CHAPTER XIV

MILITARY READINESS

The Naval Facilities Engineering Command was responsible for maintaining the military readiness of the Naval Construction Force. In order to do this, the Command was responsible for providing for the financial and logistical support of the force.[1] This included the determination of construction battalion material and equipment requirements, the management of assigned items under the Navy Supply System, the support of military operational plans, the development of mobilization plans in support of Navy plans, and the management and maintenance of the Advance Base Functional Component System. Additional responsibilities were the coordination, preparation and dissemination of emergency plans in support of Navy plans, serving as "executive agent" for the Chief of Naval Operations in the area of disaster preparedness, performance of certain civil defense functions, and the management of the Construction Battalion Centers in support of the Naval Construction Force.[2]

Quite naturally, in view of the nature of its function, the Command's Military Readiness Program felt the impact of the Vietnamese War more strongly and directly than almost any other area

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[1] Headquarters Organization Manual, NAVFAC P-313, Change 52 (NAVFACNOTE 5450 of 21 Dec 1972), p. 06-3.

[2] Ibid.

of the Command's operations. For much of the period 1965-1972, the Military Readiness Program operated in an accelerated, near crisis atmosphere. The Command's response to the challenge of Vietnam proceeded at two levels, or more accurately, in two overlapping phases--the level or phase of immediate response to the current demands of Vietnamese operations, and the level or phase of analyzing and updating procedures and policy in the light of experience. This led both to short-range changes to improve current response to immediate needs and also to long-range changes incorporating lessons learned in connection with the Vietnam War experience.

THE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE

One of the Command's major military readiness responsibilities was the support of the Naval Construction Force, both active and reserve. The latter included the responsibility to serve as program sponsor of the Reserve Program which included both the Reserve Naval Construction Force and other Reserve Civil Engineer Corps/ Group VIII personnel.[3]

During much of the period under consideration the Vietnamese War dominated Seabee activity. From 1965 till 1972 the most important accomplishments of the Naval Construction Force took place in Southeast Asia. Following the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam, the main focus of Seabee activity switched to Diego Garcia

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[3] Headquarters Organization Manual, NAVFAC P-313, Change 64 (NAVFACNOTE 5450 of 5 Nov 1973), p. 06-13.

in the Indian Ocean, where Naval Construction Force personnel began the construction of a major naval support installation.

In 1965, the steadily increasing insurgency of the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) made the large-scale commitment of United States troops a necessity. Although Seabee Teams had been active in the Republic of Vietnam since 1963,[4] it was not until 1965 that larger Seabee units were deployed to aid in the Vietnamese struggle. Not since the Second World War had the need for the Seabees been so great and not since Korea had Seabees worked under enemy fire.

The first full Seabee battalion arrived in Vietnam on 7 May 1965 to build an expeditionary airfield for the Marines at Chu Lai. Others soon followed. From 1965 until 1969 the Seabee commitment in Southeast Asia rapidly increased, necessitating a rapid expansion of the Naval Construction Force from ten understrength Mobile Construction Battalions to twenty-one. During the war, the total Seabee community grew from 9,400 in mid-1965 to 14,000 in mid-1966, to 20,000 in mid-1967 and, finally, to more than 25,000 in 1968 and 1969.

Seabee accomplishments in Vietnam were impressive. They built roads, airfields, cantonments, warehouses, hospitals, storage facilities, bunkers and other facilities that were critically needed to support the combatant forces. The mobile "search and destroy" strategy adopted by the United States during the first years of

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[4] A complete list of the Seabee Teams that served in Vietnam will be found at the end of this chapter.

the war shaped the twofold mission of the Seabees in Vietnam. In addition to the many Seabee Team activities in remote locations, construction battalions built large coastal strongholds in the I Corps Tactical Zone which embraced the northernmost provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang In, and Wuang Ngai.[5]

Fundamentally important to the effectiveness of Naval Construction Force operations in Vietnam was the harmonious relationship, based upon mutual respect, that existed between the Seabees and the Marines. This relationship continued a tradition that dated from the Second World War and its maintenance was of extreme importance since Seabees in Vietnam carried on a great deal of their construction efforts in direct support of Marine combat forces.

Naval Construction Force strength had reached its peak shortly after the beginning of the 1968 Tet offensive. During that and the following year there were more than 11,000 Seabees serving in South Vietnam. While the construction men continued to labor in the northern provinces building city-like cantonments and upgrading previously constructed facilities, the priorities of the war began to demand more and more of their skills in the south.

After responsibility for conducting the war was turned over to the South Vietnamese Government and American military operations in the north were significantly reduced, the Seabees labored to prepare the Vietnamese for the ultimate withdrawal of all American combat troops. In the Mekong Delta they built a string of coastal

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[5] For further infromation on construction accomplishments, see Chapter 10.

and riverboat bases and radar sites which would allow the Vietnamese Navy to completely take over coastal surveillance in this area of "brown water" warfare. As thousands of American troops were returning home, the Seabees continued to build. Only now, however, they built hospitals at Danang, Chu Lai, Phu Bai, Quang Tri and many other towns and villages throughout the country.[6]

When in 1970 Seabee activity drew to a close and the withdrawal of remaining units commenced, the builder-fighters had made a long and lasting contribution to the people of South Vietnam. In a war where winning the hearts of the people was an important part of the total effort, Seabee construction skills and medical assistance proved powerful weapons in the Vietnam "civic action" war. The recitation of events and the quoting of statistics fail to reveal the true nature of the Seabee's involvement during the Vietnam years. True, they supported the United States Marines at Chu Lai and Khe Sanh, reopened the railroad line between Hue and Danang, struggled with the logistics problems of the Mekong Delta, constructed a new naval base on a sand pad floating on paddy mud, and built staggering quantities of warehouses, aircraft support facilities, roads, and bridges. But they also hauled and dumped numerous tons of rock and paving on roads that provided access to farms and markets, supplied fresh water to countless numbers of Vietnamese through hundreds of Seabee-dug wells, provided medical treatment to thousands of villagers, and opened up new opportunities and hope

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[6] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

for generations to come through Seabee-built schools, hospitals, utilities systems, roads and other community facilities. Seabees also worked with and taught construction skills to the Vietnamese people, helping them to help themselves and proving that the Seabees really were "builders for peace."[7]

The rapid expansion of the Naval Construction Force which began in 1965 was a major challenge to the Command. A vast increase in Group VIII and Civil Engineer officer personnel was necessary if this expansion were to take place successfully. In May 1965, there were only ten understrength Mobile Construction Battalions (each with 300-500 men). These battalions were subsequently augmented to 750 men each (by adding a heavy construction company) and an additional nine new battalions were created.[8] In 1968, the calling-up of two Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions raised total active battalion strength to twenty-one, manned by more than 25,000 officers and men.[9]

These battalions served the construction needs of United States forces in Vietnam on a rotating basis until 7 November 1971, when Mobile Construction Battalion 5, the last battalion in Vietnam, departed.

In its growth, the command structure of the Naval Construction Force paralleled the increase in the number of battalions. Commands

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[7] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Information sheet dated 19 March 1968 from NAVFAC Military Readiness Program, Code 06.

larger than battalions were created in Vietnam. The Thirtieth and Thiry-second Naval Construction Regiments were established in 1965 and 1967 respectively and were components of the Third Naval Construction Brigade. In late spring of 1966, regiments were also established at each of the three Construction Battalion Centers to exercise control over the battalions in homeport as well as to provide training and other necessary services. A command structure such as this, with regiments and brigades, had not been seen since the height of the Second World War.[10]

Specialized Units

Besides the Mobile Construction Battalions, the Naval Construction Force also included a number of other types of units. These included Amphibious Construction Battalions, Construction Battalion Maintenance Units, Construction Battalion Units, a special Antarctic Construction Battalion Unit, a State Department Naval Support Unit, and Seabee Teams.

Amphibious Construction Battalions 1 and 2 operated under the Pacific and Atlantic Amphibious Force Commanders respectively from homeports at Coronado, California and Little Creek, Virginia. Elements of the Western Pacific Detachment of Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 took part in the initial Marine landings in Vietnam in 1965 as well as in subsequent amphibious operations in that country. Meanwhile Amphibious Construction Battalion 2 participated

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[10]Information from CDR T. H. Oswald, Jr., NAVFAC Military Readiness Program, Code 063.

in operations and exercises in the Mediterranean and Caribbean, including construction work in the Dominican Republic during the crisis there in 1965.

The first Construction Battalion Maintenance Units (CBMUs) were organized in the autumn of 1942. These units were formed to maintain public works and public utilities and operate power plants, utility distributing systems, and transportation equipment at advance naval operating bases. At the close of the war, all such units were disestablished. One CBMU was established during the Korean War, but was disestablished shortly after the end of that conflict. No CBMUs were active prior to the Vietnamese War. However, this conflict once again generated a need for such units and two were established in 1967.[11] One of these units was subsequently disestablished in 1970; the other was still active at the end of 1974.[12]

The Construction Battalion Units were small construction units (40-50 men) organized and equipped along the lines of a regular battalion. To meet contingency situations, these units could be mobilized and combined either as a nucleus for new units

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[11] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[12] A complete list of Naval Construction Force Units active during the years 1965-74 will be found at the end of this chapter. (Excluding Seabee Teams and Underwater Construction Teams.

or to augment existing units. The first of some eighteen of these units was established in 1969. The Construction Battalion Units have primarily been used in the Navy's Self-Help and Shore Establishment Habitability Program, about which more will be said later in this chapter.[13]

Construction Battalion Unit 201 was commissioned in June 1966 to perform construction activities in the Antarctic from its homeport at the Construction Battalion Center, Davisville, Rhode Island. After five years of such service, this unit was disestablished in 1971. The State Department Naval Support Unit was established by agreement between the Navy and State Department in July 1966. It provided construction surveillance and minor repairs in security areas of various foreign service buildings around the world.[14]

As tension mounted in Southeast Asia during the 1960s, the Seabees first returned[15] to that area in the form of thirteen-man teams that were capable of performing a great variety of tasks. The Seabee Team represented a new concept in the use of Naval Construction Force personnel. Each team consisted of a Civil Engineer Corps officer, eleven enlisted construction men, and a hospital corpsman. Although small in size, these units possessed

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[13] Navy Civil Engineer Special Report: Seabees Ashore/Self-Help. (Jul-Aug 1971), p. 2.

[14] Civil Engineer Biweekly Report, No. 18-66 (18 Aug 1966).

[15] Seabees first entered Vietnam in 1954 to build refugee camps and landing facilities in support of the "Passage to Freedom" effort which saw approximately 800,000 Vietnamese relocate from North to South Vietnam. They were in Vietnam again in 1956 to conduct a 1,800 mile road survey.

unique capabilities never before assembled in such compact but highly effective and versatile packages. These Seabee Teams, sometimes referred to as the Navy's "Peace Corps," sought to help the rural population of new or underdeveloped countries help themselves by providing training, lending technical assistance, and performing actual construction jobs.[16]

In 1963, Seabee Teams were sent to Thailand to assist in the Royal Thai Government's Accelerated Rural Development Program. In the northern provinces these diversified units taught and advised local Thais in an effort to help them form the cadre of essential rural public works organizations. Three years of diligent work in this region was finally concluded in May of 1966.

