USS John F. KENNEDY with Carrier Air Wing ONE embarked was a markedly successful event. The TOPHATTERS of VF-14 are proud of their performance during the deployment and remain enthusiastic concerning the innovative and stimulating flight operations which became the hallmark of the JFK/CVW-1 team.

b. Five major exercises saw the F-14 Tomcat used effectively in its primary role of fleet air defense fighter. Operating days which did not involve the F-14 in CAP or AAWEX missions, saw the introduction of the air wing ACM/DCM and MAS syllabi. Both programs were introduced professionally and methodically and by the end of cruise multiplane ACM missions and complicated MAS scenarios integrating VA, VF, AEW and VAQ assets were appearing routinely on the ship's Airplan.

c. Two highly successful Missile Shoots, the introduction of a routine CQ deck coming out of port, and the involvement in Flex Deck operations kept the aircrews involved in new and exciting operations which continuously taxed both men and machines.

d. The statistics bear out the success of this deployment, but perhaps the real meaning is lost in the numbers. Seventy-eight operating days over a 6½ month deployment (just under 12 days per month) did not allow the operations/ maintenance pace to slacken while the ship was underway. Concentrated periods of high tempo operations placed a premium on planning and hard work. Aircraft availability and aircrew performance became the trademark of the TOPHATTERS.

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II. [redacted]

15 January 1977 — Underway from Norfolk Va.

15-26 January — Translant

23 January — Refresher Ops off the Azores

25 January — Refresher Ops off the Spanish coast.

26-28 January — Anchored Rota, Spain

Events: 260900 - Inchop Sixth Fleet
26 Jan - Turnover with CVW-8 aboard USS NIMITZ

29 January - 11 February — Flight Operations

29 Jan - Ops Atlantic
30 Jan - 3 Feb - Ops Western Med
4-6 Feb - Ops Atlantic
7-9 Feb - Ops Western Med
10-11 Feb - Ops Tyrrhenian Sea

Events: 31 Jan - 9 Feb - Exercise Locked Gate
5 Feb - Soviet Bear Surveillance Flight
10 Feb - Strike on USS F.D.R.

12-25 February — Inport Naples, Italy

26 February — Limited Flight Operations for Italian Day Guest Cruise

27 February — Inport Naples, Italy

28 February - 6 March — Flight Operations

28 Feb - Ops Tyrrhenian
1-6 Mar - Ops Ionian

Events: 2 Mar - Passex with French Navy
3-4 Mar - AIM-7 Missilex on Namfi Range, Crete

7-17 March — Inport Naples, Italy

Events: 17 Mar - Safety Standdown

18-26 March — Flight Operations (Ionian)

Events: 19-25 March - National Week XXII
22 March Training Anchorage Golfo de la Castelamare, Sicily
26 March Training Anchorage 0800-1600 Augusta Bay, Sicily

27 March — Transit Ionian and Adriatic

28 March - 1 April — Inport Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (8)

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2-4 April — Flight Operations (Adriatic/Ionian)

5-18 April — Inport Naples, Italy

19-22 April — Flight Operations (Ionian)

23-24 April — Training Anchorage, Crete

Events: Safety Standdown

25 April - 1 May — Flight Operations

25-28 April - Ops Eastern Med
29-20 April - Ops Central Med
1 May - Ops Eastern Med

Events: 25-28 April - Exercise SHAHBAZ 77
26-27 April - 36 Hour Flexdeck

2-5 May — Inport Alexandria, Egypt

6-7 May — Flight Operations (Eastern Med/Ionian)

8 May — Training Anchorage Augusta Bay, Sicily

9 May — Flight Operations (Ionian)

10 May — Training Anchorage (0800-1200) Augusta Bay, Sicily

10-16 May — Flight Operations (Ionian/Tyrrhenian)

Events: 10-16 May - Exercise DAWN PATROL

17-31 May — Inport Naples, Italy

1-5 June — Flight Operations (Tyrrhenian/Western Med)

Events: 1 June - CQ
4 June - Passex with HMS MELBOURNE

6-13 June — Inport Barcelona, Spain

14-22 June — Flight Operations

14 June - Western Med
15-20 June - Tyrrehnian
21-22 June - Western Med

Events: 14 June - CQ
17 June - AIM-9 Missilex Salto di Quirra Range, Sardenia
21-22 June - 36 hour Flexdeck

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[redacted]

23 June - 4 July — Inport Palma, Spain

Events: 25-26 June - RAF Greenham Common, Airshow

5-12 July — Flight Operations (Western Med)

Events: 5 July - CQ
6-9 July - PHIBLEX 7-77
7-9 July - 65 hour Flexdeck

13-18 July — Inport Malaga, Spain

19 July — Transit to Rota, Spain

19-21 July — Inport Rota, Spain

Events: 20 July - Turnover to CVW-3 (USS SARATOGA)

22 July - 1 August — Translant

Events: 22 Jul - Outchop Sixth Fleet
28 Jul - Soviet Bear Surveillance Flight
30 Jul - Airwing Fly-off

1 August 1977 — Arrive Norfolk, Va.

III. OPERATIONS STATISTICS

1. Aircrew Experience (Pilot/NFO)

1st Tour/1st Cruise	2/0
1st Tour/North Atlantic Cruise	3/6
1st Tour/2nd Cruise	4/2
2nd Tour	4/4
3rd + Tour	1/1

2. Flight Ops.

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	TOTAL
Operating Days	7	13	14	13	10	14	9	80
Hours Flown - Day	92.4	205.6	309.8	282.7	217.1	363.3	260.8	1731.7
Hours Flown - Night	36.4	123.2	107.9	100.1	40.9	80.9	47.2	536.6
Hours flown - Total	128.8	328.8	417.7	382.8	258.0	444.2	308.0	2268.3
Sorties Sched - Day	54	110	160	169	142	197	153	985
Sorties Flown - Day	45	103	156	153	123	188	146	914
Sorties Sched - Night	31	64	69	70	19	48	27	328
Sorties Flown - Night	29	63	63	55	19	46	24	299
Total Sorties Sched	85	174	229	239	161	245	180	1313
Total Sorties Flown	74	166	219	208	142	234	170	1213
Sortie Completion Rate	87%	95%	95%	87%	88%	95%	94%	92%
Traps - Day	64	92	151	144	111	208	155	925
Traps - Night	43	73	68	63	31	64	34	376
Total Traps	107	165	219	207	142	272	189	1301
Avg Crews Onbd	13.5	13.5	13.5	13.5	12.5	14	13.5	13.4 Avg
Avg Hrs/Crew	11.3	24.4	32.1	30.3	20.3	31.7	22.8	24.7 Avg
Avg Traps/crew	7.9	12.2	16.6	16.4	11.3	22.2	14	20 Avg
Boarding Rate Day	100%	95%	92%	97%	95%	92%	92%	94%
Boarding Rate Night	100%	90%	91%	90%	97%	92%	91%	91%
Boarding Rate Overall	100%	93%	92%	95%	96%	92%	92%	93%