In early November of 1966, the Seabee Team Program in Thailand shifted from rural development to the Thai Border Patrol Police Program for the development of remote area security. The program's underlying aim was to win village support for the government in regions continually plaqued by communist insurgency. Before the termination of all Seabee Team efforts in Thailand in 1969, these skilled units had made significant progress toward achieving this goal.[17]

Also in 1963, two years before the first full Seabee battalion arrived, Seabee Teams were already laboring in South Vietnam.[18]

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[16] COMCBPAC Report, Special Edition: Seabee Teams (Jul 1968).

[17] Ibid.

[18] A list of Seabee Teams in Vietnam will be found at end of this chapter.

They busied themselves constructing small support points throughout interior South Vietnam to counter Viet Cong political influence in the villages. Demonstratable successes in constructing United States Army Special Forces camps, performing civil action tasks, and conducting military engineering projects under the Civil Irregular Defense Group Program, won the still experimental Seabee Teams long-range support.

Seabee Team activity in South Vietnam continued to mushroom. Generally working in remote rural areas, away from large population centers, they served throughout twenty-two provinces scattered from the Mekong Delta, along the Cambodian border and the central highlands, to the North Vietnamese border. In the early years only two teams at one time were employed in these regions, but by 1969 this number had grown to seventeen.[19]

Seabee Team accomplishments were many and varied. The United States Army Special Forces, who were engaged in training and advising Vietnamese Strike Forces and the Civilian Irregular Defense Group in anti-guerrilla fighting and defense tactics, required fortified camps in advance areas able to withstand recurring ground and mortar attacks. Besides constructing these special camps, Seabee Teams were called upon to build access roads and nearby tactical airstrips. Further, in South Vietnamese hamlets and villages, teams devoted much effort to carrying out numerous civil action projects. From training local inhabitants

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[19] COMCBPAC Report, Special Edition: Seabee Teams (Jul 1968).

in basic construction skills to providing desperately needed medical assistance, Seabee Teams made a significant impact on the Vietnamese populace.

While they were primarily builders and teachers, Seabee Teams were in some instances directly involved in battle. Perhaps the most significant instance occurred in June of 1965 at Dong Xoai, fifty-five miles northeast of Saigon. When Vietnam Cong troops overran a Special Forces Camp containing 400 South Vietnamese and allied Asian troops, eleven men of the United States Army Special Forces, and nine members of Seabee Team 1104, seven of the Seabees were wounded and two of them killed. One of the dead was CMA3 Marvin G. Shields who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicious gallantry in carrying a critically wounded man to safety and in destroying a Viet Cong machine gun emplacement at the cost of his life. Not only was he the first Seabee to win the nation's highest award, but he was also the first Navy man to be so decorated for action in Vietnam.

Beginning in 1970 Seabee Teams departed from South Vietnam without relief. This initiated a phasedown program which corresponded to United States troop withdrawals. Finally, on 18 April 1972, the last Seabee Team site located in Ham Tan, Binh Tuy Province, was closed. Although these unusual units were physically gone, the benefits resulting from their unique assistance to the inhabitants of Southeast Asia remained.[20]

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[20] COMCBPAC Special Edition: Seabee Teams (Jul 1968); Richard Tregaskis, Southeast Asia: Building the Bases (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 436.

The Post-Vietnam Era

When de-escalation of United States activity in Southeast Asia got underway, Seabee strength was once again reduced. By September 1970, the Mobile Construction Battalions were down to the planned post-Vietnam level of ten full-sized battalions. Because of the reduction of the Naval Construction Force in Vietnam, on 8 December 1969, the headquarters of the Thirtieth Naval Construction Regiment was moved from Vietnam to Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands, and on 1 May 1971 the headquarters of the Thirty-second Naval Construction Regiment was moved from Vietnam to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. By the end of 1971 most Seabees were employed outside of Southeast Asia. Thus, on 9 November 1971, the Third Naval Construction Brigade was disestablished.[21]

As the Seabees entered this new era, they found themselves employed on major peacetime projects which had been deferred or neglected because of wartime priorities. Alert battalions were reestablished in the Atlantic Fleet at Roosevelt Roads in Puerto Rico and in the Pacific Fleet at Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands. The men of the Naval Construction Force found themselves employed outside their homeport fleet areas. No geographical limitations existed as battalions and details were deployed to satisfy the current and ever-increasing demand for Seabee expertise. For example, since the re-establishment of the alert battalions, one

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[21] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

battalion, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4, served in 1970 as the Pacific alert battalion at Okinawa and in 1972 as the Atlantic alert battalion at Roosevelt Roads.

The post-Vietnam Seabees were involved in new construction frontiers: the Indian Ocean, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Europe, on the ocean floor, and in most of the oceans of the globe. Through younger and fewer in number than their Second World War predecessors, Seabees continued to demonstrate the same old "Can Do" spirit.

One of the major peacetime projects undertaken by Seabees after Vietnam was the development, construction, and operation of a United States Naval Communications Station on Diego Garcia.[22] Diego Garcia is one of the fifty-two coral atolls of the Chagos Archipelago in the Indian Ocean, 960 miles south of India and seven degrees south of the equator. Construction was started early in 1971, and the establishment ceremonies were held on 20 March 1973. The station became a complete operating entity and included transmitting and receiver facilities; berthing and mess facilities; an airfield to accomodate logistic aircraft; utilities roads, shops and other support facilities; a fuel storage farm; and an entrance channel and turning basin within the interior lagoon.[23]

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[22] See Chapter 10 for further information on Diego Garcia construction.

[23] "Deployment information: Diego Garcia," NAVFAC Construction Program, Code 052PJ; cf. Master Plan for U.S. Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia (Feb 1975).

Other projects on which Seabees worked in the early 1970s included the upgrading of recreational and living facilities at the Naval Communications Station, Maki, Greece. There they built a radio facility; improved the base swimming pool; built tennis courts, and a softball field; constructed an addition to the enlisted men's club; and remodeled the barracks. At the Naval Facility, Souda Bay, Island of Crete, Seabees built an open storage facility, a pipe and canvas enclosure and a helicopter pad. In Sigonella, Sicily, at the Naval Air Facility they installed diesel units and "no break" generators, and remodeled barracks and the general mess.[24] In Spain the Seabees worked on a number of projects at the Rota Naval Station. These projects included remodeling barracks and the enlisted men's club and building additions to the base telephone exchange and warehouse. They also reconstructed the Rota Seabee Camp which had deteriorated because it had been vacant from 1965 until 1971. In London, England, Seabees remodeled a Marine barracks; in Greenock, Scotland, they built a bowling alley; and at the Naval Security Group Activity, Todendorf, Germany, they built an addition to an operations building and installed a new emergency generator.[25]

In the Pacific, the major efforts of the Seabees were centered on Okinawa in the Ryukyu Islands and on Guam in the Mariana Islands. At Okinawa they carried out many different and challenging assignments. The jobs included new structures at Camp Kinser, a new

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[24] "NMCB Status Report," Naval Civil Engineer (Fall 1973), p. 7

[25] Ibid.

water pipeline, a modern underground electrical distribution system and a major land grading project at the Marine Corps Air Facility at Futema. On Guam Seabees were hard at work on a Seabee camp. The camp, dedicated to William Lee Covington, a young Civil Engineer Corps officer killed in Vietnam, included approximately thirty-nine pre-engineered buildings, housing facilities, offices, shops, a galley, living quarters, a chapel, and utilities.[26] Seabees in Taiwan worked on the rehabilitation of barracks and on the construction of duplex cabins. At Iwakuni, Japan they worked on a Marine Corps confinement facility, an exchange warehouse, and a water line. In the Philippines they constructed an aircraft rinse rack and runway support facilities.

The Seabees were also active in Antarctica, both during and after the Vietnamese War. As part of Operation Deepfreeze, they provided logistic support for the scientific research programs that were being conducted by seventy American universities, government agencies, and industrial firms. The return of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 71 from Antarctica in 1974 marked the end of Seabee participation in Operation Deepfreeze. The National Science Foundation, which oversaw the program, was to accomplish all remaining construction by contract.[27]

In addition to the work performed by the Mobile Construction Battalions, the Amphibious Construction Battalions were also

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[26] COMSERVPAC Information Bulletin (Sep 1971).

[27] See Chapter 10 for further information on Deepfreeze.

extensively employed. Both of the amphibious battalions were engaged primarily with fleet exercies and other training operations. Additionally, amphibious Seabees in the Pacific Fleet found time to accomplish earthwork for a canoe lagoon and a camping area at Imperial Beach, California, to place and remove concrete obstacles in South Bay for Underwater Demolition Teams and Sealab training, and to complete the first increment of a sheet pile bulkhead project. Meanwhile, Seabees of the Atlantic Fleet constructed a boat marina at the Little Creek Amphibious Base.[28]

Furthermore, detachments of the amphibious Seabees served in the Mediterranean and in the Caribbean. These detachments belonged to the amphibious ready groups that were prepared for amphibious assaults wherever and whenever necessary.

In June 1969, the first Seabee Team to be employed by the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands landed at Moen Island in the Truk District. While the concept of civic action was not new to the Seabees, the Micronesian environment was totally different from that of Thailand and Vietnam where the thirteen-man Seabee Teams had proven so successful.[29]

The Trust Territory was a United Nations strategic trust administered by the United States under a 1947 agreement. While

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[28] CEC Biweekly Report (23 Oct 1973);cf. Navy Civil Engineer, (Fall --1973), p. 7.

[29] Navy Civil Engineer (Fall --1970); p. 16; Navy Civil Engineer (Spring 1973), p. 24 and (March 1970), p. 33.

the area was not war-torn of threatened as was the case in Vietnam and Thailand, the Trust Territory was in an embryonic stage or threatened political and economic development.

Under an agreement between the Secretaries of the Interior and Defense, and at a specific request of the native people at each location, Seabee Teams were provided to assist the Micronesians in constructing facilities, roads, and utilities required to enhance the economic development and improve health conditions in the Trust Territory. While construction of such facilities provided tangible evidence of Seabee accomplishments in Micronesia, the major emphasis and greatest potential benefit was the valuable training in construction skills that was made available to the people of Micronesia. This training enabled them to accomplish essential construction themselves.[30]

Seabee Teams in the Trust Territory served in the districts of Ponape, Truk, Palau, Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands, and Yap. The teams built roads, dispensaries, water tanks, bridges, and public buildings. The response of the Micronesian people to the civic action program was highly favorable. The tangible benefits were readily apparent in the improved roads, utilities and new facilities.[31]

In the summer of 1972, a Seabee Team, with assistance from an Amphibious Construction Battalion, assembled an Ammi pontoon

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[30] Navy Civil Engineer (Fall 1970), p. 16; Navy Civil Engineer (Spring 1973), p. 24 and (March 1970), p. 33.

[31] Ibid.

hospital barge on Lake Titicaca high in the central plateau of Bolivia. The project was sponsored by the Bolivian Navy with assistance from the United States government. The barge was a ninety foot by twenty-eight foot Ammi pontoon with a prefabricated Lewis building superstructure that served as a dispensary. It was powered by two diesal outboard motors and contained all the basic medical and dental facilities of a small hospital.[32]

In the mid-1960s, increased interest in exploitation of the ocean for defense purposes spotlighted the need to establish an underwater construction capability within the Navy. A team of Seabee divers was formed during 1968 to launch, implant, and recover the Tektite I habitat in the Caribbean Sea. The success of this operation led to additional Seabee underwater construction assignments. It also led to the establishment of two Seabee underwater construction teams: Underwater Construction Team 1 under the cognizance of the Twenty-first Naval Construction Regiment at Davisville, Rhode Island and Underwater Construction Team 2 under the cognizance of the Thirty-first Naval Construction Regiment at Port Hueneme, California.[33]

After their formation, both teams performed successfully in numerous operations, including the installation, maintenance, and repair of submarine cables and pipelines; the placement

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[32] CEC Biweekly Report (26 Sep 72).

[33] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

recovery of moorings and acoustic and magnetic systems; underwater surveys; and harbor and dry dock inspections. The teams demonstrated a capability to perform, and they added dimension to the Naval Construction Force capability, for the most part previously restricted to efforts on land.[34]

In 1970, the Chief of Naval Operations, desiring to improve the quality of life ashore for the Navy man and his family, established a new program for the improvement of shore establishment habitability. He then assigned the Seabees to participate in the new Self-Help and Shore Establishment Habitability Improvement Program.

Under this program, active and reserve fleet Seabees and Construction Battalion Units participated in improvement to personnel support facilities. The Construction Battalion Units consisted of approximately forty or fifty men each and were established to provide more effective and worthwhile duty for Seabees while stationed ashore. In addition to training on construction projects and maintaining the Seabee's combat and disaster recovery readiness, the units guided and supervised the efforts of other Navy ratings in improving the sailor's living conditions ashore under the self-help concept.[35]

Examples of projects to improve living conditions ashore range from very simple bus shelters to large hobby shop complexes.

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[34] CEC Biweekly Report (13 Mar 73).

[35] Naval Civil Engineer (Fall 1970), p. 3.

Other typical examples included improvements to living facilities, temporary lodgings, parking garages, on-base parking, mobile home parks, locker clubs, and recreation clubs.

Special care was taken to make sure that the Construction Battalion Units doing Self-Help construction did not in any way come into competition with private industry. The principle of Seabee non-competition with private industry, originally established by Admiral Ben Moreell,[36] was still very much in effect.

In late 1973, as part of the Navy's effort to realign the naval shore establishment, the mission of the Naval Construction Battalion Center at Davisville, Rhode Island was revised. The center was reduced to providing storage and preservation facilities for advance base and mobilization stocks, and to providing mobilization facilities to support the Naval Construction Force.

At the peak of the Vietnam War, the Davisville Center supported ten full strength battalions. However, by 1973, the center was home port for only three battalions of peacetime strength and one Underwater Construction Team. In addition, the Twenty-first Naval Construction Regiment[37] was located there.

On 30 June 1974, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 71 was transferred to the Naval Construction Battalion Center at Gulfport, Mississippi; Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40 was transferred

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[36]Telecon with CDR T. H. Oswald Jr., NAVFAC Military Readiness Program, Code 063, of Nov 1975.

[37]Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

to the Naval Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme, California; and Underwater Construction Team 1 was transferred to the Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek, Virginia. Later in the year, on 27 November, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1 was transferred to the Gulfport Center. The last unit of the Naval Construction Force at Davisville was the Twenty-first Naval Construction Regiment. The regiment was disestablished there on 15 January 1975.

In the meantime, by the end of 1974, there were three regiments, ten Mobile Construction Battalions, two Amphibious Construction Battalions, two Underwater Construction Teams, and one Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit on active duty.[38]

The Thirty-first Naval Construction Regiment at Port Hueneme, California, was responsible for the operational control of the battalions that made Port Hueneme their homeport. These battalions were Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 3, 4, 5, 10, and 40. The regiment was also responsible for Underwater Construction Team 2.

The Twentieth Naval Construction Regiment at Gulfport, Mississippi, was responsible for the operational control of the battalions that made their homeport in Gulfport. These battalions were Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 1, 62, 71, 74, and 133.[39]

Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 and Underwater Construction Team 1 were located at the Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek, Virginia, and Amphibious Construction Battalion 1 had its homeport at the Naval Amphibious Base in Coronado, California.

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[38] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[39] Ibid.

Construction Battalion Mainteanance Unit 302 was permanently assigned to the Public Works Department of the Naval Base at Subic Bay, Philippine Islands.

Furthermore, the Thirtieth Naval Construction Regiment had its headquarters on Guam in the Mariana Islands. It was responsible for the operations of the construction battalions while they were employed in the western Pacific Ocean area. The regiment was also responsible for the Seabee Teams when they were employed in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.[40]

Personnel and Training

The rapidity and nature of the Naval Construction Force build-up for Vietnam called for extraordinary measures. Reflecting the technical nature of its mission, a Mobile Construction Battalion's allowance called for a disproportionate number of skilled petty officers. In the early stages of the Vietnam build-up, an acute shortage of petty officers developed. To meet this shortage, promotions were speeded up, shore rotation was temporarily suspended, shore assignments were shortened, and school quotas were greatly increased. When these expedients proved inadequate to meet the need, the Second World War procedure of direct procurement of petty officers from skilled civilian occupations was revived.[41]

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[40] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[41] CAPT Van Leer's comments to EFD CDR's re DPPO Escalation (06 to EFDs on DPPO) 1968. Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

The initial direct procurement program proved to be a great success; in the first half of 1966 it netted approximately 5,000 skilled construction workers who, within five weeks of processing and training at Davisville, Rhode Island, became first, second, or third class petty officers. The program was reconstituted, on a more modest scale, in fiscal year 1968 with training moved to Gulfport.[42]

The program was continued successfully during the following two years. Despite the positive results of the program, the shortage of skilled petty officers was still an acute problem in 1971. Some Group VIII petty officers rates were still less than 50 percent manned. To help meet these manpower shortages, the Navy instituted a new Direct Procurement Petty Officer Program for Navy rates with extremely low manning levels. Six of the seven Group VIII ratings were among those selected. These rates were to remain eligible for the DPPO Program as long as they were seriously undermanned. The 1971 program differed from earlier programs in terms of enlistment, qualifications and training.[43] The program was still ongoing in 1973.

By 1967, the extraordinary demands for Group VIII personnel in Vietnam led to a serious imbalance in the Seabee billet structure.

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[42] CAPT Van Leer's comments to EFD CDR's re DPPO Escalation (06 to EFDs on DPPO) 1968 . Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[43] "Six Seabee Rates Listed in DPPO Drive," Navy Civil Engineer (Winter 1973), p. 20.

The problem lay in the lack of sufficient shore billets to provide an adequate rotation base for career petty officers who had already received the maximum exposure in Vietnam allowable under existing rotation policies. By their very nature, Seabee shore billets proved particularly vulnerable to civilian substitition. The fact that many billets had been left unfilled in order to increase manpower for Vietnam in the early stages of the build-up served to increase this vulnerability. Overmanning of battalions to provide petty officers for essential rear echelon duty with the homeport regiments aggravated the situation by increasing Vietnam exposure rates more rapidly than had been foreseen. These imbalances led to a kind of "treadmill" effect whereby non-career directly procured petty officers were relieved from active duty as soon as they had achieved maximum exposure in Vietnam. This in turn militated for continuation of the direct procurement program as long as manpower requirements in Vietnam remained high.[44]

The increase in Vietnam commitments which acted as prime mover for creation of the Direct Procurement of Petty Officers Program just discussed, necessitated a similar increase in Civil Engineer Corps strength, from 1,700 to 2,150 between 1965 and 1967.

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[44] Seabee Shore Duty Billets, CNM presentation on Group VIII; Memo to Deputy Asst. Secy of Defense (Properties and Installations), Subj: SEABEE Rotation Policy. Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

The major source of these additional officers was Officer Candidate School. Though Corps strength had leveled out temporarily at least by 1967, the obligated service of the 1965 OCS inputs was expiring. As a result, the then annual 200-250 new CEC officer input remained a continuing need throughout 1968 and 1969.

Although OCS largely met the needs for CEC officer augmentation for Vietnam, a direct procurement program for Lieutenants and Lieutenant Commanders was established in 1967. However this program only furnished a handful of officers.[45] A shortage of mid-level officer personnel led to an accelerated promotion program for CEC officers in fiscal 1967 and again in 1968. Civilianization of a number of junior officer billets also caused concern for the future structure of the Corps.[46] The Civil Engineer Corps Officers School expanded and speeded up its operation to provide training for the influx of new CEC officers.

The influx of Group VIII personnel to meet construction requirements in Vietnam brought with it the need for greatly expanded training facilities and programs. Group VIII training was carried out at the Construction Battalion Centers. In 1965 this training was being given primarily at the Port Hueneme Center, but as the

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[45] Memo from NAVFAC 06111 to NAVFAC 06 of 4 Oct 1967. Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[46] Infogram from NAVFAC 061 (1968). Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

war enlarged, the Davisville Center began to increase its training mission and in 1967 the Gulfport center also began to provide training.[47]

Developments at the Naval Schools, Construction, at Port Hueneme evidenced the marked increase in training tempo. Enrollment rose from 1,892 students in 1965 to 5,906 students in 1966, then dropped somewhat to 4,767 in 1967. The highest student muster figure for the same years reflected the same pattern with totals of 535, 1,614, and 1,258, while the highest staff muster figures ran to 172, 332, and 292 for the three successive years. In addition to the formal A, B, C school enrollment covered by these figures the schools contributed a total of 4,746 man-hours to special (individual) Seabee training in 1965 and 9,166 and 13,361 respectively in the two succeeding years.[48]

At Davisville, a similar expansion of training effort occurred, accompanied on September 1966 by the disestablishment of the Construction Training Unit and its redesignation as United States Naval Schools Construction, under a commanding officer. Davisville also provided the site for the five week training and indoctrination given the men enlisted in the 1966 Direct Procurement of Petty Officers Program. Because of overcrowding at Davisville and more favorable conditions at the Gulfport Construction Battalion Center, direct

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[47] "Presentation: Seabee System Conference," Port Hueneme (Feb 1969); "Seabee Training" (1968). Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[48] Ibid.

procurement training shifted to the latter in 1967. A Construction Training Unit, established for that purpose, conducted the training at Gulfport.

Beginning in 1966 a crew training program began at Port Hueneme and Davisville. Administered by the respective homeport regiments, crew training provided the battalions with experience in working on projects aimed at developing teamwork capabilities in the same organic sub-groupings or work teams employed in actual operations in the field.

Training potential continued to expand during 1967 and 1968, producing even greater numbers of trained officers and men to meet the needs of the Vietnam War. By the early 1970s, the situation had changed. The end of United States involvement in the war led to a normalization of training procedures. A major change took place in 1974 when the Naval Schools, Construction at the Davisville Construction Battalion Center were disestablished as a result of the reduction at that activity. Their functions were subsequently transferred to the Port Hueneme and Gulfport centers. Effective 1 July 1974 the schools at these two centers were redesignated Naval Construction Training Centers.[49]

A new and sophisticated method of personnel management for the Seabees began to take shape in 1967 -- the Personnel Readiness

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[49] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme; Telecon with Mr. W. L. Conrad, Naval Construction Training Center, CBC, Port Hueneme, Code N1 of 24 Feb 1976.