3. Overall Missions Performed.

Mission	Sorties Flown	Percent of Total Effort
ACM	263	22%
AIC/CAP	491	42%
MAS	157	14%
STRAFE	41	4%
MISSILEX	22	2%
AAWEX	20	2%
LOW LEVEL	15	1%
MISC (Service, PMCF and Mission Aborts)	122	10%
CQ	24	2%
ESCORT	8	1%

IV. EXERCISES. The JFK/CVW-1 team participated in five major exercises; however, only three of them actually saw the F-14 used in its primary mission roles. Although tailored to realistic scenarios whenever possible, the exercises necessarily provided training to both orange and blue forces and the resulting artificialities detracted from optimum realistic training. The F-14 was frequently used in a single ship role to provide wider threat sector coverage. The resulting loss of section integrity and change in CAP station tactics/procedures were less than

[redacted]

desirable but probably very close to procedures which might be employed in a "saturation raid" scenario. The F-14/AWG-9, with its PD modes, proved to be the most effective detection platform available to the task force, and resulted in extensive use of the TOMCAT in a BARCAP/FORCECAP role. Unfortunately very few of the Exercise scenarios called for or even allowed actual air-to-air engagements with opposing air forces. A brief discussion of each Exercise follows.

1. LOCKED GATE. 31 January - 9 February, our introduction to the Med. A NATO ASW Exercise, the F-14 was used primarily in a CAP role against simulated enemy air raids or occasional AAWEXes staged by the ship's CIC. Limited use of the F-14 in a SSSC role caused great concern that this might become a burgeoning effort in future exercises, a concern which was never realized. A surveillance flight by Soviet Bear-D's exercised the intercept/escort procedures developed by the ship and air wing.

2. NATIONAL WEEK XXII. Conducted from 19-25 March, this free play exercise between carrier strike forces (JFK versus FDR) was easily the most extensive and realistic program of the deployment. No-holds-barred rules incorporating air, surface, and subsurface units thoroughly tested the employment doctrine of the CV concept. Because it was a national exercise, use of ECM and the presentation of ACM and ASCM scenarios brought optimum realistic training to the fighters. The ship and the air wing discovered several weaknesses which received added attention in subsequent exercises and training periods at sea.

3. SHAHBAZ 77. Conducted from 25-28 April, this CENTO exercise found A-6's and A-7's striking deep into Turkey on double cycles. The F-14's were relegated to meaningless CAP missions... meaningless because the Turks did not honor a single established raid window and repeatedly overflew the ship before flight ops even started. One interesting mission, however, found a section of F-14's launching from the ship, proceeding to a feet dry rendezvous with a USAF strike group and escorting them to and from an inland target. This double-cycle mission required extensive coordination and had tremendous (but unrealized) potential since opposition by USAF F-5's was an unfulfilled part of the plan.

4. DAWN PATROL. Conducted from 10-16 May, this NATO Southern Region exercise emphasized the AAW aspects of war at sea. Centered around a planned amphibious assault, the task force was constantly alert to scheduled and unscheduled raids by USAF, USMC, British and Italian air units. Extensive use of chaff and ECM made the multiplane raids difficult to detect and realistic to attack. This exercise proved to have the highest total sortie output for the air wing.

5. PHIBLEX 7-77. On 7 and 8 July, this amphibious exercise did not involve the F-14's at all.

V. MISSILE SHOOTS. The squadron enjoyed two highly successful MISSILEXes during the 1977 deployment. The first missile shoot took place on 3 and 4 March on the NAMFI Range off Souda Bay, Crete. The results were gratifying with 5 AIM-7E-4 missiles fired. The second missile shoot occurred on 17 June at the Salto Di Quirra Range off the coast of Sardinia. This Missilex was devoted entirely to Sidewinders fired against MQM-74 drones which were specifically not flare augmented. Five AIM-9G missiles were fired by the Tophatters with only one direct hit. That "kill" occurred after the drone had turned almost 720° and had run out of airspeed. Several very important lessons were learned during these two shoots and they are listed below:

ENCLOSURE (8)

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1. Key personnel with a solid understanding of MISSILEX procedures and the blessing/guidance of the CAG should be prepositioned at Range Control and in CIC of the OCE's ship. Rapid responses and explanations by these personnel will expedite launching of new drones and help ease the confusion when airborne crews "modify" the procedures to assure optimum presentations.

2. Target drones must be radar augmented with Luneberg lenses fore and aft. Limited on station time of the drones precludes "No-contact" runs.

3. Target drones which will be attacked visually (Sparrow or Sidewinder in the rear quarter) must have smoke augmentation.

4. IFF equipped drones are a luxury which would be nice but are rarely available. The E-2C can position himself to adequately track a radar augmented drone.

5. The E-2C must be properly positioned so as to double as both a range surveillance aircraft and a "last ditch" vector controller. Almost 1 in 4 of our intercepts were consummated by E-2C intervention, although range control was generally excellent (at both ranges).

6. Non-flare-augmented drones will not be bagged (as a rule) by AIM-9 missiles provided the fighters do not get "buck fever" and instead wait to fire until after the drone is observed to be turning.

7. Use of as many TM frequencies as possible makes missile tuning and check-out on the range much more simplified.

8. Use of a single frequency for range control and TM verification also simplifies the AIM-7 shoot. Use the TM people as your ultimate "cleared to fire" even though a green range has been granted earlier.

9. Several backup missile tracks and altitudes vs splash pattern templates should be available and briefed as contingency plans. The Range and OCE reps should have the power to implement these alternatives if the range is fouled by ships or other aircraft.

10. Practice profiles should be scheduled a day or two prior to the actual shoot. All participants must be familiar with plans, procedures, alternatives and voice calls. The drones are too expensive, the airborne exposure time is too short, and the profiles are too unpredictable to allow for any mistakes in the basic procedures. These exercises could stand a large dose of realism.

VI. ROUTINE MISSIONS. Many missions, considered the bread-and-butter of shipboard operations, were regularly scheduled without prior coordination being required. Although training levels earlier in the deployment dictated special attention and careful planning of each mission, by the end of the cruise most of the missions flown by the F-14 were considered routine. Procedures and "rules of engagement" were common knowledge. This is not to say such missions were unbriefed, quite the contrary. However, the language, tactics, and procedures had all been standardized,briefed and flown before. The emphasis on these flights swung toward improved specialized training and advanced scenarios.

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1. ACM.