Capability Program. The program was developed and first implemented by the Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, Atlantic Fleet. The program established a computerized inventory of data concerning skills and other personnel characteristics for each man in the Atlantic Seabee Force. Originally addressed to mobilizing data concerning available skills in relation to those required for the purpose of determining the types and quantities of training needed to meet a given situation, the program could be expanded to cover the analysis and prediction of other personnel support requirements as well.

At the end of 1967, action to generalize the system in this way and apply it to the rest of the Naval Construction Force and incorporate it as a sub-program in the STINGER System was well underway.[50]

The purpose of the program was to make sure that each battalion would have the skills capability to meet fleet requirements. After its adoption by the Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, Atlantic Fllet, it was also subsequently implemented by the Commander, Naval Construction Battalions, Pacific Fleet. Unfortunately the system as implemented lacked uniformity, since COMCBLANT and COMCBPAC had different definitions and titles for the various Seabee skill levels involved.[51]

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[50] "Personnel Readiness Capability Program," NAVFAC Headquarters. Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

[51] Interview with Mr. P. J. Doyle, Civil Engineer Support Office, CBC, Port Hueneme, Code 1571, Nov 1975.

In 1969 the problem was solved when the Personnel Readiness Capability Program became a Civil Engineer Support Office responsibility. At that time a standardized set of definitions and titles was developed for the whole Naval Construction Force, both active and reserve. In 1972 the whole system was computerized.

Under the program, each Group VIII rating had several skill levels (up to three). These were levels of proficiency within that rating and had nothing to do with the individual's rate. In the Command's construction schools, courses were taught to qualify individuals for the various skill levels. COMCBLANT and COMCBPAC required that each battalion have certain numbers of men qualified at certain skill levels. Both these requirements and the definition of the various skill levels continually evolved, so that the number of men enrolled in school courses and the curricula of the courses themselves changed as battalion requirements, based upon the tasks assigned, also changed.[52]

Another major personnel program that the Command was involved in during the years 1965-74 was the Navy Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP). This program was initiated on a Navy-wide basis in 1965 to determine, by means of a statistical surveying system, what personnel in the field were doing in their work assignments. The results were to be used as feed-back to Navy training programs, so that they might adjust their curricula to meet actual work situations encountered in the field.

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[52] Doyle Interview.

The Command participated in the program from its inception. In 1973, the Civil Engineer Support Office assumed responsibility for the Command's part of this program. The surveys themselves were conducted in the field by survey teams who visited each Naval Construction Force unit. The first such survey was conducted by the Command in 1973, the second was carried out in 1975.[53]

During the period in question, manpower shortages were an acute problem. One method for alleviating these shortages was the Department of Defense's "Project 100,000" which was inaugerated in October 1966. Under this program the Navy was to allow a certain percentage of its enlistees to come from applicants who would normally be rejected for medical reasons or because their mental test scores were too low. From October to September of 1966, 15 percent of enlistees were to be from these categories. The percentage was gradually to increase with successive years, reaching 18 percent 1968. The Seabee's share of these enlistees was to be 650 in 1966, and 950 in 1967. In actuality, there were only 40 the first year and 250 the second. To catch up, the Chief of Naval Operations directed that 1,713 be enlisted as Group VIII Personnel in fiscal year 1969.[54]

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[53] Doyle Interview.

[54] "Presentation: Seabee Systems Conference," Port Hueneme (Feb 1969). Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

Reserves

During the period under study, the Reserve Program was an important part of the Command's military readiness responsibilities. Most reserve Civil Engineer Corps officers and Group VIII personnel held billets in the eighteen Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions that comprised the organized Reserve Naval Construction Force. In addition to the men in the organized reserve, there were also numerous officers and enlisted reserves who were not part of any structured, readiness-orineted reserve unit.

Prior to 1969, the Seabee Reserve was not a centralized organization. Instead the reserve battalions came under the authority of the local Naval Districts. Each Naval District generally had two Seabee Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions under its cognizance.[55]

In September of 1969, this organization was done away with and the entire Seabee Reserve Program was centralized on a nationwide basis. The eighteen Reserve Mobile Construction Battalions were henceforth organized into nine Reserve Construction Regiments and the regiments were themselves organized as a single centrally controlled unit - the First Reserve Naval Construction Brigade.[56]

For drill purposes the eighteen battalions were broken down into more than 200 Reserve Seabee Divisions. In addition to their

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[55] Telecon with CDR T. H. Oswald, Jr., NAVFAC Military Readiness Program, Code 063 , Oct 1975.

[56] Memo to Vice Chief of Naval Operations of 30 Mar 1970; "Status of Seabee Reserve Forces," CEC Association Newsletter (Mar 1971).A list of the reserve regiments and battalions will be found at the end of this chapter.

monthly drills, the divisions composing each battalion drilled together annually for two weeks as a unit.

In 1968, the Reserve Program was put to the test in Vietnam when two reserve battalions were called to active duty. The disastrous Tet Offensive of February 1968, wreaked tremendous destruction in the Republic of Vietnam. There was an urgent need for immediate reconstruction, but sufficient personnel were lacking. Thus Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions 12 and 22 were mobilized as active units in May 1968. The two battalions served one tour with distinction in Vietnam. Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 22 was deactivated on 28 March 1969 and Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 12 on 14 May 1969. Although these two battalions were the only two organized reserve units to serve in Vietnam, countless individual reserves, both officer and enlisted, volunteered for active duty with the regular battalions during the Vietnamese conflict.

In the post-Vietnamese war period, the pressure to reduce the size of the armed forces made it necessary to place greater reliance on the reserve force to offset the reduction in the active force. The reserve Seabees experienced a closer association with their active counterparts than in the past.

Efforts were made to elevate the readiness posture of the reserve Seabee force through a variety of programs. Through innovative techniques, new procedures were implemented within the reserve force.

One such program involved the establishment of permanent drill sites for the reserve battalions at military installations within their respective geographical areas. At these sites were positioned Readiness Support Allowances. These allowances consisted of essentially a ten percent cross-section of the Advanced Base Functional Component for a Mobile Construction Battalion. This allowed the reserve battalions to develop year-round training programs.

To effectively care for and utilize this readiness allowance, active duty support personnel were provided to each of the reserve battalions. The mobilization readiness level of the Reserve Naval Construction Force was improved substantially by the middle 1970s.[57]

In 1972, the Command proposed that ten 187-man Reserve Components for Mobile Construction Battalions be established. In case of an emergency such units would allow the ten active Mobile Construction Battalions of that period to go from their peace time allowance of 584 to their battle-manning allowance of 762 in the briefest possible time.[58] It was suggested that one of these reserve components be established in each continental United States Naval District, except Washington.[59]

The proposal was taken under consideration. Its implementation appeared especially desirable in view of the 1974 Secretary of

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[57] CDR F. G. Kelly, CEC, USN, "Reserve Readiness Advanced," The Naval Civil Engineer (Spring 1973), p. 24.

[58] The allowance has since changed.

[59] Ltr from Chief of Civil Engineers to CNO of 24 Oct 1972. Subj: Reserve Components of Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (RCNMCB); request for establishment of.

Defense recommendation that the eighteen reserve battalions be slashed to eight for economy reasons. Such a reduction in potentially available Seabee strength would have made it especially important to be able to immediately field wartime-strength active duty battalions. Congress disapproved the Seabee reserve force reduction and the proposal for the Reserve Components for Naval Mobile Construction Battalions was subsequently tabled.[60]

As matters eventuated, one reserve battalion was indeed phased out during this period because of manning problems. This was Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 19 (disestablished in 1974). Following the end of the draft in 1972, manning the Reserve Naval Construction Force became a matter of some concern since young men no longer saw service in the reserves as an alternative to being drafted. Unlike the active battalion, the reserve battalion had a normal strength of 762 (since it would only be used in the event of war, there was no point in having a lower peacetime strength). In some regions of the country it was difficult to keep all available billets filled. Although detrimental to manning levels, the end of draft did have a beneficial effect. It guaranteed that the motivation of the volunteers manning the battalions was of the highest order. In 1974, there were approximately 10,000 Seabee reservists.[61]

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[60] Telecon with CDR Roger Muir, CEC, USNR, Naval Ship Weapon Systems Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, Code 0730, Nov 1975.

[61] Ibid.

In 1974, a new type of unit, the augment group, was created. These units were of three types, the Public Works Augment Unit, the Construction Battalion Center Augment Unit and the Regimental Augment Unit. These units were established to provide training billets for Seabee reservists who lived in areas where the local reserve battalions had no vacant billets. In the event of war, they would augment the active duty staffs of Public Works Centers, Construction Battalion Centers and the Reserve Naval Construction Regiments.

During their training drills, Reserve Naval Construction Force personnel executed diverse construction projects in support of Navy programs and activities.

MATERIAL MANAGEMENT

The Command's Material Management Division provided policy and direction in the functional area of material management within Headquarters. It was essentially responsible for managing the Military Readiness Material Program including OPN funds and it provided direction and assistance to Command field activities in the application of material management.[62]

Prior to 1969, this division was also responsible for inventory management. In 1969 this function was transferred to the Civil Engineer Support Office at the Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme.[63]

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[62] Headquarters Organization Manual, NAVFAC P-313, Change 52 (NAVFAC Notice 5450 of 21 Nov 1972), p. 06-3.

[63] Telecon with Mr. A. DeCicco, NAVFAC Military Readiness Program, Code 06414, Nov 1975.

During the years 1965-74, this division directly participated in many Command undertakings. In 1970, it implemented the Procurement Status Reporting System (PSRS), which was a reporting system for heavy construction equipment (2C Cog).[64] It helped in the Command effort to provide housing for victims of the earthquake in Sicily during that same year. This division was also heavily involved in support for Naval Construction Force efforts on Diego Garcia. In 1973, the division instituted a new COSAL program called E-57 (a computerized program). This program was adopted by the Ship Parts Control Center. (The Center adopted it from the Civil Engineer Support Office where it was in use).[65]

Seabee Equipment

The success of the Naval Construction Force in the field depended upon the availability of proper equipment in working order. To achieve this for the forces in Vietnam entailed development and execution of policies concerned with initial outfitting of units, spare parts support, maintenance, repairs, and overhaul.

In the years immediately preceeding 1965 much thought and effort went into developing an equipment allowance for the Mobile Construction Battalion adapted to its role in both peace and war

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[64] DeCicco telecon.

[65] Ibid.

and designed to meet its need for mobility and quick response in emergencies. The basic allowance which resulted provided the means to support a battalion for ninety days under emergency conditions before resupply became necessary.[66]

The equipment allowance for a battalion formed a four million dollar package, which included automative and construction equipment, material handling equipment, weapons, communications gear, tools, shop equipment and so forth. The approximately 250 pieces of construction equipment represented some two-thirds of the total value. In addition to the standard allowance, the augment pool provided each battalion with special equipment as needed--i.e. rock crushers, quarry equipment, batch plants, etc.

At the time full-scale Vietnam operations began, equipment outfitting for the ten existing battalions was in the process of being completed.[67]

The allowance consisted of two parts. Part I was the organic equipment and material which moved with the battalion; part II contained those items which were prepositioned or turned over by a battalion to its relieving battalion. For each of the two parts of the allowance, systematic programs of inventory, inspection, and renewal were geared to the rotation of battalions into and out of Vietnam.