Prior to the 1977 KENNEDY deployment, the Air Wing Commander expressed the desire and support for a coordinated Air Wing ACM/DCM program. Tasking was provided to returning TOPGUN aircrews to develop and implement a program which would increase individual squadron proficiency to a point where all air wing assets could participate in integrated, scenario-related exercises. The ultimate goal of the program was to expose the air wing to simulated real world threats on a continuing basis and to utilize the daily flight schedule to provide "routine" ACM training while at sea. The task at hand was substantial. Due to aircraft restrictions, VF-14 and VF-32 had participated in limited ACM over the past year. The attack squadrons were not qualified in accordance with their LATWING DCM program. Additionally, the ship's controllers initially were unfamiliar with F-14 capabilities/tactics. Four phases of training were established which, if completed, would elevate the Airwing readiness to an acceptable level. PHASE I: Intensive ground training in basic maneuvering, energy relationships, Soviet threat analysis, and safety of flight was provided to all squadrons by the Air Wing Coordinators. Air wing goals were presented and structured to each individual community. PHASE II: All squadrons completed their respective wing pre-ACM requirements. For the attack community this entailed four flights by each pilot emphasizing basic tactics maneuvering. The fighter squadrons continued to increase their ACM proficiency through a series of warm-up flights. Emphasis in this phase was on aircraft handling and departure/spin prevention and recovery. During this period, basic training with the ship's controllers was initiated. PHASE III: Fighter and attack squadrons met in the standard 1v2, 2v2 scenarios. Basic section tactics were developed. This phase saw the first uses of chaff, flares, and deception techniques. A variety of formation tactics (both offensive and defensive) were analyzed. Advanced stages of PHASE III found aircrews exposed to simulated SAM/AAA environments while opposing bogies with separate GCI and utilizing deception techniques. 2v4, and 1v1v1 were flown in preparation for even more advanced scenario exercises. PHASE IV: Advanced air wing tactics training was accomplished through coordinated evolutions. These flights were briefed and controlled by LT ROBB of VF-14 and LT STARK of VF-32. Missions flown in this phase included 4v6, STRIKE TACTICS, COORDINATED CAP, 1vMany and 2vMany. Most missions utilized individual GCI control, DATA LINK, and the use of chaff and/or deception. The CIC liaison officer proved to be very effective in providing realistic control, accurate debriefs (voice tape only), and additionally was responsible for maintaining an accurate log of shots called and fuel states.

CYCLE TIME AND TANKING. The standard flying day started with a 1+00 or 1+15 cycle followed by 1+45 or 1+30 cycles. Most advanced stage ACM was accomplished on the initial short cycle. It was discovered that during routine cyclic ops, ACM was possible by making mission tanking available to only one fighter squadron each day. This procedure enabled the participating fighters to receive at least 3,000 pounds apiece on all ACM flights. A-7 tankers were also utilized and it was interesting to note that their availability dramatically increased with their participation in the ACM/DCM program.

SUMMARY: A great majority of the Airwing ACM/DCM goals were achieved. VF-14 participated in over 240 dedicated ACM sorties and was the Keystone in exposing 77 air wing aircrews to Phase IV training. In the 1500 or so ACM sorties that were flown in the program, there were no incidents or accidents. Two line periods [redacted] over 30% of the air wing assets dedicated to ACM missions.

ENCLOSURE (8)

Although Air Wing ONE readiness has improved ten fold in the past 7 months, continued development and liason between participating activities while ashore should find the TOPHATTERS and Air Wing ONE in a position to continue this favorable trend during their turnaround and the next cruise.

2. MARITIME AIR SUPERIORITY (MAS).

Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN initiated the CVW-1 MAS syllabus which was implemented at the start of cruise and progressed smoothly throughout the deployment. The syllabus consisted of 15 flights starting with basic ECM hops against the EA-6B to familiarize aircrews with different types of jamming. The second stage involved running intercepts against various threat profiles to provide aircrews with experience in countering multiple ASM's, SSM's, and raid aircraft. The final 5 hops consisted of difficult multiple threat missile and raid aircraft in the presence of a standoff jammer. The scenarios tasked aircrews to employ AWG 9 ECCM features while trying to combat a multiple threat. A detailed breakdown of each flight is contained in the CVW-1 ACM/DCM and MAS syllabus. MAS flights were regularly scheduled on the air plan allowing simple coordination with the EA-6B and raid aircraft. Use of attack aircraft to simulate platforms and missiles proved very satisfactory in simulating current hostile threats. Their normal mission would be scheduled as BOMB/MAS. Once they had expended their bombs, they would rendezvous and set up for a particular MAS scenario with the fighters. Reciprocating briefs between the EA-6B crews and the Tophatters concerning each aircraft's capabilities in the ECM/ECCM environment proved invaluable and helped advance the expertise of all aircrews.

3. AIC.

Air Intercept Control consisted primarily of two scenarios: (1) Intercept exercises for the ship's controllers and (2) Burndown intercepts at max conserve prior to expending a carefully guarded combat package on an ACM mission. Neither scenario was particularly valuable, although an ingenious flight leader could take advantage of multiple bogey scenarios or could incorporate Data Link for additional training. A keen rapport was developed between the ship's AIC controllers and Tophatter aircrews from the start of cruise. A program was set up with lectures given by our returning "Topgun" aircrew to keep the controllers intimately involved in improving their own intercept techniques and their ability to utilize Data Link.

LINK 4A intercepts were utilized on all AIC, ACM and MAS missions providing excellent control and training to the aircrews.

The squadron also conducted AIC briefings for all the "small boys" within the task force. This consisted of lectures presenting the F-14's capabilities and proper utilization of NTDS with LINK 4A. This helped to alleviate many problems experienced in the past.

4. CAP.

Generally a major portion of each large exercise. The F-14 when properly utilized greatly enhanced the AAW posture of the task force. By mid-cruise it had become apparent to all concerned that a few minutes of coordination with the ship's TAO's in CIC would reap enormous benefits in mission performance. Whenever possible the F-14's were employed in section on a race track pattern with one radar looking down the threat axis at all times.

The biggest CAP problem throughout the deployment was never really resolved. That was the question of identification of bogies and the use of a missiles free zone around the task force. The F-14's were frequently "cleared to fire" on what turned out to be a friendly aircraft. Concurrently, the F-14's were frequently taken under attack by ships batteries (unbeknownest to the TOMCAT crews). The overhead CAP station was perhaps the most dangerous seat in the house. Return to force procedures were attempted, but the F-14's relatively slow cruising speeds caused delays in recoveries which were unacceptable. Perhaps Mode IV will solve the problem.

5. STRAFE.

Air-to-Water gunnery was scheduled as a piggyback mission using a towed larne or smokes as the target. Although the 20mm loader was broken for the better part of the deployment, aircrews accomplished 6-8 strafe missions apiece and became quite proficient in using the gun. One dangerous FOD resulted directly from gunnery as an unexpended 20mm HEI cartridge was ingested by a port engine.

6. Low Level Nav and Escort.

Very little actual strike escorting was accomplished during this deployment. However, the F-14 with its INS proved a real benefit to a strike group by aiding in the navigation problem. Numerous overland escort missions found the TOMCAT leading a section of A-7Bs to a target, acting both as fighter escort and navigation lead.

7. Z-EXERCISES.

The infamous "service" hops became more and more oppressive as the deployment progressed. As we reached the point of abject futility it became apparent that a reasonable amount of training could be salvaged if a minimum amount of coordination could be accomplished with the various OCE's. Messages flew and "hot line" phone calls allowed the coordination of AAWEXes and planned raids which solved the air wing's problem of testing various strike postures and simultaneously evaluated the AAW capabilities of the ships requesting services.

8. WEAPONS LOADOUT AND EXPENDITURE.

a. The squadron fired 12,496 rounds of 20mm TP and 3299 rounds of 20mm service for the entire cruise. Most 20mm expenditure was at the wake of a larne pulled either by a "small boy" or the USS John F. KENNEDY. Although this exercised the M61 gun system there exists a strong need for air-to-air firings on towed banners while deployed in the Mediterranean. An exceedingly high down time on the three 20mm M61 F-14 ammo loaders seriously impacted the total 20mm expenditure for the cruise.

b. The ALE-39A was used extensively to expend bundles of RR-129 chaff or MK-46 decoy flares on various flight missions. Experimentation revealed 1 chaff bundle would break a rear quarter pulse lock and deploying a single flare will negate a SEAM lock. Aircrews became highly proficient in the use of the ALE-39 dispenser as a viable means of self-protection.

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ENCLOSURE (8)

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c. The normal aircraft weapons loadout consisted of 1 Phoenix, 1 Sparrow, 1 Sidewinder, FAMMO, and 52 chaff/flares. A total of 8 aircraft out of 10 were capable of carrying 2 PH, 2 SP, and 2 SW each. Five aircraft actually carried 2 Phoenix, 2 Sparrows and 2 Sidewinders at some time during the course of the deployment which reflects the hard work done by IWT and ordnance personnel. Sparrows were carried in the belly on stations 3 and 6 and one aircraft flew loaded with 4 SP and 2 SW to test the total capability of the weapons system.

VII. SPECIAL EVOLUTIONS. Many new ideas were forthcoming during the cruise and required the incorporation of innovative procedures or totally new programs. The ACM/DCM syllabus and the MAS syllabus perhaps fall into this category; however, they were so successful in their inauguration that these missions in fact became routine, regularly scheduled events. This was not the case for the following evolutions.

1. CQ. A carrier qual deck the first day at sea following a long inport period was one of the more interesting innovations of this deployment.

Beginning at dawn, the first two cycles were normal, with each aircraft receiving a touch and go as well as the normal trap. A lengthy respot followed and as many aircraft as were up and could be spotted were launched at approximately 1100. Six to seven aircraft were called down for 30 minutes of deck time, or 3 traps whichever occurred first. Then the aircraft were either hot refueled ondeck or launched to take fuel from overhead tankers as an additional group of 6 were called down to run the deck. The final trap (the whole evolution lasted 3 hours) brought the total to 4 traps and lots of max conserve intercepts. This evolution was repeated once again in the afternoon. CQ proved to be a quick and effective method for getting pilot landing proficiency back on the step.

2. FLEXDECK. A machine breaking, crew exhausting evolution, Flexdeck consisted of continuous TACAIR launches for 36 hours or more. We had one go for 65 straight hours. No tricky cycles and very few fancy missions, Flexdeck emphasized the ability to keep it going for a lengthy period of time. Obviously, maintenance effort was grossly curtailed. The surprise to flight crews was the exhausting effect of continuous operations. It was imperative that pilots were night qualed going into Flexdeck. We also discovered that spares were a waste of manpower. The deck crews were run ragged turning the spare aircraft, and the flight crews were not receiving adequate rest because they were briefing and manning spare aircraft that launched only rarely. (Not to mention the Handler's respot problem). Pacing the schedule early and then pushing toward the end to pick up any lost sorties proved to be the keys to a successful Flexdeck operation.

3. PHOENIX CAPTIVE CARRY PROGRAM. USS John F. KENNEDY/CVW-1 was nominated to participate in the fleet captive-carry reliability program for 50,000 series (stress-screened) Phoenix missiles. Fighter Squadron FOURTEEN compiled 566.7 hours of flight time on 15 Phoenix missiles providing AIRTEVRON FOUR with valuable missile captive-flight and MOAT data. These data will be used to evaluate MOAT effectiveness, and, where possible, to identify improved MOAT techniques.

Problems incurred during the captive carry program included: (1) excessive number of motion symobols displayed in airborne MOAT with aircraft in straight and level flight, (2) Phoenix rails would pass MATS test but cause a known good missile to fail MOAT, (3) most Phoenix MOAT failures were associated with missile autopilot problems, and (4) numerous missiles were rejected for torn NOMEX covering occurred during handling.

The program allowed aircrews to become familiar with the AIM-54/AWG-9 interface, to develop a higher confidence level in BIT 4 MAS/MOAT, and to gain the ability to analyze the various MOAT DP's. A troubleshooting card with all the MOAT DP's was published and color coded so aircrews could quickly determine the best Phoenix launch mode when given any number of MOAT DP's.

The squadron flew a loadout of two Phoenix on 5 different aircraft during the captive-carry program experiencing no difficulties in cooling requirements.

Overall the program was highly successful in providing AIRTEVRON FOUR with meaningful data. It should be noted, however, that the 50,000 series Phoenix did not appear to meet the reliability requirements originally required by the Navy.

I. General Comments

II. Material Support

[redacted]

III. General Ship Support

IV. Corrosion

V. Airframes

VI. Integrated Weapons Branch

VII. Line Division

VIII. Power Plants

IX. Ordnance Branch

X. Electrical/Instruments

[redacted]

I. General Comments.

1. The squadron deployed with five block 75 and five block 85 aircraft. All were configured with block IV++ hardware, and all on their first tour. Water intrusion fixes had been completed on six, leaving four to be done during the transit. By 13 January nine aircraft had been flown aboard. The tenth was diverted to Norfolk when it developed flap problems and an outboard spoiler failed up. It was craned aboard, and spoiler problems continued throughout the cruise, though the reasons changed. The vigorous program executed by FITWING ONE to deploy only full systems capable (FSC) aircraft was successful: without it, deployment in any reasonable state of readiness would have been impossible, and with it, seven of the ten aircraft were opready during the transit. Once aircraft were aboard or within craning range, support for the FSC program diminshed. We were happy to get what we did.

2. The transit without flight operations afforded an opportunity to whip the aircraft into shape, something that was difficult prior to deployment. (FCLP, Christmas leave, CQ, ADMAT inspection, load aboard, and change of command, all within one month). There were some surprises during the transit. The ship did not have an RFI Tacan though two were aboard. Boxes which had been sent to shore based AIMD's prior to deployment were loaded back aboard without having been repaired. Six CADC's were consumed due to heavy rains, a problem which evaporated when the water intrusion fixes were fully implemented. It was not until the airwing turned in 9 CADCs that it was discovered that VAST was not up. Tech reps were flown to meet the ship in Rota. It is recommended that in the future the wing send people aboard well in advance to validate the VAST program and the status of the equipment as well as the "golden" boxes. Such problems notwithstanding, 398 MAF's were processed during the transit, and on the first day of flight operations we were ready.

3. The operating statistics reported in the operations section of this report attest to the success of the overall maintenance effort. We seemd to have turned the corner on F-14 reliability and maintainability. Percentage Opready climbed steadily while NORS abated only slightly, and aircraft utilization was impressive despite an average of only 12 operating days per month.