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[66] "The Seabee Maintenance of Equipment Story: Hardware," NAVFAC Headquarters (Feb 1968).

[67] Ibid., p. 3D.

The Supply Overhaul Assistance Program (SOAP), applied to each battalion on its return to homeport, dealt with the organic equipment of Part I. This program led to procurement actions to fill deficiencies discovered by inspection and inventory so that the battalion could return to the field fully outfitted. Naval Facilities Engineering Command procurement funds (OPN) provided for replacement of weapons and communication equipment while other fleet O&M funds paid for additional items. In practice the portion of the supply overhaul funded by the fleet suffered from delays in procurement leading to some reduction in the readiness of returned battalions. At the end of 1967, therefore, plans were underway to centrally manage the program using OPN funding. Returning battalions would simply turn in their incomplete Part I allowance and draw out a completely new one. They would thus be ready for immediate redeployment.[68] The Supply Overhaul Assistance Program was still ongoing in 1974.

Another equipment program, the Battalion Equipment Evaluation Program (BEEP), dealt with that portion of the equipment which a returning battalion left in the field (Part II). Teams composed of members of the returning battalion and specialists from the advance party of the relieving battalion conducted the evaluation under supervision of representatives from the site commander. Data generated by the evaluation program led to decisions by the

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[68] "The Seabee Maintenance of Equipment Story: Hardware" (Feb 1968).

site commander as to the necessity of repair or replacement of equipment. At the beginning of 1968 the procedures were undergoing improvements to provide for the use of standard repair/replace criteria through STINGER System Analysis.[69]

Maintainability and reliability of construction and automobile equipment under conditions faced in Vietnam offered a serious challenge. In accordance with the requirement that a battalion be capable of self-sufficiency in the field for ninety days, each battalion on deployment carried some 1,800 spare parts. The number of construction mechanics ratings was also increased when the battalions augmented from 563 to 738.[70] But under the new conditions found in Vietnam these actions were still considered inadequate and, of course, battalions completely lacked the capacity for major repair and overhaul.

Like other United States forces, the Seabees experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining the material wherewithal to do their job in the early days in Vietnam. Lack of facilities - including adequate deep-draft port facilities, inclement weather, and procurement and supply procedures which proved "negative rather than responsive" contributed to the problem. The fact that most materials had to come from the distant United States aggravated logistics difficulties still further.[71]

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[69] See below for further information on STINGER.

[70] The allowance at that time. The allowance in 1974 was 589 (peacetime) and 1082 (war).

[71] See Chapter 10 for more information on logistic problems in Vietnam.

On the eve of escalation in Vietnam, in spite of concerted efforts at improvements, equipment on hand for the battalions fell considerably short of allowances. Moreover, much of the equipment actually on hand suffered from excessive age. A massive procurement effort which began on 1 July 1967 produced an inventory of $99.5 million of A&C equipment alone with an additional $6.5 million arriving ninety days later. The total organic allowance for all equipment in fiscal year 1965 was $60 million.

From the first arrival of Seabees in Vietnam in battalion strength, the validity of construction material loomed as a critical question. COMCBPAC set about acquiring a considerable stock of general construction material, without designated end use, which was placed in a material yard at Danang under regimental control. When the establishment of a second regiment became necessary two years later, another material yard was established.[72] In 1967, arrangements were made through the Naval Supply Systems Command to provide $10 million for procurement of general construction materials at the Naval Support Activity, Danang. This material could be requested by the regiment citing military construction other project funds as appropriate.

Some loss of Mobile Construction Battalion construction capability undoubtedly occurred because of material shortages. This condition still existed as late as August 1966 but the corner

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[72] Procurement lead time was an early problem. Procurement was speeded up in 1965, and early 1966. Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks helped fill the gap.

had apparently been turned at about that time as materials began arriving in much larger quantities. A few months later, in early spring of 1967, a touring congressional subcommittee noted no significant shortages of construction materials in Vietnam. A factor, aside from improvements in procurement and the overall logistic situation in Vietnam, was the fleshing out of the Thirtieth Naval Construction Regiment in order to reduce slowness and errors in material take-off.

The Tactical Support Functional Component Program represented a new and promising extension of the functional component principle and was a response to the conditions encountered by the Naval Construction Force in Vietnam. As the war progressed and Seabee construction effort shifted away from vertical construction in major enclaves and toward line of communication construction in direct support of Marine operations in the field, the need for a supply of immediately available construction materials became increasingly clear. Tactical Support Functional Components met this quick response need for materials through special funding and supply arrangements and the development of an array of new and specially adapted components.

To increase speed of response still further, Tactical Support Functional Components were stockpiled at Danang (with back-up supplies at the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme) under control of the Third Naval Construction Brigade. Ten criteria governed issuance of materials from the stockpile. The criteria boiled down

to issuance only for urgent unforeseen requirements in direct support of tactical operations.

The program was implemented in 1967 and the Tactical Support Functional Component budget for that year came to $18 million. The following years saw budgets as high as $33 million. After the end of United States' involvement budgets declined significantly. In 1973, the program altered from providing components to simply providing facilities. The name was changed to Tactical Support Facilities Program to reflect this change.[73]

In 1968 action was started to produce a single standardized equipment package (functional component) for all the battalions -- active and reserve -- of the Naval Construction Force. Prior to 1968, the active Mobile Construction Battalion functional component (P-25A) differed from that of the reserve battalion (P-25). The difference resulted from the fact that the components were the responsibility of two different divisions of Military Readiness. The Seabee Division managed the active unit functional component, while the Material Management Division managed that of the reserve battalions.[74]

In 1968, the Civil Engineer Support Equipment responsibilities of the two divisions were consolidated and a single functional

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[73] Interview with Mr. H. C. Messer, Civil Engineer Support Office, CBC, Port Hueneme, Code 15321, Nov 1975.

[74] As the reserve battalion functional component was in storage as Prepositioned War Reserve Stock, it fell under the cognizance of the Material Management Division instead of the Seabee Division.

component (P-25) was developed for both active and reserve Seabees.[75]

In 1970, responsibility for Civil Engineer Support Equipment was transferred from Command Headquarters to the Command's newly established Civil Engineer Support Office at the Port Hueneme Construction Battalion Center.

In 1971 a conference was held on Civil Engineer Support Equipment. Participating in it were the Civil Engineer Support Office, COMCBLANT, COMCBPAC and Command Headquarters. This conference established the construction equipment requirements of the Naval Construction Force and the result was the Construction Equipment Module.

The Module consisted of a P-29 Naval Construction Regiment component, a P-31 Naval Construction Force Support Unit component and four P-25 Mobile Construction Battalion components. Henceforth modular conferences were held every other year for the purpose of updating Naval Construction Force requirements.[76]

Another development during the period 1965-74 was the Command's introduction of a new equipment inventory system, the Equipment Management System. This new system was developed and implemented during 1968 and 1969.[77]

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[75] Messer Interview.

[76] Ibid.

[77] Ibid.

THE STINGER SYSTEM

In 1966 the Command began to develop a new concept of planning and direction for the Naval Construction Force. This new concept was embodied in a system called STINGER, the acronym for Seabee Tactically Installed Navy Generated Resources. Basically the STINGER System derived from two sources: (1) an awareness of defects in the planning and execution of the transition from peace to war in Vietnam, coupled with a desire to benefit from the lessons learned in that experience,[78] and (2) realization of the need to apply systems analysis and operations research techniques to the planning and direction of the Naval Construction Force. This was especially important in view of the complex new factors involved in combat construction support in contingency situations.[79]

From the standpoint of STINGER System development, the general lesson learned in Vietnam was the difficulty and costliness of improvising a response to the demands of a contingency situation.

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[78] "A Stinger System Primer" (draft position paper, n.d.) notes that lessons learned in Vietnam provided a basic impetus to derivation of the STINGER system. A Code 06 memorandum stated, as background to the system's development, that "the Seabees have been faced with many complex problems which contributed to shortfalls in coordinating the transition from peacetime to wartime footing in Southeast Asia, particularly in the requirements area."

[79] In mid-1966 the Navy Civil Engineering Laboratory began a research project concerned with systems analysis for the Naval Construction Force. This project was the precursor of the STINGER System Analysis Office, established early in 1968 at the Port Hueneme Construction Battalion Center. Ltr from COMNAVFAC to CO, CBC, Port Hueneme of 29 Sep 1967; Memo (draft) fromNAVFAC Code 06 to NAVFAC Code 00 of 5 Sep 1967; Memo from NAVFAC Code 06 to 00B of 14 Nov 1967, enclosure.

This led to a feeling that in Vietnam the Naval Construction Force had been put in the position of reacting to events rather than acting on the basis of "anticipatory readiness."[80] For example, creation of command units (regiments and a brigade) and troop construction units and maintenance units had to be improvised under the pressure of events as did an equipment overhaul program. Advanced Base Functional Components, for various reasons, received less than optimum usage and it was felt that insufficient usage had been made of the Navy Planning and Programming System for the introduction of up-to-date construction materials, components, tools and equipment. The STINGER System approach addressed itself to correcting precisely such shortcomings as these.[81]

Early on, the Command began to study Naval Construction Force operations with a view of profiting from this experience. This study effort converged with the Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory's operations research studies in the same area to produce the STINGER system.[82]

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[80] Ibid., "The diversity of SEABEE Units and their employment, and the complex command and support chains involved, requires (sic) a system approach to this coordination responsibility;" "Seabee Tactically Installed Navy Generated Engineer Resources System," Unpaged Brochure (1 Jan 1968), p. 9.

[81] "A STINGER System Primer" (draft, n.d.).

[82] On 30 Sep 1966 COMCBPAC submitted a staff study on Mobile Construction Battalion organization and staffing which had been initiated by RADM Husband's letter of 16 Feb 1966. (Ltr from COMCBPAC letter to Chief of Civil Engineers of 30 Sep 1966.) Two and a half months later Code 06 initiated a wide-ranging study of combat construction system development.

The STINGER System approach also furnished an important by-product. It represented a "defensible analytical tool" for determining and justifying resources requirements for the Naval Construction Force and the Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks and strengthened the Command's bid to become the central manager for the Advanced Base Functional Component System.

STINGER transcended the Naval Construction Force. Therefore, it was necessary to start with a definition of Seabee operations and support in relation to the Command and support chains with which it linked up in contingency plans in the field. This definition covered plans, actions, and activities from construction requirements, through the translation of these requirements into the assets needed to meet them (fiscal support, units, troops, and engineering), to the operational aspects of actual work accomplishment, such as battalion notation schedules, spare parts provisioning and equipment overhead procedures.

Once the system had been defined, the development of a computerized simulation model contributed the next step in improved means to carry out the Command's role of coordination and management of combat construction and support. After it became fully operational the model permitted, first, identification of construction requirements and, second, analysis of the best way to structure and outfit the Naval Construction Force to meet the needs of the operational commanders. The outputs of the model included facilities requirements, material needs experienced in terms of Advanced Base Functional

Components, prepositioning requirements for Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks, as well as troop training and deployment requirements. Outputs also aided in determining new equipment needs, homeport facilities and general requirements and the need for improved construction and operational techniques. Thus STINGER replaced the "seat of the pants" techniques used in Vietnam with efficient management techniques.