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL
OP READY	38.8	37.6	40.0	46.4	57.6	60.8	65.0
NORS	37.9	35.7	29.6	23.2	23.5	27.6	30.0
ACFT UTILIZATION (HRS)	13.4	32.9	41.7	38.3	25.8	44.4	30.0

As a practical matter, the squadron could expect to start the day with 7-9 aircraft (the 10th multi-NORS) and suffer only modest attrition during flight ops. The high aircraft turnaround rate, 79%, was pivotal to success.

4. Although the block 85 aircraft flew about 10% more sorties than the block 75's, we could find few real differences in reliability. The following statistics illustrate:

	BLOCK 75	BLOCK 85	TOTAL
Sorties Flown	550	620	1170

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	BLOCK 75	BLOCK 85	TOTAL
Turnaround Rate (Landed Oprdy)	78%	80%	79%
FSC Launch Rate 1)	93%	93%	93%
FSC Recovery Rate 2)	70%	78%	75%
Abort Rate	8.9%	6.6%	7.8%

1) 159019, block 75, was plagued with AWG-15 wiring problems which when introduced into the calculation lowered Block and Total FSC launch rates to 79% and 87% respectively.

2) COMM/NAV equipment were primarily responsible for the disparity.

5. While favorable trends were noted in opready rates and A-799 rates, over the long haul the squadron maintained a steady pace. Meaningful statistics such as sortie generation rate and aircraft recovery rate showed no distinctive trend when viewed over the cruise. Setbacks in one area seemed to be offset by gains in others, and production remained fairly constant.

II. MATERIAL SUPPORT.

1. There are several indications that overall supply support was much improved over the previous Mediterranean deployment. With two less aircraft and 19 fewer flying days, more sorties were flown, flight time was more evenly distributed over the aircraft, fewer aircraft became SPINTAC, and the average NORS rate was lower:

	NORS Rate
75/76 Cruise	42.1%
77 Cruise	29.6%

Although the supply support picture is necessarily dynamic, many of the situations discussed below prevailed throughout the deployment.

2. Response Rate. The overall response rate for both on and off-ship NORS requisitions was far better than previously experienced.

a. Logistics: Excellent logistic facilities at NAPLES combined with regular COD service substantially reduced off-ship response times. In-port periods were of sufficient length to ensure that items staged to the fleet landing had ample opportunity to be barged to the ship. Helicopter runs were made daily while in-port. For hard items, actual delivery dates lagged EDD's by as much as three weeks but not due to local logistics. On one occassion, the supply pipeline was turned off for approximately a week due to an Italian labor dispute.

b. Supply Assistance: The Super Bobcat program was more of an impediment than a help. The squadron's intensive program of monitoring critical requirements revealed that Bobcat items took as long as other items, and were often excluded from supply assist type messages. On the other hand, several operational impact type messages, listing a few very high priority items, generated positive supply

status, usually within two days. It rapidly became obvious that a few critical NORS requirements prioritized by the operators are more meaningful and have greater impact than voluminous supply assist messages. In this regard, the diligence of the AIRLANT staff significantly contributed to operational readiness.

c. Logistics Support Reps: The aggressive Grumman LSR was invaluable. Numerous parts with an initial NIS status were located among onboard stocks, and many sorties were saved due to the expeditious handling of critical items during flight operations. Additionally, the direct line to the manufacturer available through the LSR seemed to speed response for tough off-ship items.

3. CANNIBALIZATION: The necessity for excessive cannibalization continued throughout the deployment. The impact of the numerous severe support deficiencies was aggravated by the short intense operating periods. Packing total flight operations for an entire month into a dozen consecutive days was incompatable with a policy strictly limiting cannibalization while at sea. It would have resulted in missed commitments while attempting to achieve a 5% manhour savings. Despite this dilemma, actions were taken to reduce the rate of cannibalization, the most effective of which was emphasis on improving troubleshooting techniques. The reduction in A-799 statistics supports our success here.

a. Cannibalization Rate: Although the number of items cannibalized varied widely, at no time during the deployment did the monthly cannibalization rate climb as high as the average rate for the preceeding six months (.81 items/sortie). The rate for the period January through June 1977 (.57 items per sortie) constitutes a 29% reduction. The following statistics are pertinent:

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	AVG
Items cannibalized	60	81	111	152	92	115	102
Cannibalization Rate (Items/100 hours)	41.3	24.6	26.6	39.7	35.6	25.8	30.9
Cannibalization Rate (Items/sortie)	.57	.49	.51	.73	.65	.49	.57
% MDR HRS	4.7%	4.4%	6.3%	7.8%	4.2%	7.9%	5.9%
A-799 Rate (O-level)	9.8%	8.5%	7.0%	6.8%	6.5%	6.9%	8.5%
A-799 Rate (I-level)	23.3%	11.0%	12.7%	8.1%	10.6%	7.7%	11.4%

b. SPINTAC: The squadron is not manned nor is the ship provisioned to support 12 aircraft. This accounts, in part, for the higher utilization rate of the 10 aircraft squadron. However, the reduced number of aircraft limits the strategies available to address support deficiencies. An immediate casualty is the "No SPINTAC policy." The downing of an additional aircraft or two to play musical parts (about 35 at time) to head off a SPINTAC would increase cannibalization (items and especially rate) while preempting operational requirements. Instead, the squadron's policy was to refit aircraft coincidently timed with the projected availability of parts and a long in-port period. As a result, there were only two occurences of SPINTAC, totaling 36 days, and SPINTAC never interferred with operational commitments.

[redacted] ENCLOSURE (8) [redacted]

The adverse impact was primarily in having to down the otherwise FSC aircraft to remove or prevent a SPINTAC.

4. Problem Areas: There are indications that few of the problems listed below are unique to VF-14 or USS John F. KENNEDY. These must be addressed at higher levels.

a. AVCAL: Deficiencies in AVCAL were in both insufficient AVCM as well as AVCAL items not aboard. The low percentage of onboard AVCAL assets is reflected in the inordinate number of NIS responses. Investigation revealed many frustrated AVCAL requisitions without follow up action. Such documents should be reviewed prior to deployment. Several items require special attention for the next AVCAL review. Flap actuators (Nos. 3 and 4, both sides) and spoiler actuator (P/N -3 and -4) remain a serious problem due to inherent cannibalization difficulties coupled with a severe system-wide shortage of assets. Known high failure items such as CSDC's, CADC's, and mach lever controllers, which require a tempramental VAST station to effect repair, experienced multiple failures. Other items requiring an allowance increase are ECS valves, radar altimeters, ARC-159 radios, nose wheel steering dampers, and fin caps.

b. EXREP/BCM: In several cases expeditious repair was neither. The cause was typically AWP. Often piece parts were received after several weeks, only to discover another part was required. AIMD reluctance to cannibalize further increased turn-around-time. To minimize the negative impact and to help expedite repair, constant aggressive monitoring became necessary. Squadron generated supply assists for piece part support coupled with BCM action requests definitely helped to facilitate repair. Additionally, the assistance of tech reps proved invaluable in this area. Since the response time for a whole assembly often exceeded that for an EXREP item, it is vital that AIMD develop a viable BCM policy based on a realistic assessment of its capability and piece part support.

c. Flight gear: The ship deployed with insufficient quantities of flight and flight deck gear. Anticipating the situation, the squadron procured as much as possible, limited only by the twenty-five percent overexpenditure limit imposed by OPTAR instructions. However, severe shortages occurred during the fourth month of deployment, particularly for aviators flight and anti-G suits. As a further aggravation, all 7F requisitions off-ship were processed through NSC Norfolk, necessitating long lead times, typically in excess of 45 days. It is highly recommended that additional stocks be warehoused in the Mediterranean area.

d. Labor Saving Devices: There was a shortage of these devices, particularly electric typewriters. Existing instructions show a squadron allowance for five electric typewriters; however, only three were allocated, of which only two were considered in satisfactory working condition. It is strongly recommended that "C" section pre-deployment milestones be actively monitored by squadron personnel to ensure compliance.

III. GENERAL SHIP SUPPORT.

1. Several of the historic impediments to expeditious shipboard maintenance remain a problem. This is not unlike other deployments and maintenance was performed regardless. Although the Air Department was very cooperative and requests submitted on the daily spot request sheet were rarely denied, the problems discussed below were apparent.

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2. Flight and Hangar Deck Spotting: Under the CV concept the deck loading was at its upper limit. Twenty-four hour operations, a common occurence, limited the F-14's to a max of two wing sweep spots. With these in use, the hanger bay was "locked".

3. High Power Turns: These are still hard to come by, and, with the large number of engine changes experienced, became a real problem.

a. Underway - Three of the high power turn spots were located aft in the landing area, hence, they were unavailable during flight operations which often continued for over 24 consecutive hours. The spot on elevator #4 was not available as it was the primary access to the hangar deck. One high power turn was performed during flight operations on elevator #3 in order to prevent an aircraft from becoming SPINTAC. The problems incurred in this evolution proved far less serious than anticipated.

b. In-port - Here things were worse. The spots on elevator #3 and #4 were unavailable. The remaining three spots were often unusable because (a) deck house #4 was in use, (b) a VERTREP spot was in, or (c) the fantail was pointing toward the beach. Obtaining permission to perform turns could take several days, turning into a very frustrating evolution for all concerned. These delays had a significant impact on operational readiness.

4. Ground Support Equipment: Waiting for a "huffer" was common. The 440 and AC power system was frequently unreliable, and some deck wells were down for the entire deployment. The number, type, and quality of hydraulic test stands onboard was inadequate for F-14 maintenance. There were not sufficient units aboard to simultaneously power both hydraulic systems. The unsatisfactory practice of borrowing a jenny from another squadron was a routine necessity. In order to make room for more units of frequently used GSE, it is strongly recommended the consideration be given to reducing the number of fork-lifts carried aboard the CV.

5. Fueling/Defueling: The squadron had a difficult time getting aircraft defueled. Reasons frequently given were; (a) we were inport (a ship's instruction prohibits fueling and defueling inport, where we spent 60% of the deployment), (b) aircraft not properly spotted, (c) not enough hard hose to reach the aircraft, or (d) crew not available. Only one fueling/defueling station was operable in hangar bay #2 throughout the cruise. In one case, it took four days to get an aircraft defueled and another three days to get it refueled after the discrepancy was repaired.

6. Washing: This requires constant attention. The same instruction which prohibited fueling also prohibited washing in port. A successful corrosion control program requires frequent aircraft washing and we constantly pressed for the required water and aircraft spots.

7. In-port Maintenance: A key factor to the squadron's successful cruise was a carefully formulated maintenance plan delineating precisely what had to be accomplished during in-port periods. This allowed all supervisors to be aware of the total maintenance picture and the department's daily requirements. In-port, the squadron was allowed to spot only two aircraft on the hangar deck, the majority of the maintenance being performed on the flight deck. Aircraft were spotted on the flight deck in two rows adjacant to the island nose to tail. This limited maintenance turns and made utilization of electrical power and deck well air

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difficult due to the limited number of operating units. When we visited Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia and Alexandria, Egypt maintenance personnel were not allowed to perform any maintenance due to general visiting and the diplomatic nature of the visits. Typically, one hour during an in-port period was devoted to aircrew turns. This proved to be a beneficial program but all efforts must be made to ensure that the maximum number of aircraft are put in turn up spots.

IV. CORROSION.

1. General: Corrosion in the F-14A is a continuing problem requiring constant attention by all levels of maintenance. Interior corrosion, due to its inaccessibility, has proven difficult to detect. Thus, an "All Hands" approach on a daily basis was required.

2. Manning: The corrosion control team was spearheaded by a highly qualified AMS1 work center supervisor and an AMS2 night check supervisor. The team consisted of eleven men. The shop enjoyed the luxury of having in excess of 50% of its personnel volunteer for the corrosion control team. The elimination of the requirement to augment the corrosion team during the in-port periods was a direct result of the vastly improved workmanship, enthusiasm, and efficiency of the volunteer team.

3. Equipment: The corrosion effort was hampered by a shortage of equipment and overaged/defective supplies.

a. Equipment:

(1) Sanders - The cruise commenced with five Black and Decker sanders. As the sanders wore out, replacements were difficult to obtain. Only three sanders were operative by the end of the cruise.

(2) Paint Guns - At one point, the work center was down to only one paint gun. In order to maintain four paint guns in good working order, the shop should deploy with at least eight re-build kits.

(3) Air Hose/Fittings - The work center experienced a shortage of air hose by mid-cruise. At least 500 feet with fittings should be on hand at the start of cruise.

b. Overaged/Defective Supplies: Many corrosion man-hours were wasted using overaged/frozen paint, primer, and alodine which caused paint peeling and chipping. Despite repeated attempts to purge the system of overaged/frozen materials, the problem was never rectified.

4. Program:

a. 42 Day Induction Cycle - the 42 day corrosion cycle was implemented during the month of March. However, due to deck spotting problems and heavy operational committments, a special effort was made to optimize man-hour utilization. As many aircraft as possible were inducted into corrosion each in-port period. Consequently, the number of discrepancies for the 42 day induction cycles was greatly reduced allowing maximum utilization of assets while at sea.

b. Documentation - The squadron's documentation problem was not illuminated until the 3M summary form was revised to focus attention on the

"All Hands" involvement. Very simply stated, "If you don't document it, then you have not performed it."

c. Cosmetics - In keeping with the spirit of COMNAVAIRLANT INST 4750.5, the squadron virtually eliminated cosmetic painting of aircraft tail surfaces by using acrylic lacquer Mil-L-81352 (Light gull gray - 36440). In addition, the squadron insignia was reduced in size and simplified. The touch-up paint operation was significantly more efficient as fewer coats were required, thus saving precious corrosion control man-hours.