By the end of 1967, the basic structures of the model had been completed in the sense that the logic of the program had been proven and an elemental program was in being. Expansion and refinement of basic data banks constituted the next major task on the way to a targeted fully operational date, set for the third quarter of fiscal year 1969.

At the same time, establishment of the STINGER System Analysis Office was underway at the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme. Creation of the new office responded to the need for providing the operational means by which NAVFAC direction and control may be exercised to further expand and utilize developed programs and computer models. Selection of Port Hueneme as the site for the office stemmed from its proximity to Naval Construction Force data sources, computer availability and the abundance of required technical talent in southern California.[83]

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[83] Ltr from COMCBPAC to Chief of Civil Engineers of 30 Sep 1966.

Although established in early 1968, the STINGER System Analysis Office only existed as a separate entity for some six months. In July 1968, the STINGER Office was merged with the Construction Battalion Center's Material Department. The new organization was called the Seabee Systems Engineering Office.[84]

In 1971, the STINGER Analysis Group was disbanded. Consequently, the Naval Construction Force model became outdated and by 1974, it was no longer in use in Naval Construction Force management.[85]

CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTERS

The Construction Battalion Centers at Port Hueneme, California, Gulfport, Mississippi, and Davisville, Rhode Island, functioned as the primary logistic support points for the Naval Construction Force during the period under consideration.[86] Through their various departments, the three centers provided technical, supply, administrative and engineering expertise. In addition, the centers provided storage and outloading port services to other activities of the Armed Forces and host support to various tenant activities. Finally, they acted as the primary stock point for material under the inventory management of the Command.[87]

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[84]The name of this office was later changed to Civil Engineer Support Office. This office will be discussed fully in Chapter 5.

[85]Telecon with Mr. W. C. Richardson, CBC, Port Hueneme, Code 25A1. After 1971, the only portion of the model still in use was that part which dealt with officer promotions.

[86]The Davisville Center experienced a mission change in 1974 of which more will be said below.

[87]NAVFAC Instruction 5450.86A of 26 Jun 1972.

Specifically, the center's responsibilities vis-à-vis the Naval Construction Force called for the provision of general logistic support for active duty and reserve Naval Construction Force units. This included the maintenance and overhaul of their automotive and construction equipment allowances, and the procurement, handling, packing and shipping of construction and general support materials requisitioned by Naval Construction Force units located overseas. The centers were also responsible for receiving, storing, maintaining and issuing the Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks to the Naval Construction Force.

The centers' Advanced Base Material Support mission called for them to provide services for receipt, storage and shipment of Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks (PWRS) and Advanced Base Functional Component (ABFC) material and equipment and other items of material and equipment under the Command's cognizance including inspection, testing, maintenance and preservation. Furthermore the Command tasked the centers with the modification and conversion of equipment to bring it up to present day standards or to meet unusual conditions.[88]

The centers were also tasked with providing general logistic support to the Naval Construction Force and to all resident tenant activities. This included provision of supply services including procurement, storage, issue, disposal, and stock control of material and provisions for local issue, and operation of general messes,

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[88] NAVFAC Instruction 5450.86A of 26 Jun 1972.

and operation of clothing and small stores. Additionally, the centers had to provide administrative services, including accounting, management engineering, industrial relations, office services, security and communications.[89]

In addition to these general functions, there were certain mission support functions that were unique to each center. Until its mission reduction in 1974, the Davisville Center was largely responsible for Operation Deepfreeze and Diego Garcia support. The Gulfport Center provided Reserve Naval Construction Force active duty training. The Port Hueneme Center acted as the Port Authority for the port of Hueneme and(from 1969 and 1968)it was also responsible for supporting the Command's Facilities System Office and Civil Engineer Support Office.[90]

As mentioned above the Construction Battalion Centers provided logistic support and homeport facilities and services for units of the Naval Construction Force. Through tenant activities like the homeport regiments, Naval Construction Training Centers, Construction Training Units, and the Civil Engineer Corps Officers School, the centers provided educational, training, personnel support, and other services to units in homeport status.

The Vietnamese war naturally brought about a great expansion of activity at the centers. Taking the centers as a group, about

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[89] NAVFAC Instruction 5450.86A of 26 Jun 1972.

[90] Ibid.

a quarter of their effort in fiscal year 1966 went for naval Station type functions, i.e. supporting the Naval Construction Force, homeported ships, Operation Deep Freeze and other military support. The remaining three-quarters of their effort went for industrial type support, including 15 percent for Prepositioned War Reserve Stocks and the remainder for such activities as centralized data processing, medical and commisary support for ancillary activities and retired personnel.

In addition to formal schooling, special schooling, and crew training, battalion personnel received military and disaster recovery training during homeport stays. Military training was administered by the homeport regiments and conducted at Camp Lejeune or Camp Pendleton as appropriate while disaster recovery training was administered by the Construction Battalion Centers themselves. The fact that several different agencies conducted several kinds of training seemed to be a possibly undesirable feature of existing training arrangements, for it involved a certain amount of duplication of effort, fragmentation of responsibility, and dispersal of resources.

Port Hueneme

From 1965 onward, the Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme hummed with a level of activity unmatched since the Second World War. The number of construction battalions was increased, forcing a rapid expansion of operations. The growing workload

necessitated a dramatic increase in civilian personnel. Simultaneously, tenant organizations also underwent phenomenal growth. In 1965, the first full strength Mobile Constuction Battalions shipped out to Vietnam from Port Hueneme.[91]

The Construction Battalion Center at Port Hueneme, because of its location, served as the major logistic base for the construction program in Southeast Asia. A few statistics show the great upsurge in activity at the center in response to events in Vietnam. The number of military personnel at the center more than doubled in fiscal year 1966, the first full year of escalation. Thereafter the number of personnel held steady at just under 7,000. Civilian employment in fiscal year 1966 jumped from 2,532 to 4,756 and rose in the following year to 5,818. The number of measurement tons shipped from the port approximately tripled during calendar year 1965 and again during the calendar year 1966 before leveling off at the 600,000 level. Most heavy construction in the Republic of Vietnam was completed in 1969. Consequently there was a decrease in center activity from that year onward. Tonnage handled at Port Hueneme reached a peak of 657,824 measurement tons in 1968, and from then on it steadily decreased to a low of only 55,533 measurement tons in 1973.[92] The number of homeported Seabee battalions

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[91] History of the Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California, 1973 (OPNAV Report 5750-1), p. 5.

[92] Ibid.

also declined, from seven at the height of the war to four in 1973. Not only was the number of battalions reduced, but the strength of the remaining battalions also was subsequently reduced.

With the cessation of direct American participation in Vietnam, the Navy and the Port Hueneme Center rapidly returned to normal peacetime activity. Even before the American disengagement, reductions in operations were already underway. Employment reductions and budget cutbacks were characteristic of the Navy and the center after 1969. Although drastic cutbacks were characteristic of the postwar era, the center did not suffer as much as might have been the case.

Cutbacks in other activities resulted in new responsibilities being transferred to the Port Hueneme Center so that, in effect, the center grew at the expense of other Navy activities during the 1970s. For example in 1974 the center took over responsibility from the Davisville Center for logistically supporting Operation Deep Freeze, and logistically supporting operations on the atoll of Diego Garcia.[93]

Davisville

The Construction Battalion Center, Davisville also enjoyed a period of great activity during the second half of the 1960s. At the height of the Vietnam War, the Davisville Center was homeport

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[93] History of the Naval Construction Battalion Center, Port Hueneme, California, 1973 (OPNAV Report 5750-1), p. 6.

to ten full strength battalions. It was also a major supply point for the Naval Construction Force. It not only supported Naval Schools, Construction, but also was the location of Direct Petty Officer Procurement training during the 1966 DPPO Program.

The end of direct United States involvement in Vietnam led to a drastic decrease in activity at Davisville. By 1973, the center was homeport for only three peacetime strength battalions and one Underwater Construction Team.

In October 1973, as a result of an overall Navy effort to realign the shore establishment with programmed reductions of fleet operating units, the Construction Battalion Center at Davisville's mission was to be reduced by June 1975 to that of providing storage and preservation facilities for advanced base and mobilization stocks and to provide mobilization facilities to support the Naval Construction Force. The Mobile Construction Battalions and the functions that supported them were transferred to the Construction Battalion Centers at Gulfport and Port Hueneme and to the Naval Station at Norfolk, Virginia.[94]

On 30 June 1974, one of three remaining battalions was transferred to the Gulfport Center. A second battalion was transferred to the Port Hueneme Center and the Underwater Construction Team was transferred to the Naval Amphibious Base at Little Creek

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[94] "U. S. Naval Construction Battalion, Davisville, R. I." NAVFAC Hqs Code 0653. For information on the units stationed at each Center and their redistribution after the mission reduction at Davisville, see pp. 889-890 of this chapter.

Virginia. On 27 November 1974, the last battalion at Davisville was transferred to the Gulfport Center. By June 1975, the reduction in activity at the Davisville Center was complete.[95]

Gulfport

The great expansion of Construction Battalion Center facilities during the Vietnamese War was probably most important for the Gulfport Center. Prior to 1966, the Gulfport Center operated on a very limited basis as a material storage and shipping center.[96]

The military build-up in Southeast Asia created a requirement for additional Mobile Construction Battalions and, as a result, the Command, on 19 January 1966, proposed to the Chief of Naval Operations that the Gulfport Center be utilized to homeport a portion of the new requirements.[97] The Chief of Naval Operations agreed and by April 1967 the Gulfport Center was the homeport for five newly established battalions. This achievement required a rapid and extensive plant rehabilitation effort. Without the existence of the facilities at Gulfport, it was felt, the actual doubling of Seabee strength in a relatively short period would not

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[95] "U. S. Naval Construction Battalion, Davisville, R. I." NAVFAC Hqs Code 0653.

[96] Command History 1973, Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, p. 5.

[97] Ibid.

have been possible. Gulfport also served as the center for reserve battalion training and for the second year of the Direct Procurement Petty Officer training program.

On 6 June 1967, a Naval Construction Training Unit was established at Gulfport with the primary mission of training Group VIII petty officers procurred under the Direct Procurement Petty Officer Program. By the end of 1969, this unit had graduated over 5,000 DPPOs.[98]

In the early 1970s the Gulfport Center, like the other centers, suffered activity reductions. On 26 February 1971, the Direct Procurement Petty Officer training carried out in the Construction Training Unit was terminated.[99] By 1973, the number of battalions homeported at the Gulfport Center had dropped to three.

In 1974, the Gulfport Center expanded its activities when it acquired some of the mission responsibilities of the Davisville Center. Two Mobile Construction Battalions and some functions of the Davisville Naval Schools, Construction were transferred to Gulfport. These functions combined with those of the Construction Training Unit.[100]

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[98] Command History 1973, Naval Construction Battalion Center, Gulfport, p. 9

[99] Ibid., p. 31.

[100] Record Group 1, NAVFAC Archives, CBC, Port Hueneme.