5. Audit: The mid-cruise corrosion audit was very favorable. The aircraft material condition reflected significant improvement over the condition noted during pre-deployment inspection. LCDR John Senape, from COMFAIRMED, headed the inspection team. He was not interested in talking with Officers. Instead, he held a 45 minute session with the key workers from all work centers asking pertinent questions relating to their particular function in the corrosion program. The questioning period was very informal but, most beneficial as it high-lighted our strong and weak training areas.

6. Problem Areas:

a. Emergency Reclamation - Actuation of the hanger deck light-water system was a constant threat. Four times during the deployment F-14's in hangar bay two were doused with fire fighting chemicals. An emergency reclamation TIMI is a must. Speed is paramount. Doused aircraft were washed on the spot in the hangar deck.

b. In-port problems - During the Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia and Alexandria, Egypt port visits the amount of corrosion work allowed was minimal due to the diplomatic nature of these visits. This hardship caused a higher than normal treatment rate for the month of May.

7. All Hands Involvement: The corrosion control task required a "total" maintenance effort and was headed by Maintenance Control, Quality Assurance, and the Corrosion Control work center supervisor. Emphasis was placed on close coordination for the "total" corrosion requirements. Specialized teams were assigned to replace calafax fasteners, thoroughly clean cockpits, and seal panels. Complete aircraft cleanliness was accomplished utilizing the squadron's detailed corrosion prevention and control program TIMI. The Quality Assurance work center strengthened the program with its acceptance of only high quality professional workmanship and insurance of strict compliance to established, check-list prodecures. The Squadron's total maintenance team effort yielded 20.5% of the total MDR man-hours to corrosion prevention/treatment.

V. AIRFRAMES.

1. GSE Support - The AHT 63/64 hydraulic jenny with an output of 20 GPM at 3000 PSI is inadequate to perform wing sweep and flap/slat actuation. To use a jenny on each primary system is infeasible in view of the ship's limited assets (5 AHT 63's and 5 AHT 64's); the ship must have either 50 GPM equipment or enough jennys to give each F-14 squadron two.

2. Flaps/Slats - The flap/slat assymetry tester and recorder proved extremely useful in reducing man-hour expenditure performing AFB 114. Additionally, the increased inspection interval to 60 HRS has obvious labor savings and reduces

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stress on the system.

3. Calfax/High Torque Screws - A 25% failure rate was experienced upon removing panels. This is a continuing problem. These fasteners are a FOD and corrosion problem which plagues the entire community. Employment of fastener teams helped.

4. Spoiler Actuators - Outboard spoiler actuators failed on 7 occasions. All failures were due to internal LTVA or 18% switch malfunctions.

5. Hydraulic Line Clamps/Brackets - approximately thirty clamp brackets broke from vibration in the port sponson and engine box areas. Six hydraulic line clamps broke, two of which ultimately precipitated the only hydraulic system failures of the cruise.

6. Fin Caps - The deterioration of Fin Caps in the high 'G' ACM environment was a continuing problem. No less than 10 had to be replaced and/or repaired. AFC 506 should help.

VI. INTEGRATED WEAPONS BRANCH.

The integrated (AQ & AT) concept was utilized this cruise with notable success.

1. AWG-9 - No particular high WRA failure rates were identified. At the outset, available NR-5's were found to be in disrepair, providing inadequate cooling for the F-14A. With proper GSE, maintenance availability improved later in the deployment. It is recommended that these units be thoroughly tested prior to departing CONUS. Additionally, the paucity of 440V wells outlets onboard further restricted AWG-9 maintenance.

2. AWG-15 - Reliability was much improved over last cruise. Possible contributing factors, in addition to relatively good weather were:

a. Given an ACP faiure, both ACP and RDU were removed and replaced, preventing potential mutually induced failure of the pair.

b. 28 Day missile check requirements were adhered to religiously. Long inport periods provided excellent opportunity to perform this preventive maintenance.

3. CSDC - An extremely high failure rate (74+) was experienced. Nearly all failures were attributable to memory alterations due to insufficient cooling and power transients. This problem is well documented among other F-14A squadrons. Additionally, two units were found to be repeat offenders suggesting the need for adaquate trend analysis to purge the rotable pool of troublesome boxes.

4. INS - Many problems were experienced with RF alignment. CSDC and ASQ 85 were identified as the primary deficient units. Once again, particular WRA's were recycled by the rotable pool with repeat discrepancies. IMU "dump" is a continuing problem and is well documented.

5. Comm - An excessive number of faulty cockpit relay boxes were identified. Inadequate test equipment in AIMD exaggerated the problem.

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insufficient number given the high incidence of engine changes.

5. Engine Trims - Trims were only performed during non-flight hours, usually at night. The time allowed to complete such trims was often insufficient. The reliability of the trim tester was much improved as was the ship's ability to calibrate it. It is recommended that spare cable adapters be stocked to forego potential problems.

6. Prepositioned Parts - It proved beneficial to build up and maintain consumable kits (seals and "O" rings) for engine, fuel control and fuel accessory changes.

IX. ORDNANCE BRANCH.

All ten aircraft were configured with multi-purpose pylons and LAU-7/A-3 launches on stations 1A and 8A. Eight aircraft had AIM-7 adapters on stations 1B and 8B. Eight aircraft had weapons rails with LAU 93 launchers for AIM-54 on stations 3R and 6R. Standard weapons load for the cruise was 1-1-1, plus gun.

1. Sparrow Adapters:

a. As only eight sets of sparrow adapters were available, numerous reconfigurations were necessary to meet daily commitments. This constant movement caused six injected video connectors (located in the sparrow adapter wiring harness) to fail. Though a few connectors were easily repaired, it was found that the triaxial cables on some harnesses were too short and extension cables had to be manufactured. The hardware for these cables took a minimum of thirty days to procure. Recommend all sparrow adapters received from the ancillary equipment pool be inspected for functional injected video cables of adequate length.

b. The long sway brace pods for the LAU 92 launchers (ACD 2177) continued to fall off and the rubber liners peeled back, necessitating removal. Rejected pods are to be exchanged on a one for one basis with Raytheon. Eleven pods were returned 17 November 1976 and replacements have not been received.

c. The LAU-92 launcher cleaning stand was operational when nitrogen and replacement teflon seals were available. During flight operations, no nitrogen carts were available for use by AIMD work center 710. Once the initial supply of teflon seals was depleted, it was approximately sixty days before sufficient replacements were received. Recommend increased stocking of teflon seals, and that a nitrogen cart be permanently assigned to AIMD work center 710.

2. Phoenix Fairings and Weapons Rails:

a. Only one right-hand phoenix fairing failed during this deployment when the meter glass broke. This was a significant improvement over the many failures experienced during the previous deployment. The fairing was quickly repaired by AIMD.

b. The safe arm linkage on all weapons rails should be checked for proper rigging prior to each weapons load. Most rigging problems were fixed quickly at AIMD.

6. Displays - "HUD too dim" was an all too common discrepancy. HUD's were adjusted to the point of appearance of retrace, and the windscreen coating was examined, yet no solution is apparent at this time.

7. Cannibalization - During cyclic ops, components from down aircraft were utilized to provide expeditious repair, in effect providing an on-site rotable pool. This circumvented supply support problems and reduced the NORS rate. This practice was indispensable in reducing turnaround time.

VII. LINE DIVISION.

1. Vent Tank Leaks - This was a continuing problem. We coped with it by not "topping off" prior to entering port. A large supply of fuel vent pencil drain plugs is a must, as is a 55 gallon drum on wheels.

2. Chains - We found that sailing with a large number of spare parts for tie down chains saved surveys and inconvenience.

VIII. POWER PLANTS.

1. Engine Changes - Forty-one (41) TF-30-P-412 engines were removed and reinstalled during deployment. The bulk of the engine rejections were necessitated by assists for other work centers and rescheduling of Hot Section Inspections (HSI) from 500 hours to 350 hours.

Number of Actions	Cause
12	Assist another work center
11	HSI
7	Cannibalization
7	FOD
2	Bearing seal failure
1	Cracked IGV
1	Hightime Compressor

2. FOD - Fourteen (14) engines were FODed of which seven (7) required changes. Causal factors were inlet guide vane failure, a 20mm shell, calfax fasteners, fuel nozzle dust cover, in addition to the usual flight deck ingestion. Standard FOD prevention procedures were observed. The initial 7 FODS were of the starboard engine which lead us to believe the damage was incurred during the inflight refueling evolution. After close inspection of KA-6 baskets and review of inflight refueling procedures, the incidence of this particular FOD abated.

3. RFI Assets - An inadequate number of RFI engines were available throughout the deployment. At one point the two F-14 squadrons were NORS for 5 engines each. Piece parts to rebuild on-board assets were in short supply throughout. Additionally, RFI engines were often trapped in AIMD's jet shop behind the ship's boats and a mountain of supply retrograde.

4. Adapters/Engine Stands - Engine removal/replacement was inhibited by insufficient availability of adapters (skates). Each squadron maintained 4 sets while AIMD had 2. Non-RFI engines were often stored in NORS aircraft. Similar problems were experienced with 4000 stands. A total of five were available, an

c. The "O" ring located in the aircraft QD fitting that mates with the weapons rail continued to fail causing coolanol leaks. These "O" rings should be checked each time the weapons rail is lowered. Recommend keeping several (P/N GS570J2J24) "O" rings on hand.

d. On two occasions, AIM-54 post-load checks revealed excessive play between LAU-93 launcher and the missile. There is no known pre-load check or adjustment. The weapons rails must be removed and sent to AIMD for replacement of the LAU-93 launchers. Recommend all missiles be checked after loading for this discrepancy.

e. Rubber environmental seals around weapons rails began to shred and work loose. When this condition exists, the seal should be removed to prevent FOD. Recommend new seals be provided during turnaround cycle maintenance at NAS Oceana AIMD.

f. For AIM-54 loading, the air gun was found to be impractical as large quantities of air hose are required. A large ½" drive speed handle with ½" X ½" universal and ½" drive socket worked very well. Recommend two of these speed handles be acquired and the ½" X ½" universal be added to the loading box inventory.

3. M61A1 Gun System

a. Four transfer adapter units failed during gunnery missions resulting in gun jams. In one instance, a 20mm round exited the gun bay through the gas purge door and was ingested by the port engine. An improved transfer adapter unit is being evaluated at PACMISTESTCEN PT MUGU, CA at this time.

b. Distorted 20mm gun cases in two of the above jams damaged the gun drums necessitating replacement. One drum was available aboard ship. The other required long lead time for procurement. Recommend a greater depth of M61A1 gun parts be stocked aboard ship.

c. A total of six gun control units failed. All required a minimum of 30 days for replacement. Recommend increased supply support and greater depth of rotable assests.

d. The linkless ammunition loading system (LALS) conveyors were the same ones used on the last cruise. An estimated 150,000 rounds have been cycled through each with minimal problems when the cruise began. After approximately thirty operating days, these conveyors failed and only limited repair part support was available. Replacement conveyors shipped from CONUS were utilized approximately twenty operating days before they too developed problems. Recommend that conveyors be sent to NARF for complete rework after each deployment and a minimum of two conveyors per squadron with M61A1 gun systems be prepositioned aboard ship prior to deployment.

V. ELECTRICAL/INSTRUMENTS.

1. Water intrusion - The water intrusion program significantly improved aircraft availability. Water associated problems have abated particularly with respect to CADC, spoilers and fuel quantity indicators. RTV 118, a sealant used for this

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purpose, remains in short supply.

2. External Electrical Power - Successful application of external electrical power continued to be a problem. The narrow frequency and voltage limits, 400± 25HZ, 115± 5 volts respectively, is the essence of the matter.

3. Connectors - It has been impossible to obtain connectors for the box beam fuel quantity probes (P/N M81511/56FE04B1)

4. Fin Caps - The vulnerability of fin cap lights in the ACM environment is well documented. This continued to be the case.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT

1. The Predeployment Personnel Manning Assistance Report (PERSMAR) (CINCLANTFLT INST 1306.8 of 22 April 1977) provides a means to identify, and notify higher echelon personnel management of manning deficiencies that preclude achieving an optimum manning level upon deployment. At least 8 months prior to a major deployment the command should identify projected shortages indicated on the EDVR and attempt to correct them by:

a. NEC adjustments via returnable school quotas

b. Increased retention efforts

c. FRAMP NEC training adjustments for personnel programmed to report onboard, and locally identify shortages not identified on the EDVR such as: career designated personnel not reenlisting, administrative separations and officer program selectees. The initial report, due six months prior to deployment, should fully identify all prospective shortages in order to give BUPERS and EPMAC time to program and train replacements. The reports required at three months, one month, and two weeks prior to deployment serve mainly as SITREPS. The best hope of preventing services deficiences is to plan at least 8 months ahead and make the initial report thorough and meaningful.

2. While in the Med, NAVAIRTERM ROTA is usually unaware of priority requirements for incoming personnel. If you have a critical need for personnel ordered in while deployed, notify ASCOMED and NAVAIRTERM ROTA to move them on a priority basis vice first come-first served. We found response to these requests to be very good.

3. ESO - Courses ordered usually require at least one month for mail delivery. ESO at NSA, Naples set up GED testing by A.F. South testing center. Three weeks lead time was required to procure examinations. Results were available within 6-7 weeks.

4. HRO - Human Resources Management Center, Naples is available while in port. It is located in the basement of the BEQ at NSA. The facilities there range from films to the use of their classrooms. Quotas for the various schools they operate are available when in port and may be obtained on short notice in many instances.

5. HRO - If the squadron HRAV cycle is nearing its end, it is possible to have an HRAV survey taken while deployed. Human Resource Management Det, Rota (Human Resource Management Center London) administered ours in Malaga during transit to Rota with results being forwarded to the center in Norfolk.