DISASTER PREPAREDNESS

The Command's Military Readiness Program was also responsible for disaster preparedness. It coordinated the administration of disaster preparedness programs for all naval shore activities, and provided policy guidance relating to criteria for organization, manning, training, equipment, and inspection requirements of disaster forces. Military Readiness also represented the Department of Navy in planning for joint actions, and promulgating joint action policy to shore activities.[101]

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[101] Headquarters Organization Manual, NAVFAC P-313, Change 4 (NAVFACNOTE 5450 of 5 Nov 1973), p. 06-10.

NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE UNITS

(Active during period 1965-74)

Naval Construction Brigades

Third Naval Construction Brigade

Reestablished at Danang, Vietnam (with headquarters in Saigon)	1 Jun 66
Headquarters moved to Danang, Vietnam	1 Aug 67
Disestablished	9 Nov 71

Naval Construction Regiments (NCR)

Twentieth NCR

Reestablished at Gulfport, Mississippi	1 Apr 66

Twenty-first NCR

Reestablished at Davisville, Rhode Island	1 Apr 66
Disestablished	15 Jan 75

Thirtieth NCR

Reestablished at Danang, Vietnam	10 May 65
Headquarters moved to Okinawa, R. I.	8 Dec 69
Headquarters moved Guam, M.I.	1 Sep 73

Thirty-first NCR

Reestablished at Port Hueneme, California	18 May 66

Amphibious Construction Battalions (ACB)

Unit	Established	Status	Places Served
ACB 1	Oct 50	Active	Alaska, Japan, Korea, Vietnam
ACB 2	Oct 50	Active	Ascension Island, Dominican Republic, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Lebanon, Puerto Rico, Spain

Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB)

Unit	Established	Status	Places Served
NMCB 1	Aug 49	Active	Antarctica, Bermuda, Costa Rica, Cuba, Morocco, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico, Spain, Vietnam, Virgin Islands, Diego Garcia, Trust Territories of the Pacific, Alaska, Guam
NMCB 3	Jul 50	Active	Alaska, Chi Chi Jima, Guam, Hawaii, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Yap, Japan, Taiwan, Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia
NMCB 4	Feb 51	Active	Bahama Islands, Bermuda, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Morocco, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico, Scotland, Spain, Trinidad, Vietnam, Okinawa, Panama, Greece, Sicily, United Kingdom, Andros Island, Vieques, Guam, Diego Garcia

Unit	Established	Status	Places Served
NMCB 5	Mar 51	Active	Alaska, Eniwetok, Guam, Hawaii, Midway, Okinawa, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Japan, Taiwan, Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia
NMCB 6	Apr 51	Disestablished 17 Nov 69	Antarctica, Antigua, Bermuda, Cuba, Greece, Morocco, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico, Spain, Vietnam
NMCB 7	Aug 51	Disestablished 31 Aug 70	Barbados, Cuba, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Morocco, Sicily, Newfoundland, Puerto Rico, Scotland, Spain, Trinidad, Vietnam
NMCB 8	Sep 51 Reestablished Nov 60	Disestablished Jun 55 Disestablished 20 Dec 69	Antarctica, Bermuda, Cuba, Greece, Morocco, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Spain, Turkey, Vietnam
NMCB 9	Aug 52	Disestablished	Alaska, Guam, Hawaii, Kwajalein, Marcus Island, Midway, Okinawa, Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam
NMCB 10	Oct 52	Active	Alaska, Anguar, Antarctica, Canton Island, Guam, Midway, Kwajalein, Okinawa, Saipan, Philippines, Ulithi, Vietnam, Japan, Hawaii, Greece, Morocco, Crete, Diego Garcia, United Kingdom, Italy, Sicily, Germany, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Panama, Bermuda, Newfoundland

Unit	Established	Status	Places Served
NMCB 11	Jul 53	Disestablished 20 Dec 69	Alaska, Guam, Kwajalein, Midway, Okinawa, Philippines, Vietnam
RNMCB 12	Activated May 68	Deactivated 14 May 69	Vietnam
RNMCB 22	Activated May 68	Deactivated 28 Mar 69	Vietnam
NMCB 40	Feb 66	Active	Vietnam, Diego Garcia, Guam, Hawaii, Philippines, Taiwan, Spain, Okinawa, Puerto Rico
NMCB 53	Jul 67	Disestablished 10 Dec 67	Vietnam
NMCB 58	Mar 66	Disestablished 17 Nov 67	Vietnam
NMCB 62	Jul 66	Active	Vietnam, Puerto Rico, Diego Garcia, Guam, Spain
NMCB 71	Oct 66	Active*	Vietnam, Cuba, Antarctica, Diego Garcia, Andros Island, Bermuda, Puerto Rico
NMCB 74	Dec 66	Active	Vietnam, Andros Island, Antigua, Cuba, Panama, Diego Garcia, Puerto Rico, Guam, Spain
NMCB 121	Feb 67	Disestablished 31 Aug 70	Vietnam

*Subsequently disestablished 30 June 1975.

Unit	Established	Status	Places Served
NMCB 128	Apr 67	Disestablished 17 Nov 69	Vietnam
NMCB 133	Jul 66	Active	Vietnam, Okinawa, Guam, Japan, Hawaii, Philippines, Greece, Morocco, Italy, Sicily, United Kingdom, Diego Garcia, Germany, Spain, Crete, Sardinia

Construction Battalion Maintenance Units (CBMU)

Unit	Established	Status	Places Served
CBMU 301	Apr 67	30 Oct 70 Inactivated	Vietnam
CBMU 302	Apr 67	Jul 67 Still Active	Vietnam, Philippines,

Construction Battalion Units (CBU)

Unit	Activated	Status	Assigned
CBU 201	Jun 66	Inactivated 7 May 71	Antarctica
CBU 401	Dec 69	Active	Public Works Center Great Lakes, Ill.
CBU 402	Jul 70	Active	Public Works Center Pensacola, Fla.
CBU 403	Jul 70	Active	U. S. Naval Academy Annapolis, Md.
CBU 404	Oct 70	Active	Naval Air Station Memphis, Tenn.

Unit	Activated	Status	Assigned
CBU 405	Dec 70	Active	Public Works Center San Diego, Calif.
CBU 406	Dec 70	Active	Naval Air Station Lemoore, Calif.
CBU 407	Oct 70	Active	Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, Tex.
CBU 408	Nov 70	Deactivated 31 Mar 74	Naval Station Newport, R. I.
CBU 409	Nov 70	Deactivated 30 Jun 74	Naval Air Station Alameda, Calif.
CBU 410	Jan 71	Active	Naval Air Station Jacksonville, Fla.
CBU 411	Jan 71	Active	Naval Station Norfolk, Va.
CBU 412	Jan 71	Active	Naval Station Charleston, S. C.
CBU 413	Dec 70	Active	Public Works Center Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
CBU 414	Jul 71	Active	Naval Submarine Base New London, Conn.
CBU 415	Aug 71	Active	Naval Air Station Oceana Virginia Beach, Va.
CBU 416	Jul 71	Active	Naval Air Station Alameda, Calif.
CBU 417	Aug 71	Active	Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.

SEABEE TEAMS DEPLOYED TO
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1963 - 1972

Team	Date Arrived in RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
0101	30 Jun 68	Chau Phu	Chau Doc	13 Feb 69
0102	30 Jun 68	Phu Vinh	Vinh Binh	13 Feb 69
0103	28 Jun 69	My Tho	Dinh Tuong	10 Mar 70
0104	28 Jun 69	Xuan Loc	Long Kanh	10 Mar 70
0105	31 Jul 70	Bac Lieu	Bac Lieu	13 Apr 71
0106	04 Sep 70	Ham Tan	Binh Tuy	14 May 71
0107	04 Sep 70	Tan An	Long An	14 May 71
0301	10 Jul 63	Bon Sar Pa	Quang Duc	
		Bu Prang	Quang Duc	Note 2
		Ban Don	Darlac	
		Ban Me Thuot	Darlac	18 Jan 64
0302	07 Jul 63	Tan Son Nhut	Gia Dinh	
		Plei Mrong	Pleiku	Note 3
		Polei Krong	Kontum	
		Plei Kly	Pleiku	Note 4
		Plei Me	Pleiku	
		Pleiku	Pleiku	
		Plei Ta Nangle	Binh Dinh	
		Pleiku	Pleiku	18 Jan 64
0307	02 Dec 67	Dran	Tuyen Duc	
		Tan Son Nhut	Gia Dinh	08 Jun 67
0308	12 Apr 67	Thu Duc	Gia Dinh	11 Oct 67
0309	29 May 67	Thoai Son	An Giang	
		Long Xuyen	An Giang	16 Dec 67
0310	07 Aug 68	Long Xuyen	An Giang	
		Bac Lieu	Bac Lieu	11 Apr 69

Team	Date Arrived in RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
0311	07 Aug 68	Can Tho	Phong Dinh	11 Apr 69
0312	10 Aug 69	Ben Tre	Kien Hoa	06 Apr 71
0313	30 Aug 69	Cao Lanh	Kien Phong	14 May 70
0318	13 Dec 70	Ben Tre	Kien Hoa	29 Aug 71
0319	04 Nov 70	Xuan Loc	Long Khanh	14 Jul 71
0321	05 Jan 72	Ham Tan	Binh Tuy	26 Apr 72
0406	05 Mar 67	Bao Trai	Hau Nghia	15 Sep 67
0407	29 May 67	Tan Son Nhut Can Tho	Gia Dinh Phong Dinh	16 Dec 67
0408	29 Mar 68	Go Dau Ha	Tay Ninh	12 Dec 68
0409	29 Mar 68	Vinh Long	Vinh Long	12 Dec 68
0410	05 May 69	Tan An	Long An	03 Jan 70
0414	05 May 70	Cao Lanh	Kien Phong	22 Jan 72
0417	25 Jun 71	Xuan Loc	Long Khanh	27 Jan 72
0501	25 Jan 63	Dam Pau Buom Me Ga	Tuyen Duc Darlac	17 Jul 63
0502	25 Jan 63	Tri Ton Dan Chau	Chau Doc Kien Phong	17 Jul 63
0503	07 Jan 64	Minh Thanh Moc Hoa Bu Gia Map	Binh Long Kien Tuong Phuoc Long	16 Aug 64
0504	06 Jan 64	Pleiku Kannack Dong Ba Thin Nha Trang	Pleiku Binh Dinh Khanh Hoa Khanh Hoa	Note 5 16 Aug 64
0505	30 Oct 64	Quang Tri Phar Rang	Quang Tri Ninh Thuan	06 May 65

Team	Date Arrived in RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
0506	30 Oct 64	Quang Ngai Danang	Quang Ngai	06 May 65
0507	28 Oct 65	Dran	Tuyen Duc	10 May 66
0509	30 Nov 66	Thoai Son	An Giang	14 Jun 67
0510	10 Jan 67	Tan An	Long An	12 Jul 67
0511	30 Aug 67	Bao Trai Go Dau Ha	Hau Nghia Tay Ninh	14 Apr 68
0513	03 Dec 68	Tan Son Nhut Ben Tre	Ga Dinh Kien Hoa	21 Aug 69
0514	31 Jan 69	Phu Vinh	Vinh Binh	25 Oct 69
0517	29 Mar 70	Ben Tre	Kien Hoa	20 Dec 70
0518	25 Feb 71	Soc Trang	Ba Xuyen	11 Oct 71
0601	28 Sep 67	Thu Duc	Gia Dinh	06 Jun 68
0602	11 Jan 68	Phuoc Le	Phuoc Tuy	06 Jun 68
0603	04 Oct 68	Phan Rang	Ninh Thuan	19 Jun 69
0604	04 Oct 68	Tan An	Long An	16 May 69
0605	30 Sep 69			
0701	29 Jun 67	Dien Khanh Phan Rang	Khanh Hoa Ninh Thuan	15 Feb 68
0702	29 Jun 1967	Tan An	Long An	15 Feb 68
0703	14 Aug 68	Soc Trang	Ba Xuyen	02 Apr 69
0704	14 Aug 68	Go Cong	Go Cong	02 Apr 69
0705	02 Sep 69	Thu Duc	Gia Dinh	06 May 70
0706	02 Sep 69	Lai Thieu	Binh Duong	06 May 70
0707	30 Sep 69	Rach Gia	Kien Giang	18 Jun 70

Team	Date Arrived in RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
0708	02 Nov 69	Soc Trang	Ba Xuyen	10 Jul 70
0805	25 Aug 66	Tay Ninh	Tay Ninh	
		Bao Trai	Hau Nghia	15 Mar 67
0807	10 Jan 67	Dien Khanh	Khanh Hoa	12 Jul 67
0809	08 Dec 67	Can Tho	Phong Dinh	14 Aug 68
0810	31 Mar 69	Can Tho	Phong Dinh	
		Rach Goi	Phong Dinh	13 Dec 69
0811	31 Mar 69	Bac Lieu	Bac Lieu	13 Dec 69
0903	10 Apr 64	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai	07 Nov 64
0904	10 Apr 64	Nam Dong	Thua Thien	Note 7
		Quang Tri	Quang Tri	07 Nov 64
0905	28 Apr 65	Danang		
		Dalat		
		Dran	Tuyen Duc	10 Nov 65
0906	28 Apr 65	Phan Rang	Ninh Thuan	10 Nov 65
0907	28 Oct 65	Phan Rang	Ninh Thuan	
		Thoai Son	An Giang	10 May 66
0908	30 Apr 66	Thoai Son	An Giang	12 Dec 66
0912	01 Apr 68	Xuan Loc	Long Khanh	10 Nov 68
0913	03 Dec 68	Go Dau Ha	Tay Ninh	29 Jun 69
0914	10 May 69	Cao Lanh	Kien Phong	13 Sep 69
1001	11 Oct 63	Quang Ngai	Quang Ngai	25 Apr 64
1002	11 Oct 63	Hue		Note 7
		Nam Dong	Thua Thien	16 Apr 64

Team	Date Arrived In RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
1003	10 Aug 64	Bu Gia Map	Phuoc Long	
		Binh Thanh Thon	Kien Tuong	08 Feb 65
1004	10 Aug 64	Dong Ba Thin	Khanh Hoa	
		A Ro	Quang Nam	Note 8
		Tay Ninh	Tay Ninh	Note 9
		Tan Son Nhut	Gia Dinh	08 Feb 65
1005	01 Feb 65	Binh Thanh Thon	Kien Tuong	
		Tuyen Nhon	Kien Tuong	
		Nha Trang	Khanh Hoa	11 Aug 65
1006	01 Aug 65	Nha Trang	Khanh Hoa	
		Dak To	Kontum	
		Tan Son Nhut	Gia Dinh	
		Tay Ninh	Tay Ninh	13 Mar 66
1007	01 Mar 66	Tay Ninh	Tay Ninh	04 Sep 66
1008	30 Apr 66	Dran	Tuyen Duc	12 Dec 66
1009	05 Mar 67	Vinh Long	Vinh Long	14 Apr 68
1011	30 Aug 67	Vinh Long	Vinh Long	14 Apr 68
1013	30 Oct 68	Xuan Loc	Long Khanh	13 Jul 69
1015	30 Dec 69	Tan An	Long An	15 Sep 70
1017	30 Nov 69	Bac Lieu	Bac Lieu	07 Aug 70
1018	30 Dec 69	Phuoc Le	Phuoc Tuy	
		Ham Tan	Binh Tuy	15 Sep 70
1019	16 Feb 71	Rach Gia	Kien Giang	
		My Tho	Dinh Tuong	25 Oct 71
1020	16 Feb 71	Phu Vinh	Vinh Binh	
		Go Cong	Go Cong	25 Oct 71
1104	01 Feb 65	Tan Son Nhut	Gia Dinh	
		Ben Soi	Tay Ninh	
		Dong Xoai	Phuoc Long	Note 10

Team	Date Arrived In RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
1105	01 Aug 65	Pleiku	Pleiku	
		Tan Son Nhut	Gia Dinh	
		Vinh Long	Vinh Long	12 Mar 66
1106	01 Mar 66	Vinh Long	Vinh Long	04 Sep 66
1107	25 Aug 66	Vinh Long	Vinh Long	15 Mar 67
1108	12 Apr 67	Lai Thieu	Binh Duong	11 Oct 67
1110	08 Dec 67	Long Xuyen	An Giang	14 Aug 68
4001	28 Sep 67	Lai Thieu	Binh Dong	06 Jun 68
4002	11 Feb 68	Go Cong	Go Cong	23 Aug 68
4004	01 Mar 70	Xuan Loc	Long Khanh	Note 11
4006	01 May 71	Tan An	Long An	12 Jan 72
5301	22 Mar 69	Soc Trang	Ba Xuyen	17 Nov 69
5801	11 Jan 68	Binh Thuy	Phong Dinh	Note 12
		Chau Phu	Chau Doc	10 Jul 68
5802	11 Feb 68	Tan Son Nhut	Gia Dinh	
		Soc Trang	Ba Xuyen	23 Aug 68
5803	02 Feb 69	Chau Phu	Chau Doc	08 Oct 69
5804	12 May 69	Rach Gia	Kien Giang	08 Oct 69
6201	27 Jan 68	Phan Rang	Ninh Thuan	10 Oct 68
6202	22 Mar 69	Go Cong	Go Cong	17 Nov 69
		Quang Xuyen	RSSZ	Note 13
6203	01 May 70	My Tho	Dinh Tuong	04 Nov 70
6204	24 Apr 70	Thu Duc	Gia Dinh	13 Dec 70
6205	24 Apr 70	Lai Thieu	Binh Duong	02 Dec 70

Team	Date Arrived In RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
6206	06 May 71	Ham Tan	Binh Tuy	12 Jan 72
7101	09 Mar 68	My Tho	Dinh Tuong	23 Nov 68
7102	02 Jun 69	Phuoc Le Quang Xuyen	Phuoc Tuy RSSZ	03 Jan 70 Note 14
7103	18 Oct 69	Phu Vinh	Vinh Binh	29 Jun 70
7104	01 Jul 70	Soc Trang	Ba Xuyen	14 Mar 71
7105	01 Jul 70	Go Cong	Go Cong	14 Mar 71
7107	15 Oct 71	My Tho	Dinh Tuong	16 Apr 72
7108	15 Oct 71	Go Cong	Go Cong	16 Apr 72
7401	31 May 68	Thu Duc	Gia Dinh	11 Jan 69
7402	31 May 68	Lai Thieu	Binh Duong	11 Jan 69
7403	30 Sep 69	Chau Phu	Chau Doc	18 Jun 70
7407	25 Oct 70	My Tho	Ding Tuong	22 Apr 71
7409	17 Jan 71	Cao Lanh Bac Lieu	Kien Phong Bac Lieu	13 Jun 71
7411	05 Jan 72	Tan An	Long An	25 Apr 72
12101	03 Nov 68	My Tho	Dinh Tuong	10 Jul 69
12102	03 Nov 68	Phuoc Le	Phuoc Tuy	10 Jun 69
12103	02 Nov 69	Go Cong	Go Cong	13 Jul 70
12104	08 Dec 69	Rach Goi	Phong Dinh	23 Jul 70
12801	29 Dec 68	Thu Duc	Gia Dinh	10 Sep 69
12802	29 Dec 68	Lai Thieu	Binh Duong	10 Sep 69
13301	27 Jan 68	Tan An	Long An	10 Oct 68
13302	31 May 68	Phuoc Le	Phuoc Tuy	23 Nov 68

Team	Date Arrived In RVN	Site	Province	Date Departed RVN (Note 1)
13305	31 May 70	Chau Phu Long Thanh	Chau Doc RSSZ	10 Feb 71
13306	30 May 70	Rach Gia	Kien Giang	23 Feb 71
13307	18 Jun 70	Phu Vinh	Vinh Binh	23 Feb 71
13308	14 Aug 71	Ben Tre	Kien Hoa	26 Jan 72

Note 1: In some instances, this is the date Team returned to parent battalion in-country for onward transportation to CONUS. Dates shown in italics are approximate.

Note 2: Team split with AOIC in charge of Bu Prang Detachment.

Note 3: Team split during turnover between Saigon and Plei Mrong.

Note 4: Team was located at the Phu Nhon District Headquarters.

Note 5: Team split with AOIC in charge of the Dong Ba Thin Detail for the period of 19 May 1964 to 25 Jun 1964.

Note 6: Team 0605 redesignated Team 0707 upon disestablishment of NMCB SIX. All information listed under Team 0707.

Note 7: Teams 0904 and 1002 were located principally at the Special Forces Camp, Nam Don, although a Team house and headquarters were retained in Hue from January to June 1964.

Note 8: Team split with AOIC in charge of Dong Ba Thin Detail during the period 1-30 Sep 1964.

Note 9: Team split with AOIC in charge of Don Ba Thin Detail during the period 16 Nov 1964 - 23 Dec 1964 and in charge of the Tan Son Nhut Detail during the period 23 Dec 1964 - 9 Jan 1965.

Note 10: Last four members, Team 1104, returned to NMCB ELEVEN on 26 Jun 1965.

Note 11: Returned to NMCB SIXTY-TWO in Danang RVN on 11 Nov 1970 for onward transportation.

Note 12: Team 5801 temporarily located at NSA Detachment during Tet Offensive awaiting tranportation and improved security.

Note 13: Five men Detail ZULU, Team 6202, under charge of AOIC.

Note 14: Five man Detail from Team 7102.

RESERVE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE

Reserve Naval Construction Brigades

First Reserve Naval Construction Brigade

Reserve Naval Construction Regiments (RNCR)

First Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Second Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Third Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Fourth Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Fifth Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Sixth Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Seventh Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Eighth Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Ninth Reserve Naval Construction Regiment

Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (RNMCB)

Unit	Location
RNMCB 2	12th Naval District
RNMCB 12	1st Naval District
RNMCB 13	3rd Naval District
RNMCB 14	6th Naval District

RNMCB 15	9th Naval District
RNMCB 16	11th Naval District
RNMCB 17	11th Naval District
RNMCB 18	13th Naval District
RNMCB 19 (disestablished 1974)	3rd Naval District
RNMCB 20	4th Naval District
RNMCB 21	4th Naval District
RNMCB 22	8th Naval District
RNMCB 23	5th Naval District
RNMCB 24	6th Naval District
RNMCB 25	9th Naval District
RNMCB 26	9th Naval District
RNMCB 27	1st Naval District
RNMCB 28	8th Naval District